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1Introduction
The core of economic models of human behavior are preferences and beliefs.
Preferences capture how a person values different outcomes and beliefs specify
what a person thinks about unobserved states of the world. Both are combined
in an optimization routine that leads to a choice. Standard economic theory
puts a parsimonious and tractable structure on the elements of this as if model
of behavior: people have egoistic and stable preferences, incorporate all avail-
able information into their beliefs according to a normative updating rule, and
are endowed with unconstrained cognitive resources to identify the optimal ac-
tion. While these assumptions produced a powerful framework that rationalizes
numerous phenomena, they also generated predictions that are systematically
at odds with reality. This has motivated the literature on behavioral economics
that equips the economic model with more realistic assumptions to explain what
seemed to be empirical puzzles. Much of this work focuses on enriching the
scope of preferences and on relaxing the notion of unconstrained optimization.
Instead, this thesis empirically investigates the systematic role of subjective
beliefs in economic behavior. How do people incorporate information into their
beliefs?What are the cognitivemechanisms underlying different updating rules?
To what extent is observed heterogeneity in beliefs and behavior predictable?
Are beliefs shaped by people’s individual experience? How do beliefs translate
into economic behavior?
The following four chapters revolve around these questions and explore
the hypothesis that a more nuanced account of the nature of subjective beliefs
improves the explanatory power of the economic model of human behavior. The
unifying approach of this work is cross-disciplinary and fundamentally relies
on incorporating ideas from other fields such as cognitive science, psychology,
sociology and anthropology.
2 | 1 Introduction
The empirical motivation for Chapter 2: “Inattentive Inference” is the per-
vasive miscalibration to information in practice: the dominant puzzle is overreac-
tion induced by excessive belief swings (Bondt and Thaler, 1985), whereas other
evidence documents belief inertia and information rigidities, leading to under-
reaction. There is a limited understanding, however, of the common processes
underlying belief formation that reconcile such divergent findings.
Chapter 2 addresses this issue, starting from the simple observation that
for most information structures in practice, learning in a normatively optimal
(Bayesian) way is practically impossible. The reason is that any piece of news
usually contains information about a multiplicity of variables. Correct inference
requires taking into account all underlying variables. However, the difficulty of
updating grows exponentially in the number of dimensions. At the same time,
mental computing is costly and the processing capacity of the human brain is
limited (Newell and Simon, 1972). To accommodate these constraints, we need
to reduce the complexity of real-world contexts to manageable levels. One way
of doing this is to selectively attend to the personally most relevant variables in
an information structure (signal), while ignoring other dimensions (noise).
Chapter 2 studies selective attention in belief formation. In simple choice ex-
periments, I investigated how people deal with noise in information structures.
I found that the vast majority of beliefs corresponded to exactly three updating
rules. The largest fraction exhibited noise neglect, which means a person treated
a piece of information as if it were specific to the variables he was most inter-
ested in, while ignoring other dependencies. This overattribution to a subset of
dimensions that guide subsequent actions generated overreaction. The second,
somewhat smaller share accorded to the normatively optimal Bayesian bench-
mark, as if taking into account all variables. The third and smallest fraction com-
mitted information neglect and displayed no updating at all in the face of new
information. This set of beliefs sticked to the prior and therefore underreacted.
A series of additional experiments provided three main insights. First, the
origin of different updating rules were the set of elements of an information
structure that a person attended to. Such selective processing of the context
induced a simplified subjective representation of the information environment.
This mental model determined how the person perceived a given situation, and
formed the basis for further mental computations that resulted in a posterior
belief. Second, the relative prevalence of the three updating modes emerged as
if resulting from trading off the expected benefits against the cognitive costs of
forming the corresponding beliefs. Third, the mental process by which people
adopted a representation occurred outside their awareness. That the underlying
psychological mechanisms were unconscious had far-reaching implications for,
e.g., the success of different debiasing strategies such as nudging and the
persistence of bias in the presence of feedback.
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Chapter 3: “Heterogeneity of Loss Aversion and Expectations-Based Ref-
erence Points” moves the focus to how people’s beliefs affect their decisions.
Specifically, this chapter considers the role of forward-looking beliefs, i.e., ex-
pectations. A seminal insight from psychology is that we tend to evaluate out-
comes relative to a reference point. In the canonical model of economic behavior,
however, utility is defined over final levels of consumption or wealth. In theories
of reference-dependent decision-making, by contrast, people code outcomes as
gains or losses relative to some reference point. Yet, the location of this reference
point is a critical degree of freedom. A recent theoretical advance characterizes
the reference point based on people’s expectations about their own future out-
comes (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). Imagine that an employee expects to be paid
five thousand euros more in the next year. At the end of this year, he learns
that his salary will only increase by one thousand euros. He will partly perceive
this pay raise as a loss, because he compares the outcome against his own ex-
pectations. In recent years, empirical tests of this model yielded mixed results
and there remains a lack of consensus on the location – and thus the empirical
relevance – of reference points.
Chapter 3 attempts to reconcile different approaches and findings. In this
study that is joint work with Lorenz Goette, Charles Sprenger and Alexan-
dre Kellogg, we developed a tightly controlled exchange experiment with
two main innovations: First, the design recognizes that testing the role of
expectations-based reference points requires experimental control of other
plausible avenues of reference dependence, such as the status quo or personal
experience. Second, it accommodates a critical confound related to the key
behavioral parameter, loss aversion. Loss aversion captures that people dislike
losses more than equal-sized gains. A growing body of evidence documents
substantial heterogeneity in measured levels of loss aversion, with a substantial
fraction of people being loss-neutral or even loss-loving. Different levels of
loss aversion, however, lead to different signs of comparative statics. In our
results, recognizing heterogeneity in loss aversion allowed us to reliably recover
the central prediction of expectations-based reference points. Moreover, our
manipulation of individual exchange experience identified a distinct effect
of exchange experience on behavior, which was driven by the subjective
perception of previous trading experience. In sum, this study sheds light on
the simultaneous forces of forward-looking and backward-looking sources
of reference-dependent behavior and stresses the importance of systematic
considerations of heterogeneity in empirical work.
The first two chapters assume an almost mechanical perspective on beliefs
by exploring information processing and the translation of beliefs into behavior.
In Chapter 4: “Breaking Trust: On the Persistent Effect of Economic Cri-
sis Experience”, I incorporate the specific content of beliefs and consider one
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particularly important belief: trust. Trust is the degree of belief in the benevo-
lent intentions of another person. It is considered a basic foundation for human
progress (Harari, 2015). In the realm of economic behavior, trust plays a central
role as a prerequisite for all forms of economic exchange: without a minimal
amount of trust in the counterpart, no person would be willing to sign a con-
tract. In fact, trust has been shown to affect economic outcomes at the individ-
ual, group and societal levels. However, much less is known about the origins of
trust. Recent evidence documents that levels of trust vary substantially across
locations and over time, but the determinants of this geographical and temporal
variation are not well understood.
In Chapter 4, which is joint work with Tom Zimmermann, we analyzed
the economic implications of a breach of trust argument, positing that trust is
not easily restored once it has been abused. Building on a nascent literature
on the economic implications of people’s experience, we hypothesized that
trust is partially determined by the experience of catastrophic macroeconomic
events. Using a variety of identification strategies in a large cross-country
sample, we estimated a persistent and robust negative long-term effect of
economic crisis experience on trust in other people. In line with the breach
of trust hypothesis, the effect was specific to living through crises in trust-
intensive domains, most of all banking crises. The effect was not driven by
distrust in financial institutions but was accommodated by a lack of confidence
in the political class, and operated via beliefs rather than changes in preferences.
Chapter 5: “Negative Long-run Effects of Prosocial Behavior on Happi-
ness” studies happiness, a topic that has played a secondary role in standard
economic analysis. Welfare theory as well as economic policy in practice have
focused on objective and quantifiable measures such as output and growth. How-
ever, the correlation between these measures and a population’s perceived well-
being is far from perfect. In recent times, measures of subjective well-being are
increasingly viewed as relevant indicators of a society’s welfare, and a rising
number of countries have incorporated national happiness levels as a policy ob-
jective (Layard, 2011). This has sparked scientific interest in the causes of happi-
ness. Perhaps most prominently, recent studies contribute to a debate spanning
more than two millennia on the hypothesis that prosocial behavior is a key to
happiness. The existing causal evidence indeed confirms a positive influence
of prosocial behavior on happiness, but are limited to short-term effects of an
enforced prosocial or selfish act (Dunn et al., 2008).
In Chapter 5, which is joint work with Armin Falk, we reconsider this hy-
pothesis in a behavioral experiment that extends the scope of previous studies
in various dimensions. In our Saving a Life paradigm, every participant either
saved one human life in expectation or received one hundred euros, respectively.
Using a choice between two binary lotteries with different chances of saving a
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life, we observed subjects’ intentions at the same time as creating random varia-
tion in prosocial outcomes. We repeatedly measured happiness at different time
horizons after the experiment. We confirmed the previous consensus finding of
a positive short-term effect, but this effect quickly faded. As time passed, the
sign of the effect even reversed, and we recorded significantly greater happiness
associated with the selfish outcome than with the prosocial outcome one month
later.
These findings hint at distinct sources of happiness. On the one hand,
physical consumption can generate happiness. On the other hand, people
derive happiness from their memories, thoughts and expectations, i.e., they
consume their beliefs (Ariely and Norton, 2009). Prosocial choices and outcomes
create the latter type of happiness, promoting feelings of warm glow or doing
the right thing. These feelings, however, plausibly occur in temporal proximity
to the time of choice and fade over time. Happiness derived from physical
consumption, by contrast, is linked to the time when actual consumption
occurs, which can be spread out over time. Chapter 5 provides an initial piece of
evidence that a comprehensive understanding of the effects of prosocial behav-
ior on happiness requires a more nuanced view that accounts for delayed effects.
A common thread of this thesis is the focus on the sources and implications
of heterogeneity in beliefs and economic behavior. First, average behavior often
masks a substantial amount of underlying structure, e.g., in how people process
information or react to trading experience. Second, much of this heterogeneity
is predictable. Beliefs systematically respond to contextual features and individ-
ual experience. Uncovering and organizing these influences is a promising path
towards a deeper understanding of the role of beliefs in economic behavior.
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2Inattentive Inference
2.1 Introduction
Updating beliefs in a normatively optimal way is cognitively demanding even
for simple information structures. The reason is that complexity grows expo-
nentially in the number of variables going into an information-generating struc-
ture.1 An investor assessing an analyst recommendation, a consumer reading a
customer review of a product or an economist interpreting macroeconomic indi-
cators in principle need to account for thousands of underlying variables when
making inference from these pieces of information. However, mental computing
is costly and the processing capacity of the human brain is limited. To accom-
modate these constraints, we can selectively attend to only some elements of
an information structure when forming a posterior. For example, the consumer
might only care about the functional quality of a product, even though he knows
that the product rating also reflects the reviewer’s assessment of its aesthetics.
To simplify an updating problem, we might then account for a selected few of
the variables included in an information structure, while ignoring others, or we
might not even incorporate a piece of information at all. This paper studies se-
lective attention in belief formation from noisy information.
The empirical analysis builds on a simple experimental design that tightly
controls the information environment. An updating problem consists of two real-
valued random variables, X and Y , that are drawn from known distributions.
Subjects get paid to guess the realization of X , but not of Y . Before stating a
guess, they receive a piece of information I that depends on both random vari-
ables, e.g., I = X + Y . From the perspective of a subject, this information struc-
ture is noisy: it has a signal part, X , which is the subject’s learning target, and a
1 Assume an information structure that depends on k binary variables. The number of possible
realizations of these k binary variables is O(2d). This rapid growth of complexity is a form of the
curse of dimensionality.
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noise part, Y .2 However, to learn from I about X , subjects need to account for the
variation coming from Y . Intuitively, extracting a signal from noisy information
requires accounting for the noise.
In a set of baseline experiments conducted in the laboratory and online, three
modes of updating captured the vast majority of observed beliefs. The largest
share of beliefs was formed as if ignoring Y , that means subjects interpreted the
information as if it did not depend on Y . They overattributed the information
to X and consequently overreacted in their guesses of X , relative to the rational
(Bayesian) adjustment. This mode of updating, called noise neglect henceforth,
was not an artifact of the complexity of the updating problem. In a control con-
dition, Broad, subjects were incentivized to predict both X and Y instead of only
X , so that Y was not noise. Both conditions featured exactly identical informa-
tion structures and subjects should rationally have formed the same belief.3 In
Broad, however, Y was not neglected and most beliefs were closely aligned with
the Bayesian posterior. The second, smaller share of beliefs accorded to Bayesian
updating. The resulting posteriors were well-calibrated to the informativeness of
the signal. The third and smallest systematic portion of stated posteriors sticked
to the prior, i.e., no updating occurred. I will refer to this mode as information ne-
glect, which caused underreaction relative to the Bayesian adjustment. Together,
beliefs exactly in line with these three modes made up between sixty and up to
more than ninety percent of beliefs in each task.
The central finding of a pronounced trimodality of posterior beliefs was ro-
bust to a battery of variations of the data and information structures and modifi-
cations of the experimental procedures. It provides the point of departure for a
comprehensive investigation of the heterogeneity, predictability and the underly-
ing cognitive mechanisms of updating patterns. To organize and guide through
the analyses I develop a simple conceptual framework in Section 2.2.
In this framework, belief formation proceeds in three steps. First, the agent
chooses which elements of an information environment (X ,Y, I) to attend to. At-
tention to each of the three elements is all-or-nothing, i.e., a dimension is either
fully processed or completely ignored. The attention vector induces a subjective
representation, or mental model of the information environment. Second, upon
observing information i, the agent forms a posterior belief given his represen-
2 Noise is generally defined as an unwanted source of stochastic variation that masks the signal
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949). Y is noise because given an action, i.e., a guess of X , the subject’s
utility does not depend on the realization of variable Y .
3 That the information structure was held fixed across conditions distinguishes this design
from previous studies (Caplin et al., 2011; Dean and Neligh, 2017; Enke, 2017; Enke and Zim-
mermann, 2017; Khaw et al., 2017). That means the data-generating process, the signal structure,
the induced prior, the Bayesian posterior and the stake size were kept exactly identical.
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tation of the situation. Third, he takes an action, which can be thought of as
predicting X . Utility directly depends on the realization of X , but not of Y .4
Different subjective representations lead to different posterior beliefs, but
they also come at different cognitive cost. This cognitive cost captures the com-
putational resources required to calculate a posterior given a representation. In
the model, the agent pays attention so as to adopt the representation that max-
imizes the expected utility benefit net of the cognitive cost, as if following from
a form of cost-benefit analysis. The key property of the cost function is that re-
quired mental resources are determined by the dimensionality of the updating
problem, reflecting that complexity is above all driven by the number of vari-
ables. The dimensionality-based form of the cost function is the reason people
will choose from a discrete set of updating modes and not choose mixtures. In
Section 2.2.2, I argue that the framework is conceptually distinct from rational
inattention theory (Caplin and Dean, 2015; Sims, 2003).5 Importantly, inatten-
tive inference features a mechanic link between belief formation and actions:
because we tailor an action to (our beliefs about) certain variables, we attend to
these – but not other – variables by default, even in the absence of new informa-
tion. In the model, the agent always attends to X , irrespective of an additional
updating problem.
The framework generates the three cases observed empirically based on sub-
jective representations that follow from different attention strategies. Bayesian
updating results from a complete representation of the environment. Informa-
tion neglect means that an agent does not represent the information I . Noise ne-
glect, in turn, corresponds to a representation in which the agent processes the
information I , but removes Y from the information structure. This framework
provides a structured way to study inference from noisy information, using a
cognitive foundation geared to the empirical findings. The primitive of different
updating rules is the set of elements of a situation that an agent attends to. This
representation serves as the basis for other mental operations, e.g., computa-
tions, that result in a posterior.6
Motivated by the conceptual framework, the paper proceeds in two steps.
First, in Section 2.4, I investigate whether inattentive inference is driven by a
4 More generally, X and Y can have arbitrary dimensions. Treatment Broad is nested as a case
where X has two elements and the dimensionality of Y is zero.
5 Inattentive inference is concernedwith processing exogenously given information, rather than
the acquisition and choice of an information structure. It also suggests a different object of atten-
tion, i.e., elements of an information structure. Moreover, it establishes a direct link between
attention and actions.
6 This distinction between representation and subsequent computations squares with the com-
putational theory of mind in psychology (Horst, 2011) that has been invoked by other recent
work on belief formation (Enke, 2017).
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form of cost-benefit analysis. Second, I shed light on the underlying cognitive
mechanisms in Section 2.5.
If inattentive inference is the product of a consideration of the benefits and
costs of different updating modes, it should systematically respond to variations
in those. The benefits depend on features of the information environment. In
additional experiments I tested the effects of bias and variance introduced by
noise. Treatment Signal-to-Noise Ratio varied the ratio between the variance of
X , σ2X , and the variance of Y , σ
2
Y . The utility loss associated with noise neglect
relative to Bayesian updating rises as the variation of Y increases, while that of
information neglect decreases. Intuitively, if an ever greater part of the informa-
tion structure is noise, it gets more harmful to treat the information as if it were
precise, and less harmful to ignore the information altogether. These predic-
tions were borne out in the data. With higher signal-to-noise ratio, noise neglect
increased at the expense of information neglect. Notably, the overall share of
beliefs in line with the three updating modes remained approximately constant.
The second treatment, Directional Bias, analyzed the effect of directional bias in
information while fixing the signal-to-noise ratio. Under noise neglect, beliefs
are more biased the larger the deviation between the mean information value
and the mean of X . As this difference increased across tasks, people indeed be-
came less likely to neglect the noise. These two treatments demonstrated that
the relative prevalence of different updating modes varied in line with their ex-
pected utilities.
To shed light on whether inattentive inference was also shaped by cognitive
costs, I analyzed the effect of between-subject differences in cognitive skills as
a proxy of this cost. An incentivized measure of cognitive skill significantly pre-
dicted the propensity to form Bayesian beliefs, albeit with a moderate effect size.
Moreover, there was substantial within-subject consistency in updating modes,
indicating the existence of individual-specific inference styles. At the same time,
a significant fraction of subjects in all experiments used at least two different
updating modes. The combined findings highlight that most people were able
to produce Bayesian beliefs, but did not always do so.
The evidence on the plausibility of a cost-benefit type reasoning does not
sufficiently characterize the underlying processes. Building on the distinction
between mental representations and subsequent computations on those repre-
sentations, Section 2.5 examines the mechanisms through which the initial rep-
resentation is formed. The concept of a cost-benefit analysis seemingly implies
a conscious, willed activity. Yet, the process of adopting a representation need
not be deliberate but could occur automatically. In consequence, the resulting
neglect itself might not be perceptible to the agent’s conscious mind. This idea
leverages research from neuroscience and psychology showing that even com-
plex mental operations are routinely executed outside of a person’s awareness
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(Dijksterhuis and Aarts, 2010). Viewing subjective representations as the result
of an unconscious optimization routine has several implications.
First, the effect of interventions and nudges in the inference process should
depend on whether they affect the mental representation formed by a person, or
only the downstream computations while leaving the representation unaltered.
In a bonus task, a tenfold increase in stake size caused subjects to try harder
and spend more time on the problem, but this consciously exerted effort left
performance unaffected. It apparently did not help noticing the initial neglect.
This shows that inattentive inference systematically occurred under effortful so-
lution strategies.7 On the other hand, the conceptual framework naturally gives
rise to the possibility of “lightbulb moments” that make people “wake up” after
receiving hints that alter the mental representation directly. In treatment Hint,
a simple reminder to “also think about the role of Y ” nearly eliminated noise
neglect. In fact, once nudged to attend to Y , subjects were able and willing to
compute Bayesian beliefs.
Second, people should generally be confident in their deficient beliefs if they
are unaware of the underlying neglect. In condition Confidence, I elicited sub-
jects’ minimum valuations for their stated beliefs.8 Strikingly, reservation prices
were unrelated to inattentiveness in beliefs, implying that subjects who com-
mitted noise neglect were nevertheless fully confident in their beliefs. This and
further experimental variations consistently suggested that subjects lacked any
metacognitive experience of their neglect, i.e., they were unaware of both the
processes responsible for inattentive inference and the resulting discrepancy be-
tween their mental model and the external environment. They confidently com-
puted a posterior, but employed a faulty solution strategy, i.e., representation of
the problem.
A third implication of unawareness is that inattentive inference can be per-
sistent, even in the presence of feedback. Learning that a belief was flawed
should not necessarily lead to improvement if people were fundamentally un-
aware about the unconscious processes at the root of their mistakes. Reflecting
on the source of error would instead lead people to first “blame” those steps of
their solution strategies that they are consciously aware of. I developed three
treatments to causally test the hypothesis that learning from feedback is less
likely the more consciously executed steps are associated with the inference pro-
cess, holding fixed the complexity of the problem. The results suggest that a critical
reason for the persistence of biases is that subjects are unaware of why errors oc-
7 This is one reason why inattentive inference is not easily reconciled with dual process mod-
els, in which a primary characterization of Type 1 reasoning is as providing effortless responses
(Kahneman, 2003).
8 I elicited the minimal certain amount subjects prefer over being paid out for their stated
guesses using an incentive-compatible price-list method.
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cur, which compromises targeting them adequately in the presence of surprising
feedback.
Section 2.2 introduces the motivating conceptual framework. Section 2.3
discusses the baseline design and results. Section 2.4 analyzes predictability and
heterogeneity of updating patterns and Section 2.5 investigates mechanisms.
Section 2.6 discusses the related literature and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
2.2.1 Baseline Model
This section introduces a simple framework that organizes the empirical find-
ings. An agent observes a signal i. The state of the world is fully characterized
by two real-valued stochastic variables, X and Y , with known distributions de-
scribed by joint density function h. An observed piece of information i is gener-
ated by a known information structure g, I = g(X ,Y ). The entire information
environment is described by R= (X ,Y, I).
I assume the agent proceeds in three steps. First, he chooses which el-
ements of the information environment R to attend to. An attention vector
a = (aX , aY , aI) induces a subjective representation R˜(a) of the environment. For
reasons described later I will focus on attention that is all-or-nothing in each di-
mension. A feature of the environment is either fully attended to, or not at all,
ai ∈ {0,1}. E.g., attention vector a = (1,0,1) corresponds to a subjective repre-
sentation R˜= (X ,S). Second, upon observing information i, the agent forms a
subjective posterior belief described by joint density h˜(R˜, i) given his represen-
tation of the situation. I will discuss below how h˜ is connected to each possible
subjective representation. Third, he takes an action m(h˜) based on his belief.
This is the basic three-step structure of the framework. Utility v(R˜) :=
u(m(h˜), x) depends on the realization of X , but not of Y . Accordingly, the op-
timal action depends only on the posterior belief about X .9 Dimension Y will
sometimes be called noise. To fix ideas, an action can be thought of as guessing
the realization of variable X using information that is also affected by Y , and
utility is determined by some incentive structure that rewards the accuracy of
the guess given the true realization of X . Note that the agent always attends to X ,
which is imperative to take an action. That means belief formation is shaped by
a mechanical relationship between action and attention: when updating beliefs,
the agent by default already pays attention to those variables that he tailors his
9 Put differently, conditional on an action, utility is independent of the realization of variable Y .
In Appendix 2.B.1 I refine and endogenize the classification of variables as X or Y . This extension
provides a foundation of this distinction based on which variables an agent optimally tailors his
action to. This in particular pertains to cases where X and Y have many dimensions.
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actions to. To simplify notation, I sometimes omit dimension X in the attention
vector, a = (aX = 1, aY , aI) = (aY , aI).
Different subjective representations R˜ lead to different posterior beliefs, but
they also come at different cognitive cost C(R˜). This cognitive cost captures on
the computational resources required to calculate a posterior given a represen-
tation. I assume that the agent pays attention to select the representation R˜ that
maximizes the expected utility benefit minus the cognitive cost:





 − C(R˜(a)) (2.1)
This formulation purports that people engage in a form of cost-benefit anal-
ysis that systematically responds to two elements. On the hand, features of





. On the other hand, behavior depends on the cost structure of dif-
ferent updating modes, C(R˜(a)). The key property of the cost function is that
required mental resources are determined by the dimensionality of the updat-
ing problem, which reflects the curse of dimensionality: complexity as mea-
sured by the joint sample space grows exponentially in the number of variables,
a phenomenon called combinatorial explosion. For a given environment R, the
agent’s perception R˜ determines which features the agents cognitively repre-
sents. Specifically, I assume that accounting for a continuous variable or a signal
recruits fixed amounts of mental resources:
C(R˜(a)) = q · (aY + l · aS) (2.2)
Since X is always attend to, I normalized its cost to 0. The fixed cognitive cost of
computation associated with an additional dimension in the updating problem
is q ≥ 0, which in practice varies between individuals. The cost of accounting
for the piece of information – rather than ignoring it – is q · l, with l ≥ 0.
The cost function is a fundamental unknown in models of attention and pro-
vides a critical degree of flexibility (Caplin and Dean, 2015). The motivation of
the present cost function is that the cost of information processing does not pri-
marily depend on the expected informativeness of a signal, but on the richness of
the information environment. The assumed step cost structure associated with
the dimensionality of a problem reflects the realistic feature that each additional
dimension renders the cognitive process discretely more difficult, and leads to
the dimension-wise all-or-nothing attention strategy from above.
There are three possible attention strategies a = (aY , aI). a = (1,1) is the
full-attention benchmark where are all dimensions of the environment are fully
represented. a = (0,1)means he attends to the information but not to the noise
Y , a case labeled noise neglect. a = (0,0) specifies the case in which the agent
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does not attend to the information, which further obviates the need to attend
to the noise Y . I call this case information neglect.10 Moving from info neglect
over noise neglect to full attention, the process of updating beliefs on the corre-
sponding representations is accompanied by increasing cognitive costs.
How are posterior beliefs formed on a given subjective representation? The




x |i; R˜B = h(x) · h(i|x)
h(i)
(2.3)
An agent who commits information neglect, R˜IN = R˜((0,0)) = (X ) builds a
posterior that is equal to the prior:
h˜
 
x |i; R˜IN = h(x) (2.4)
Themost interesting case is noise neglect, R˜NN = R˜((0,1)) = (X , I), which re-
quires specifying how an agent interprets information that is perceived as being
generated by X alone. While the empirical findings indicate a somewhat more
intricate general rule, let us assume for now that the agent picks the element in
the support of X that is closest to the signal realization, which reasonably fits
the evidence in most algebraic signal structures studied in this paper:
h˜
 




I will call belief formation that is in line with this framework inattentive
inference because deviations from Bayesian updating are driven by inattention
to specific dimensions of the information environment.
The above framework has three key features. First, it views mental represen-
tations as the primitives of belief formation. Second, cognitive cost are primarily
determined by the dimensionality of an updating problem, which is motivated
by the curse of dimensionality that occurs when trying to interpret a piece of in-
formation as the result of the joint realizations of many variables. This character-
ization of cognitive costs is why people stick to a discrete set of representations
and the ensuing updating rules. They adopt representations as if based on a cost-
benefit analysis. Third and perhaps most importantly, attention in belief forma-
tion is fundamentally determined by the nature of the action an agent takes. The
framework relies on a classification of variables as being signal (X ) or noise (Y )
to an agent. This is the cornerstone of the belief formation framework. The rel-
evance of Y for the agent is limited to the belief formation process. That means
10 Note that attention a = (1,0) would lead to the same action as information neglect, but at a
higher cost due to the unnecessary attention paid to Y . I will not discuss this case any further.
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Y is relevant to the extent that it can help form a more accurate belief about X ,
but Y has no effect on utility given a belief about X. The framework as outlined
above relies on a crude distinction into X and Y variables based on whether the
realization of a variable affects utility given an action, or not. Appendix 2.B.1
develops a more realistic version of this distinction, in which an agent optimally
chooses which variables he wants to tailor his action to. He will ignore variables
that only affect the action (and thereby his expected utility) by a sufficiently
small amount. This extension results again in a binary characterization of vari-
ables as being signal (X ) or noise (Y ). However, it provides a clearer intuition
for the sources of noise neglect. If an agent takes an action based on what he
thinks about X , he will consider X even in the absence of any new information.
When new information arrives, he thinks about X already, though not about Y .
In a sense, the agent can leverage the cognitive cost (incurred for acting on X ) in
the belief formation process. If the agent could only decide between bearing the
combined cost of attending to all dimensions (X ,Y and I) and ignoring the in-
formation altogether, he might frequently neglect information in order to avoid
the large cognitive cost. However, since he pays the cognitive cost of attending
to X in any case, both information neglect and Bayesian updating (based on a
complete representation) might be dominated by noise neglect, which exploits
the fact that he already attends to X but avoids the cost of accommodating Y .
2.2.2 Relationship to Rational Inattention Theory
The framework shares a common ground with a vibrant line of research that is
associated with the term rational inattention. All of this literature shares the no-
tion that information is costly, and people (rationally) trade of that cost against
the utility of improved decision quality. There are three key differences between
inattentive inference and this line of work.
First, rational inattention is concerned with the acquisition of information.
People are assumed to choose (some elements of) the structure of their informa-
tion. In the most prominent type of model pioneered by Sims (2003), subjects
have unrestricted power over the structure of their information, in Verrecchia
(1982) people choose the variance of a piece of information, and in Reis (2006)
they decide whether to receive a fully informative signal or no information. In
inattentive inference, by contrast, information structures are exogenous and peo-
ple cannot change them. The focus is instead on processing available informa-
tion.
The second distinction from rational inattention concerns the primitive of
attention and the nature of cognitive costs. In rational inattention theory, the
object of attention are pieces of information, while inattentive inference con-
siders attention to elements of a given information structure. The observed in-
formation is only one element of the information structure. There is no room
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in rational inattention models to not attend to individual variables included in
an information structure: If people acquire a piece of noisy information, they
update in a multidimensional way that recognizes all underlying variables. In
particular, models of rational inattention cannot generate noise neglect. This
difference in the object of attention is reflected in the specification of cogni-
tive costs. The most widespread approach in rational inattention theory is to
model agents as finite-capacity channels, where costs are based on the Shannon
mutual information between prior and posterior beliefs (Sims, 2003). In many
situations this can be thought of as putting a limit on the variance reduction
from prior to posterior. Inattentive inference, by contrast, suggests that the cost
of processing is not primarily driven by, e.g., the expected informativeness of an
information structure, but by the dimensionality of an updating problem. Fixing
the overall amount of uncertainty reduction that could be achieved by updating
in a Bayesian way, inattentive inference builds on the idea that costs increase in
the number of variables included in the information structure.
Third, inattentive inference is fundamentally motivated by a mechanical link
between belief formation and the action an agent takes. The way we tailor our
actions to certain unobserved states of the world leads us attend to some vari-
ables by default, even in the absence of newly arriving information. This pre-
determined attention plausibly affects how we choose to allocate additional at-
tention in the face of new information. This idea cannot be modeled with the
tools of rational inattention. Assume, for example, the case of being paid to guess
only X versus being paid to guess both X and Y , fixing the absolute stake size
between conditions. A compound piece of information I on X and Y provides an
identical updating problem in both conditions from the perspective of rational
inattention. It does not in inattentive inference.
I will next outline the empirical setting and return to specific predictions of
the framework at various stages of the empirical analysis.
2.3 Evidence for Inattentive Inference
I analyze two empirical settings in this paper. The laboratory provides maximum
control and thus serves two purposes. First, it provides specific evidence on the
existence of noise neglect. Second, I analyze the psychological mechanisms that
drive observed behavior using tightly controlled settings.
Online experiments provide access to a different, more diverse sample ob-
served under less controlled choice conditions. I complement the baseline and
mechanism evidence about noise neglect with online experiments for two rea-
sons. First, the online study uses a simpler but more general design variation to
study updating from noisy information. It is less centered on the identification
of noise neglect. It serves to test the robustness and generality of the labora-
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tory results and allows precise and inexpensive replication by other researchers.
Second, I study the nature of updating rules in a large variety of information
structures and explore predictors of heterogeneity in belief formation. The on-
line experiments allow to run multiple treatment variations with a large number
of participants, which would be infeasible in the laboratory.
2.3.1 Baseline Study on Noise Neglect: Laboratory Evidence
2.3.1.1 Design
Causally identifying noise neglect in belief formation requires (i) a fully con-
trolled and transparent data-generating process and information structure that
is known to subjects, (ii) an experimental manipulation of the presence of noise,
(iii) limited complexity to minimize confusion, (iv) a clear prediction for the
posterior under neglect of noise, and (v) an incentive-compatible procedure to
extract beliefs. In the following I present a tightly controlled laboratory experi-
ment that meets all of these criteria.
The crux of the design is to create an environment that allows to vary the
presence of noise without changing the information structure or data-generating
process. The simplest such setting features only two unknown states of the world,
i.e., two unobserved random numbers X and Y , generated by stochastic pro-
cesses known to subjects. The numbers are independently drawn from two dis-
crete uniform distributions, each with a size of the sample space below ten. Sub-
jects receive an easily understandable signal I on the two unknown draws, such
as the sum of the two numbers, I = X + Y . That virtually all subjects are, in
principle, capable of forming normatively optimal beliefs in this simplistic setup
is confirmed in the data. I define noise as a source of variation that constitutes
an unwanted modification to a signal (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). This defini-
tion directly lends itself to an interpretation in terms of incentives as discussed
in Section 2.2: noise is a stochastic component in the information structure, but
its realization does not directly affect the agent’s utility given an action. If sub-
jects are paid for their accuracy of guessing X , but have no monetary prediction
incentives for Y , then I consider Y to be noise within the information structure.
However, Y is not characterized as noise as soon as it is explicitly incentivized.
Accordingly, there are two experimental conditions in the baseline design: In
Narrow, subjects are paid to guess only X , while in Broad, subjects are paid to
guess both X and Y . This implementation of noise highlights its inherenlty sub-
jective nature. Given an informational structure, what is noise to one person
might be the signal for another person. Note that the induced prior, the signal
structure, and the Bayesian posterior are identical in Narrow and Broad. More-
over, by randomly paying for only one of the guesses in Broad (about X or Y ),
the incentive size is kept constant.
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Table 2.1. Overview of baseline tasks
Sample space X Sample space Y Info structure Info value
30, 40, 50, 60, 70 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 (X + Y )÷ 2 60
180, 190, 200, 210, 220 180, 190, 200, 210, 220 (X + Y )÷ 2 200
130, 140, 150, 160, 170 -25, -15,-5, 0, 5, 15, 25 X + Y 165
80, 90, 100, 110, 120 -30, -20, -10, 0, 10, 20, 30 X + Y 80
230, 240, 250, 260, 270 210, 220, 230, 240, 250, 260, 270, 280, 290 (X + Y )÷ 2 230
Notes: This table provides an overview of the ve baseline belief tasks in the laboratory study. The
distributions of X and Y as well as the signal structure are identical in both treatment conditions.
X and Y were independently drawn from two discrete uniform distribution, i.e., every indicated
outcome was equally likely.
Subjects play the five updating problems of Table 2.1 in random order with-
out receiving feedback in between. For example, in the first task of of Table 2.1,
X is one of five numbers, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70 with equal probability, while Y
is independently drawn as a multiple of 10 between 10 and 90. Subjects learn
that the average of X and Y is 60 and then state their belief. To solve the prob-
lem, a subjects needs to identify all (X , Y ) combinations with an average of
60, that is (30, 90), (40, 80), (50, 70), (60, 60), (70, 50). Both numbers being
drawn uniformly and independently, it is intuitive that each of these outcomes
is equally probable. The elicitation procedure extracts the maximum amount of
information about subjective beliefs by having subjects indicate the full posterior
distribution instead of point predictions. At the end, one of the tasks is randomly
selected to be paid out based on the Binarized Scoring Rule with a prize of 10 eu-
ros (Hossain and Okui, 2013).11 Subjects receive extensive instructions and had
to complete eight control questions that test their understanding of the instruc-
tions, the data-generating process and signal structure, as well as the elicitation
protocol. In two unpaid practice tasks subjects learned how to indicate a given
belief in a way that maximizes their payoff. This training stage was identical in
both treatments.
A notable feature of this design is that unlike previous belief formation stud-
ies, the present experiment does not alter the updating task between condi-
tions, significantly reducing concerns about differential complexity (Caplin et
al., 2011; Dean and Neligh, 2017; Enke, 2017; Enke and Zimmermann, 2017;
Khaw et al., 2017).
Beyond the tasks in Table 2.1, a number of different task specifications and
additional treatment variations address robustness of the baseline results and
examine the nature of updating rules (see Sections 2.3.1.6 and 2.3.1.7).
11 The scoring rule proposed by Hossain and Okui (2013) elicits truthful beliefs even if subjects
are risk averse or do not follow the expected utility hypothesis.
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2.3.1.2 Baseline Hypothesis: Existence of Noise Neglect
I adapt the framework presented in Section 2.2 to the experimental setting with
discrete data. The Bayesian posterior belief about X given the signal is charac-
terized by a discrete probability distribution P(X |I) = P(I |X )·P(X )P(I) . This normative
benchmark (i) applies independent of the decision maker’s incentives and (ii)
depends on Y through I . Accordingly, the treatment manipulation is inconse-
quential under Bayesian updating.
Consider a person who selectively attends to the dimensions he perceives
as being most important while taking into account cognitive costs. In condition
Broad, X are Y are equally important for the decision maker’s payoff. In condi-
tion Narrow, however, the realization of Y neither changes the decision maker’s
optimal action, i.e., her optimal prediction about X , nor does it affect her payoff
given an action. She might be (partially) inattentive to Y , which is noise to her.
Note that if inattention leads to a neglect of Y , it is a priori unclear which
form this neglect takes. For example, the decision maker might underestimate
the variance of Y , replace Y with a default value, be somehow unaware of its
existence, or apply a specific rule in the belief formation process. Different hy-
potheses about the structure of inattentive inference require different auxiliary
assumptions, such as about the default value. The baseline design is agnostic
about the functional form of noise neglect – if there is any – and seeks to impose
minimal assumptions on its parametric structure.12 In all baseline tasks of Table
2.1, the information structure is an unbiased estimator of the mean of X . Either
subjects receive the average of the drawn numbers and the prior distributions of
X and Y have an identical mean, or they see the sum of the drawn numbers and
Y has a mean of zero. This provides a natural way of how Y can be neglected,
namely by interpreting the information as an unmodified signal about X .13 The
inattentive posterior distribution with full noise neglect in the baseline design
can be specified in accordance with Equation 2.5 as P˜NN (X |I) = 1{X=x∗} where
x∗ = argmin
x ∈ supp(X )
x − i.
Hypothesis 1. Beliefs formed in Narrow and Broad significantly differ. Subjects in
condition Narrow display noise neglect.
12 I investigate the precise patterns in additional experimental variations, see Section 2.3.1.7.
13 Noise neglect in condition Narrow is observationally equivalent to taking the observed infor-
mation at face value for the unobserved X . I demonstrate that belief formation here is not driven
by anchoring on the signal value. First, anchoring cannot explain a treatment effect because the
signal is identical across treatments. Anchoring should similarly affect beliefs in condition Broad.
Second, the additional treatment variation Computation explicitly rules out anchoring effects, see
Section 2.3.1.6.
20 | 2 Inattentive Inference
2.3.1.3 Procedural Details
Subjects in condition Broad guess the joint distribution of X and Y and are ran-
domly paid for their accuracy in guessing either of these. The decision screen is
displayed in Appendix Figure 2.G.24. Subjects in condition Narrow only guess
the marginal distribution of X (Appendix Figure 2.G.21).14 To reduce potential
experimenter demand, the design unobtrusively obfuscates the experimental
objective. Subjects received their signal in encrypted form and had to decipher
it using a simple two-step decoding protocol.15 No subject had trouble imple-
menting the protocol. Each belief elicitation (excluding the deciphering stage)
was subject to a time limit of five minutes. The findings are robust to removing
both the deciphering and the time limits (see Section 2.3.1.6). The belief up-
dating problems were followed by a questionnaire. To shed light on correlates
of subject-level heterogeneity in belief formation, I measured performance on a
incentivized test of cognitive ability (10 Raven matrices, 0.2 euros per correct
answer) and elicited a measure of risk preferences (Falk et al., 2016) as well
as two personality questionnaires, the Big 5 inventory (Rammstedt and John,
2005) and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Paulus, 2009).
144 student subjects (72 in condition Narrow, 72 in condition Broad) partic-
ipated in six sessions of the baseline experiment run at the University of Bonn’s
BonnEconLab in July 2017. Treatment status was randomized within-session. I
invited subjects using hroot (Bock et al., 2014) and implemented the study in
oTree (Chen et al., 2016). Mean earnings amounted to 11.40 euros – including
5 euros show-up fee – for an average session duration of 57 minutes.
2.3.1.4 Baseline Results: Laboratory
Result 1. Beliefs in Narrow significantly differ from Broad in line with noise
neglect in condition Narrow.
Figure 2.1 shows the raw beliefs in all five baseline tasks. It displays the sam-
ple distribution of subjective belief distributions for each condition, as well as
the Bayesian benchmark and the value of the observed information. The aver-
age subject in Broad forms belief that are closely aligned with the sophisticated
14 While this is the natural and preferred design to test for noise neglect, note that there is
treatment difference in what is elicited, namely X and Y versus only X . Additional treatment
variations harmonize the elicitation protocol, i.e., subjects with Narrow incentives predict both X
and Y , and subjects with Broad incentives predict first the marginal of X , and then the marginal
of Y on a separate subsequent page. All main findings persist. See Section 2.3.1.6.
15 Concretely, subjects saw a sequence of letters. First, each letter had to be translated into a
digit based on a displayed table. Then the number 20 had to be added to the result. Subjects
were familiarized with the deciphering process in the practice stage. See also the instructions
reproduced in Appendix 2.G.
2.3 Evidence for Inattentive Inference | 21
Bayesian posterior. In Narrow, by contrast, subjects on average assign too much
probability mass to outcomes close to the signal value, as implied by inattention
to Y .
Three key implications are that (i) there is no systematic misunderstanding
of the experimental setup, since subjects in Broad successfully form Bayesian
beliefs, (ii) in Narrow, beliefs overshoot in the direction of the information value
and (iii) are overprecise relative to Bayesian and Broad beliefs. Task (3) in Figure
2.1 exemplifies the role of overprecision. Since the signal realization coincides
with the mean of the Bayesian posterior distribution, subjects in Narrow form be-
liefs featuring the correct expected value of X . They are, however, far too faithful
that this expected value of X was actually drawn. This would be unobservable
if I only elicited point predictions about the mean of X .
Table 2.2 provides an overview of summary statistics and non-parametric
tests by task. Median beliefs in Narrow (column 3) and Broad (column 4) closely
correspond to the observed information (column 1) and Bayesian benchmark
(column 2), respectively. Column 7 shows that belief distribution means and
belief distribution variances are significantly different between treatments at
the 0.1% level (M-W U tests).16

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
distribution mean
(distribution variance)
median of distribution means
(median of distribution variances)
p-value: distribution of means
(p-value: distribution of variances)
60 50 60 50 < 0.001 0.664 < 0.001
(200) (0) (200) (< 0.001) (0.011) (< 0.001)
230 237.6 230 240 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
(71.7) (0) (67) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
200 200 200 200 1.000 0.012 0.024
(200) (0) (200) (< 0.001) (0.004) (< 0.001)
80 95 80 95 < 0.001 0.508 < 0.001
(125) (0) (125) (< 0.001) (0.180) (< 0.001)
165 155 165 155 < 0.001 1.000 < 0.001
(125) (25) (125) (< 0.001) (0.180) (< 0.001)
Notes: This table displays beliefs in Narrow and Broad for each one of the ve baseline tasks. An elicited belief corre-
sponds to a full distribution, which is described here by itsmean and variance. I showmedians of subjective distribution
means and variances in each condition and compare these to the mean and variance of the Bayesian posterior distri-
bution. Column (7) shows treatment comparisons for the distributions of distribution means and variances. The task
order was randomized.
16 This holds for all tasks except the distribution means in task (3), in which the observed



























































































































Condition Narrow Condition Broad Bayesian posterior
Figure 2.1. Distribution of elicited belief distributions about X in each one of ve baseline tasks. N=72 for each condition
in each task. The horizontal axis shows possible outcomes of X . The Bayesian posterior belief is provided for reference.
The observed signal is indicated by the vertical dashed line. In all ve tasks, X and Y follow independent discrete uniform
distributions that were shown to subjects. Task order was randomized. In task (1), Y ∼U{10,20, . . . , 80,90}, in task (2),
Y ∼U{−30,−20, . . . , 20,30}, in task (3), Y ∼U{180,190,220,210,220}, in task (4), Y ∼U{−30,−20, . . . , 20,30} and in
task (5), Y ∼U{−25,−15,−5,0,5,15,25}. Subjects observed the mean of the drawn numbers in tasks (1), (2) and (3), and
they saw the sum in (4) and (5).
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Noise neglect comes at a sizeable cost for the decision maker. The average
expected payoff for the beliefs stated in the baseline tasks was 53% higher in
Broad than in Narrow (5.86 versus 3.82 euros, p < 0.0001, M-W U test).17
2.3.1.5 Typical Beliefs and Updating Rules
The measures of central tendency analyzed above obfuscate the presence of spe-
cific updating rules. Next I analyze what are typical beliefs in each condition.
To this end I characterize each stated belief in terms of how close it is to the
Bayesian posterior relative to noise neglect, recognizing that each observation
corresponds to a full distribution rather than a single value. To obtain a single
measure of distance between distributions, I first calculate the Hellinger dis-













Given an analogous distance to the inattentive posterior distribution, HNN ,19 I
define a score of inattention to noise, θ , that captures the distance of the sub-
jective belief distribution to the Bayesian distribution, relative to the sum of the






A Bayesian belief corresponds to θ = 0 and noise neglect to θ = 1. The param-
eter θ can be backed out for every stated belief, independent of the specific
updating task, so I proceed with a joint analysis of the data pooled together
from all tasks. Figure 2.2 is a histogram of empirical inattention parameters,
split by treatment condition. More than 70% of beliefs are roughly Bayesian in
17 Actual earnings for the baseline tasks also significantly differed across groups (means of
4.56 in Narrow and 2.22 euros in Broad, p = 0.005, M-W U test), but these further depended on
randomness induced by the binarized scoring rule as well as an additional choice by subjects that
affected their payoff (see Section 2.5.2).
18 The Hellinger distance is a bounded metric frequently used to characterize the similarity
between two probability distributions (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2016). It is suited to the present
purpose as it is a proper metric, unlike, e.g., the Kullback-Leibler divergence.







P˜(X i |S) −
Æ
PNN (X i |S)
2
(2.7)
24 | 2 Inattentive Inference
Broad, whereas only less than 20% are in Narrow. Instead, about 60% in Narrow
are characterized as close to fully inattentive, with the remaining 20% located
in between the two poles. This figure indicates that in the vast majority of cases,
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Condition Narrow Condition Broad
Figure 2.2. Inattention to Y in baseline tasks. N=1135. Indicated are
treatment-specic binned histograms for the implied inattention param-
eters from all beliefs elicited in the ve baseline tasks. Inattention is cal-
culated as θ = HBHB+HN , where HB and HN denote the Hellinger distance of
the subjective distribution to the Bayesian posterior and the inattentive
posterior distribution, respectively. A parameter of θ = 0 is consistent with
Bayesian updating. θ = 1 is a fully inattentive belief.
2.3.1.6 Robustness
The baseline laboratory experiment documents the occurrence of noise neglect
in a specific configuration of the information environment. In additional exper-
imental variations I examine the robustness as well as competing explanations
for the findings. These extensions include (i) additional tasks introducing var-
ious departures from the simple discrete uniform case, (ii) a direct test of a
signal anchoring heuristic, (iii) two treatments that exactly align the elicitation
procedures across conditions, and (iv) a simplification version that removes the
deciphering stage and time limits.
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Four additional tasks were presented in random order after the baseline
tasks.20 First, once the numbers are correlated instead of independent, there
is an additional incentive to attend to Y . Subjects in Narrow partially accommo-
dated this incentive, as indicated by lower median inattention of 0.59. Second,
moving toward a (more naturalistic) continuous data structure increased the
complexity of the inference problem and pushed the median subject in Broad
away from the Bayesian benchmark. Third, normal instead of uniform data ap-
pears to have had a similar added-complexity effect on Broad. Fourth, a signal
realization outside of the range of X “wakes up” some subjects in Narrow to a
small extent and increases the share of Bayesian beliefs. Most importantly, highly
significant treatment effects persist in all four tasks (p < 0.001, M-W U tests).
Treatment Computation directly tests whether noise neglect is driven by a
simple face value heuristic, whereby inattentive subjects anchor their guess
of X on the observed information value.21 If this were the case, then the ob-
served inattentiveness to Y might not be the specific neglect of noise, but only
an instance of a more general simplification strategy. Treatment Computation
is identical to Narrow, but inserts a simple algebraic computation into the sig-
nal structure, such that it remains equally plausible to anchor on the observed
signal value. For example, instead of I = X+Y2 , subjects receive the modified sig-
nal I = X+Y2 − (2 · 10) + 30. I find very limited evidence for anchoring on the
observed signal. Instead, subjects are well able and willing to invert the com-
putations, but then still do not account for Y .22 Inattention to noise implied
by beliefs in Computation is indistinguishable from Narrow (p = 0.37, M-W U
test), and significantly different from Broad (p < 0.001). This suggests the base-
line finding reflects a specific error in probabilistic reasoning rather than mere
anchoring on the signal value.
Another block of treatments addresses the sensitivity of the baseline find-
ings to specific experimental procedures. A central insight of the experiment is
that attention can be directed using incentives, which in turn affects belief for-
mation. The experiment, however, varies the elicitation procedure along with
the incentive structure: subjects in Narrow only state a belief about X , whereas
subjects in Broad guess both X and Y .23 To better understand what portion of
the treatment effect can be explained by the difference in the elicitation mech-
anism, two additional treatments were designed to obtain a full 2 (incentives
20 See Appendix 2.D.1 for the robustness task specifications and detailed results.
21 Even then, anchoring cannot explain the treatment effect without further assumptions.
22 Further treatment details, figures and results are relegated to Appendix 2.D.2.
23 This is a deliberate design choice. The natural setup is one in which a person only predicts
the states with non-zero prediction incentives, since making a prediction in itself can provide
a non-monetary incentive to pay attention. At the same time, the available information set was
held exactly constant across treatments, so that subjects in Narrow did not have to memorize the
distribution of Y .
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Narrow/Broad) × 2 (elicited: only X / X and Y ) between-subjects factorial de-
sign. I find that given an incentive structure, i.e., Narrow or Broad, harmonizing
the elicitation protocol reduces the treatment effect by roughly one third, while
all differences in estimated inattention remain highly significant (see Appendix
2.D.3). Put differently, the better part of the treatment effect is purely driven by
prediction incentives.
Finally, drastically simplifying condition Narrow by removing the decipher-
ing stage as well as all time limits induces a reduction in inattention (p < 0.01),
but the treatment effect persists in a conservative comparison against the base-
line condition Broad which includes deciphering and time limits (p < 0.001).
The robustness exercises substantiate the baseline findings about the preva-
lence and distinctness of noise neglect. All details are relegated to Appendix
2.D.
2.3.1.7 The Form of Noise Neglect
Incorporating inattentive inference into models of belief formation requires un-
derstanding the form of the neglect. The term noise neglect, however, has no
immediate formal analogue. This is because there are, in principle, many ways
in which noise can be neglected in the updating process. I characterize different
possibilities by whether they correspond to the (implicit) use of (i) a modified
signal structure g∗, (ii) a modified distribution of Y , h∗Y , or (iii) a non-Bayesian
belief formation rule.
For example, people might update as if the information structure only de-
pended on X, but not Y, i.e., I = g∗(X ). This has different implications than if
people used the correct information structure g, but replaced the true distribu-
tion of Y by something else. Different yet again is a belief formation rule that
relies on the actual data and information structure, but does not comply with
Bayesian updating. A candidate in this respect is a belief that ignores the prior
(or base rate) and overweights the likelihood. A recent strand of the literature
systematically incorporates such deviations into belief formation in the form of
diagnostic expectations (Bordalo et al., 2017, 2018).
Since it is infeasible to identify and test every possible candidate rule, I pro-
ceed by ruling out categories of specifications based on the data. In an additional
experiment, subjects faced various tasks that allow to distinguish between some
of the main explanations. This evidence is reported in Appendix 2.D.5.
I make three observations. First of all, noise neglect empirically differs from
likelihood-based explanations such as diagnostic expectations. People form di-
agnostic expectations if they overweight outcomes that become more likely in
the light of new information (Bordalo et al., 2018). However, in my data people
typically overweight outcomes of X that are close to i, even if these outcomes
have become less likely under i. For example, consider two independent, nor-
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mally distributed variables X ∼N (100,100) and Y ∼N (100,100), and infor-
mation structure I = X + Y . Upon observing, e.g., i = 145, diagnostic expecta-
tions overweight small outcomes of X below 100. In the experiment, however,
subjects overweight outcomes of X above 100, as if trying to explain the infor-
mation solely through X . Relatedly, empirical beliefs do not feature the kernel of
truth property of diagnostic expectations, stating that beliefs generally respond
to news in a directionally correct, but excessive manner. In the experiment, sub-
jects also respond to news that is fully uninformative about X .
Second, I find that noise neglect is not in line with belief formation using
the correct information structure, but a modified prior about Y . Specifically, in
several tasks stated beliefs about X are not in line with any possible belief about
Y defined on the union of the actual support of Y , the mean, median and mode
of Y , and the number 0. This excludes any rule that replaces Y by a single value
in its support, its mean, etc. as well as any rule that shrinks the variance of Y .
Third, I find evidence for the following patterns. If i is in the support of X ,
noise neglect is in line with people overweighting the outcome(s) closest to i. If
i is not in the support of X but “sufficiently close”, noise neglect corresponds to
overweighting the outcomes in the support of X that are closest to i. If i is not in
the support of X and “sufficiently far” from any value with positive likelihood,
noise neglect is often in line with people overweighting outcomes of X whose
multiple is close to i.
A word of caution is in order about these regularities. First, the results per-
tain to the specific experimental design studied in this paper, that is, algebraic
signal structures in which X and Y are combined additively. In practice, informa-
tion environments rarely have these features, let alone an explicit information
structure. As such, the results above on how people deal with algebraically ex-
plicit information structure should not be over-interpreted.
The main insight from this analysis is that noise neglect is best characterized
as a strong form of ignorance about the existence of Y . That means, people seem
to apply a modified information structure g∗(X ) that excludes Y .
2.3.2 Baseline Study on Updating Rules: Online Evidence
The laboratory experiments provide evidence for the existence of noise neglect
in a controlled experimental setting. However, the design is not well suited as
a test of the prevalence of different updating modes in practice. Note that the
laboratory design puts strong emphasis on the piece of information, with, e.g.,
an information deciphering stage that makes it practically impossible to ignore
it. Moreover, subjects have to indicate a full posterior while the prior is uni-
form, such that entering the prior is relatively effortful. That means, while the
cognitive process of neglecting a signal neglect is arguably inexpensive, the ex-
perimentally necessary procedure of having subjects state a guess to make their
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beliefs visible makes signal neglect practically costly. Furthermore, the baseline
lab design does not allow to distinguish signal neglect from Bayesian updating
in many tasks. The online task design addresses these issues, while maintaining
the same basic structure.
2.3.2.1 Design
There are three main modifications relative to the laboratory experiment. First,
subjects do not have to indicate a full posterior distribution but are incentivized
to state the mean of their posterior belief, substantially simplifying the proce-
dure. Second, X and Y are not discrete with sample space size below ten, but
follow (discretized) continuous distributions with a much larger sample space.
The baseline tasks are displayed in Table 2.3. Third, there is no deciphering
stage preceding the belief elicitation.
Hypothesis 2. The heterogeneity in beliefs formed in the online experiment can
be characterized by three underlying updating rules: Bayesian updating, noise
neglect, and information neglect.
2.3.2.2 Procedural Details
I conducted incentivized experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an
online labor marketplace frequently used by researchers. A recent study sug-
gests that MTurk workers are more attentive to instructions than college stu-
dents (Hauser and Schwarz, 2016). Participants in my online experiments had
to live in the U.S. and be of legal age, have an overall approval rating of more
than 95 percent, and have completed more than 100 tasks on MTurk. Workers
were paid 0.5 dollars for participation and could earn up to 5 dollars for their
performance on the guessing task. They played five rounds in randomized or-
der. A decision screen is reproduced in Figure 2.G.25. One round was randomly
chosen to be paid, and the payoff was determined based on a quadratic scoring
rule.24 Following the belief tasks, subjects worked on 5 Raven matrices. Correct
answers were incentivized with 20 cents each. In the online experiments, all
subjects were paid to predict X only, analogous to condition Narrow in the labo-
ratory experiments. 131 subjects participated in the online baseline experiments
for an average payment of 2.7 dollars. Completion of the study took 13 minutes
on average. It was implemented using oTree (Chen et al., 2016).
24 The monetary payoff (in US dollars) was determined by the following rule:
max

0 , 3 − 0.1 · (guess of X − draw of X )2	
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Table 2.3. Online baseline tasks
X Y I
N (100,100) N (0,100) X + Y
N (100,100) N (0,400) X + Y
N (100,400) N (0,100) X + Y
U [75,76, . . . , 125] U [−25,−24, . . . , 25] X + Y
U [75,76, . . . , 125] U [90,91, . . . , 110] X+Y2
Notes: This table provides an overview of the ve baseline be-
lief tasks in the online experiment. Note that for all normally dis-
tributed variables, the support was discretized to integers, trun-
cated at µ− 50 and µ+ 50 and then the distributions were scaled
such that the they have unit probability mass.
2.3.2.3 Baseline Results: Online
Result 2. The distribution of subjective beliefs is trimodal. The three modes
correspond to – in order of frequency – noise neglect, Bayesian updating and
information neglect.
Figure 2.3 shows all stated beliefs together with the information value re-
ceived in the five baseline tasks. It further highlights which stated beliefs would
correspond to noise neglect, information neglect and Bayesian updating.
There is evidence for each of those three updating rules. In fact, in each task
at least 60% of stated beliefs are exactly in line with these three updating modes.
Among the three modes, Bayesian updating and noise neglect are observed with
roughly similar frequency, while information neglect occurs to a somewhat lesser
extent. Note that the Bayesian benchmark changes across tasks, and subjects
clearly respond to this change.
To illustrate the degree to which beliefs are clustered on these three updat-
ing modes, Figure 2.4 plots kernel density estimates for the task in the upper
left corner of Figure 2.3. In this task, X ∼N (100,100), Y ∼N (0,100), and
I = X + Y . The stated belief that corresponds to a Bayesian posterior in this




= 12 . Intuitively, since X and Y have
equal variance, a normatively optimal guess of X would attribute half of i’s devi-
ation from the expected value of 100 to X . Information neglect, in turn, would
correspond to a belief equal to the prior of X , E[X ] = 100. This is equivalent to
assigning none of the deviation of i from its expected value to X . In fact, with m
denoting a subject’s stated guess, I can back out the empirical equivalent of λ,
as λˆ= m−100i−100 . In the case of information neglect with m= 100, λˆ= 0. Finally, if
people commit signal neglect they state m= i, leading to λˆ= 1.
Figure 2.4 provides three insights. First, most of the probability mass is cen-
tered on the three updating modes. Second, noise neglect is relatively most fre-
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X = U{75, 76, ..., 125}
Y = U{−25, −25, ..., 25}
S = X+Y
X = U{75, 76, ..., 125}























Bayesian posterior Noise neglect Signal neglect
Figure 2.3. Beliefs in baseline tasks of online experiments. N=131 in each
task. Each dot corresponds to one stated belief. The three red lines indicate
the Bayesian benchmark, noise neglect, and information neglect.
quent in this task, and information neglect least frequent. Third, as indicated by
the rug plot on the right, people who neglect the noise (λˆ= 1) or the informa-
tion (λˆ= 0) do so exactly. By contrast, people are more dispersed around the
Bayesian benchmark (λˆ≈ 0.5), presumably because it is harder to compute the
Bayesian posterior exactly.
In the experimental settings studied in this paper, beliefs are clearly too het-
erogeneous to be adequately described by a single representative updating rule.
Average beliefs mask the underlying structure. At the same time, there is little
randomness in stated beliefs. Instead, most beliefs accord to a discrete set of
three updating modes. They align exactly with one of these modes, and there
is virtually no mixing between the modes, i.e., people do not choose “combina-
tions”.
A much deeper understanding is necessary to predict the occurrence of the
updating modes for different environments, and to pinpoint the underlying psy-
chological mechanisms that can inform a formal model of belief formation from
noisy information.










Figure 2.4. Kernel density plot for beliefs stated in a task where X ∼
N (100,100), Y ∼N (0,100), and I = X + Y . In this task, the Bayesian




= 12 . For each
stated belief, the empirical counterpart of λ is calculated as λˆ= m−100i−100 . The
plot documents three distinct clusters at λˆ= 0 (information neglect), λˆ= 1
(noise neglect) and around λˆ= 12 (Bayesian posterior.) Based on N=131.
Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.07.
2.4 Predictability of Updating Modes
In this section I report additional evidence that sheds light on how the prevalence
of different updatingmodes depends on features of the information environment
and individual-specific factors.
In terms of the conceptual framework in Section 2.2, the former corresponds





2.1, while the latter refers to factors that might systematically influence the
cognitive cost of updating modes, C(R˜(a)).
2.4.1 Responsiveness to the Information Environment
Hypothesis 3. The relative prevalence of different updating modes responds to
their expected accuracy in an information structure.
A central comparative static concerns the effect of the signal-to-noise ratio.
Relative to Bayesian updating, the expected utility of noise neglect (information
neglect) is increasing (decreasing) in the signal-to-noise ratio.
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I illustrate this logic in a simple example. Assume X and Y follow indepen-
dent normal distributions, X ∼N (0,100) and Y ∼N (0,σ2Y ). Information is
generated as I = X + Y . Assume that the agent’s utility of an action is described
by a loss function
u(m, x) = −1
2
(m − x)2.
In the independent normal case with quadratic cost, the actions associated
with different representations have a simple closed form as shown above. After
observing information i, the fully attentive representation leads to the Bayesian







Noise neglect means an agents takes action m= i, and information neglect cor-
responds to m= E[X ] = 0.
Assuming q = 15 and ν= 0.5 for expositional purposes, Figure 2.5 illus-
trates costs and benefits of the actions associated with different representations
for varying σ2Y . For small noise variation σ
2
Y , noise neglect is optimal, while
for high σ2Y , signal neglect dominates. Under this parameterization, Bayesian
updating prevails only for intermediate values of σ2Y .
In a sample with heterogeneous cognitive cost q, I therefore expect the fre-
quency of noise neglect to decrease and that of information neglect to increase
as σ2Y rises. I directly tested this prediction in an additional online experiment
with seven tasks with varying signal-to-noise ratio as shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4. Online tasks: Experiment on signal-to-noise ratio






N (100,25) N (0,1600) X + Y 0.015
N (100,100) N (0,1600) X + Y 0.059
N (100,25) N (0,100) X + Y 0.25
N (100,100) N (0,100) X + Y 0.5
N (100,100) N (0,25) X + Y 0.75
N (100,1600) N (0,100) X + Y 0.941
N (100,1600) N (0,25) X + Y 0.985
Notes: This table provides an overview of the ve tasks in the
online experiment on the eect of the signal-to-noise ratio. Note
that for all normally distributed variables, the support was dis-
cretized to integers, truncated at µ− 50 and µ+ 50 and then the
distributions were scaled such that the they have unit probability
mass.
A sample of N = 209 participated in this experiment, where again task order
was randomized and one task was randomly incentivized with a maximum prize
of 3 dollars.
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Noise neglect Bayesian Signal neglect












Figure 2.5. Illustration of the eect of the the signal-to-noise ration
on updating modes. In the displayed example, X ∼N (0,100) and Y ∼
N (0,σ2Y ). Information is generated as I = X + Y . The agent’s has quadratic
utility, u(m, x) = − 12 (m− x)2. The gure assumes noise paramters q = 15
and ν= 0.5 for expositional purposes. For small noise variation σ2Y , noise
neglect is optimal, while for high σ2Y , signal neglect dominates. Under this
parameterization, Bayesian updating prevails only for intermediate values
of σ2Y .
Figure 2.6 documents the results by plotting estimated kernel densities of
λˆ= m−100i−100 by task. In line with the previous results, there are three empirical
modes in each task, corresponding to Bayesian updating, noise neglect and in-
formation neglect. Note that the value of λ in line with Bayesian beliefs changes
across tasks, as indicated by the dashed diagonal line. To support the visual
analysis, I perform non-parametric test on the distributions of λˆ. First, note that
the summed share of beliefs in line with either one of the three updating modes
(defined as being within [λ− 0.05,λ+ 0.05]) does not significantly differ across
tasks (p > 0.1 for all pairwise comparisons in χ2 tests). Second, for each task
with λ > 0.75, the share of beliefs in line with noise neglect (again, defined as
being within [0.95,1.05]), is significantly higher than in all tasks with λ < 0.75
(all p < 0.05, pairwise χ2 tests). Third, for each task with λ < 0.25, the share
of beliefs in line with info neglect (defined as being within [−0.05,0.05]), is
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significantly higher than in all tasks with λ > 0.25 (all p < 0.01, pairwise χ2
tests).
This means that, in line with the hypothesis, while the overall share of
beliefs in line with the three updating modes stays roughly constant, the share
of noise neglect increases and the share of information neglect decreases with
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Figure 2.6. Kernel density estimates for seven dierent tasks (see Table 2.4)
in an online experiment testing the eect of the signal-to-noise ratio on the





of the task. The vertical axis shows the empirical equivalent derived
from subjects guesses as λˆ= m−100i−100 . Note that λˆ= 0 indicates information
neglect, λˆ= 1 indicates noise neglect, and the dashed line indicates the
λˆ that corresponds to Bayesian updating. Based on N=207 in each task.
Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.07.
I now turn to a second implication of the conceptual framework that relates
to the analysis of the form of noise neglect in Section 2.3.1.7. The empirical find-
ings suggest that noise neglect induces people to overweight outcomes close to
the observed information value. In the baseline laboratory experiment as well
as the preceding experiment on the effect of the signal-to-noise ratio, task con-
figurations were (purposefully) chosen such that the information is an unbiased
estimator of the mean of X , i.e., E[I] = E[X ]. In this case, noise neglect leads
to overreaction without generating a directional bias on average. In information
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structures in which the signal does not have the same mean as X , however, noise
neglect also induces directional bias. This, however, is reflected in the expected
utility loss from neglecting noise. An interesting question is whether subjects
recognize this bias, i.e., whether it makes them less likely to neglect the noise.
If people in fact incorporate the expected costliness (in terms of utility losses,
not cognitive costs) of each updating mode, this would be additional evidence
that the prevalence of updating modes follows a form of cost-benefit analysis.
To examine this prediction I ran a variation of the online experiment in which
the distribution of X as well as the variance of Y were kept constant across tasks,
but the mean of Y varied. The five task configurations are displayed in Table 2.5.






is identical across tasks, setting this experiment apart form
the preceding one on the signal-to-noise ratio. However, the expected value of
the information, µI , varies. To optimally learn from I , subjects need to account
for the fact that observed values of I are on average higher or lower than X if
µX 6= µI .
Table 2.5. Online tasks: Experiment on directional bias in information
X Y I µI
N (100,100) N (0,100) X + Y 100
N (100,100) N (−25,100) X + Y 75
N (100,100) N (−50,100) X + Y 50
N (100,100) N (25,100) X + Y 125
N (100,100) N (50,100) X + Y 150
Notes: This table provides an overview of the ve tasks in
the online experiment on the eect of the signal-to-noise
ratio. Note that for all normally distributed variables, the
support was discretized to integers, truncated at µ− 50
and µ+ 50 and then the distributions were scaled such
that the they have unit probability mass.
Raw beliefs are shown in Figure 2.7. The figure suggests that subjects be-
come less likely to commit noise neglect the larger the directional bias of the
signal, i.e., the further away the mean of Y is from 0. Belief in line with noise
neglect have to be close to the dashed red line.
This observation is supported by non-parametric tests. The share of beliefs
in line with noise neglect significantly decreases as µI moves away from 100.25
25 That is, the share of noise neglect decreases in both directions away from 100 for adjacent
tasks, e.g., both for µI = 100 vs. µI = 75 and µI = 75 vs. µI = 50. Noise neglect can be defined
in different ways. I either define it as the any guess falling within a margin of 5 around the
hypothetical noise neglect guess, or based on d relNN =
dNN
dNN+dB+dIN
falling within 0.05 to either side
of 0, where d is the distance of a stated belief m to the respective benchmark belief for each
of three updating modes. That means, e.g., dB =
m−mB is the distance to the Bayesian belief.
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Figure 2.7. Beliefs in baseline tasks of online experiments. N=112 in each
task. Each dot corresponds to one stated belief. The three red line indicate
the Bayesian benchmark, noise neglect, and information neglect.
Notably, I find that this decrease goes hand in hand with an increase in Bayesian
beliefs, rather than information neglect.26
Another way to illustrate this result is to characterize an observed belief by
how relatively close it is to each of the three benchmarks. I do this by computing
the distance to each of the three benchmarks, add up these distances, and then
calculate a measure of closeness for each updating mode as the fraction of that
mode’s distance relative to the sum of distances. Specifically, I obtain three
measures of relative distance for each elicited belief, all of which lie between 0,
meaning the belief lies exactly on the posterior of that updating mode, and 1.
These three measures sum up to 1. A ternary plot of beliefs characterized by
these three distances is shown in Figure 2.8. In each triangle, the distance from
the posterior under noise neglect corresponds to the vertical distance from the
bottom. That means, a belief close to the horizontal axis is in line with noise
neglect, while are belief further away from it indicates a larger distance from
Hence, d relNN is the distance of a belief to a hypothetical belief under noise neglect, relative to the
summed distances of the elicited belief to all three updating modes. p < 0.05 in all pairwise χ2
tests.
26 The share of Bayesian beliefs as defined above significantly increases with the distance of µI
from 100, p < 0.1 in all pairwise χ2 tests.
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Figure 2.8. Beliefs in online experiments on the eect of directional bias
in information. N=112 in each task. Each point corresponds to one stated
belief. Red areas in the heatmap indicate regions with more stated beliefs.
The displayed data is computed based on three relative measures of dis-








where d is the distance of a stated beliefm to the respec-
tive benchmark belief for each of three updatingmodes, e.g., dB =
m−mB
is the dierence to the Bayesian belief. Hence d relNN is the distance of a be-
lief to a hypothetical belief under noise neglect, relative to the summed
distances of the elicited belief to all three updating modes.
Note, however, that as the mean of Y moves away from 0, subjects are also
more likely to observe information values further away from 100. With X nor-
mally distributed around 100, the “plausibility of noise neglect” as judged by the
probability P(X = i) therefore on average decreases as the distance
µI −µX  in-
creases. In additional analyses reported in Appendix 2.E.1, I show that noise ne-
glect becomes more unlikely as the directional bias of the information structure
increases, controlling for the information value observed by subjects. That means,
in two tasks with identically distributed X and an identical observed information
value i, the propensity to commit noise neglect is less likely the larger
µY − 0,
i.e., the larger the expected utility loss from noise neglect.
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The evidence reported in this section suggests two things. First, subject
do react in a systematic way to features in the information environment as
suggested by the (as-if) cost-benefit analysis discussed in Section 2.2. Second,
people respond to the structure of noise in the environment even conditional
on observing the same piece of information. This implies that the process that
leads to a specific updating mode such as noise neglect is not purely driven by
the observed piece of information i, e.g., by a plausibility check of the resulting
posterior, but likely starts before that, once a subject studies the information
environment and allocates attention.
Result 3. The empirical distribution of updating rules responded to the degree
of variance and bias introduced by Y .
2.4.2 Correlates of Inattention and Within-Subject Consistency
To understand whether attention allocation in inference problems depends on
considerations about the cognitive cost of different updating modes, I will ana-
lyze between-subject differences in cognitive skills. Higher cognitive skills might
be associated with a lower cost of computational effort when forming a poste-
rior. However, there are other ways in which cognitive ability could affect per-
formance in the updating tasks that are different from reflecting the outcome
of a cost-saving choice of a mental representation that avoids certain computa-
tions. For example, subjects with lower cognitive skills might misconstrue per se
the updating problem (they are not able to understand the task correctly even
if they wanted to), leading to a flawed mental representation to begin with, or
they might form a correct understanding of the problem but fail to execute the
necessary computations. However, the baseline laboratory experiment provides
evidence against both of these explanations as key determinants of inattentive
inference in the experiment: Virtually all subjects in Broad solve the problem
in Bayesian fashion. This means subjects are able to form a normatively correct
representation independent of their cognitive skills, and, conditional on this cor-
rect mental representation, are both willing and able to execute the necessary
contingent reasoning to arrive at an optimal belief.27
To shed light on whether person-fixed characteristics are associated with
different updating styles, I analyze correlates of inattention to noise in the base-
line laboratory experiment. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6 document a significant
but moderate association between cognitive skills and inattention when pooling
27 In fact, the experiment was designed in such a way that belief formation does not boil down to
performing mental arithmetic as in a test of cognitive intelligence. Instead, practically no subject
is barred from “solving” the problem on cognitive capacity grounds. It is trivial, however, that this
may well be the case in many information environments in practice.
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both treatments together. This effect has roughly similar magnitude but seizes
to be significant in a subsample restricted to condition Narrow (column 3). This
supports the view that cognitive skills do play a role in generating noise neglect,
but this is not because people with lower cognitive skills lack the capacity to
understand the task correctly of to execute the necessary computations.
Table 2.6. Correlates of inattention in baseline laboratory experiment
Dependent variable: Inattention to noise θ
Condition: Narrow and Broad Narrow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0 if Broad, 1 if Narrow 0.516*** 0.517***
(0.042) (0.041)
Cognitive skills (Raven) -0.027** -0.022 -0.003
(0.014) (0.019) (0.023)
Big 5: Conscientiousness -0.007 -0.015
(0.010) (0.011)
Willingness to take risks -0.002 0.027
(0.042) (0.044)
IRI: Perspective-taking 0.005 0.009
(0.014) (0.014)
Response time (seconds) -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
Reading time (seconds) -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.154*** 0.316*** 0.802*** 0.693*** 0.572** 0.917*** 0.709*** 0.614***
(0.021) (0.089) (0.113) (0.241) (0.255) (0.026) (0.149) (0.107)
Controls Yes Yes
R2 0.3778 0.3904 0.0107 0.0039 0.1222 0.4223 0.0005 0.4565
N 1135 1135 607 607 607 607 607 607
Notes: OLS regressions with implied inattention as dependent variable. Inattention is calculated as θ = HBHB+HN , where
HB and HN denote the Hellinger distance of the subjective distribution to the Bayesian posterior and the inattentive
posterior distribution, respectively. Cognitive skills were measured using 10 Raven matrices and a payo of 0.2 euros
for each correct answer. Willingness to take risks is based on the survey preference module of Falk et al. (2016).
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) has a subscale on perspective-taking, dened as “the tendency to
spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others”. Response time is the duration in seconds the subject
spent on the belief elicitation page. Reading time is the duration in seconds that the subject spent on the instructions
screen. Robust standard errors clustered at participant level in parentheses. Controls include gender, age, income and
task-xed eect. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.6 show that inattention to noise in Narrow is
unrelated to other selected individual-level traits. There are no significant asso-
ciations with self-reported measures of conscientiousness (a Big 5 trait), willing-
ness to take risks, and the self-reported ability to take perspective.
In columns 6 to 8, I examine the relationship with the reading time of the
experimental instructions as well as response times, the latter being variably
interpreted as a proxy for cognitive effort or the distinction between instinctive
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and contemplative modes of reasoning (e.g., Rubinstein, 2007). Noise neglect
is indeed associated with lower response times.28
Another measure for how cognitive skills are related to inattention is sub-
jects’ consistency across tasks. Analyzing data from the baseline experiments
both in the laboratory and online, I make the following observations. First, there
is substantial consistency as judged by the fraction of subjects who always em-
ploy the same mode of updating. 64% of subjects in the laboratory and 43% of
subjects online employ the same updating mode in all five tasks. Second, there
is a non-negligible fraction of subjects (16% in the laboratory, 34% online) who
used at least two different updating modes in the five tasks. Third, in the online
experiment, the distribution of updating styles is systematically related to cogni-
tive skills. When characterizing each subject by their medianmode of updating, I
find that on average, cognitive skill increases from the information neglect type,
over the noise neglect type, to the Bayesian type.
The combined correlational evidence presented in this section allows the
following conclusions. Cognitive skills are systematically related to different up-
dating modes, but not because the complexity of the tasks exceeds the cognitive
capacity of subjects with lower cognitive per se. Instead, the vast majority of
participants is in principle able to form normatively correct beliefs, as shown by
the condition Broad as well as a sizable share of online subjects who formed a
Bayesian beliefs at least once. In fact, many participants switch between modes.
An interpretation that is compatible with these results is that cognitive skills
are a proxy for a person’s individual cost of cognitive computations associated
with belief formation, and the process that leads to the selection of a subjective
representation (and resulting updating mode) at least partly accounts for this
cost.
Another immediate implication of the data concerns the systematic infer-
ence patterns of groups with different average cognitive skills. The group with
the lowest cognitive skills is most likely to underreact as here the share of infor-
mation neglect is highest. Subjects with somewhat higher cognitive skill tend to
disproportionately engage in noise neglect and therefore overreact. The group
with highest cognitive skills is well calibrated and tends to perform Bayesian
inference. The relationship between cognitive skills and the potential for over-
reaction to information might thus be non-linear.
28 Note that inattention to noise mechanically leads to lower response times, because the fully
inattentive belief in the experimental setting is characterized by lower variance, requiring fewer
inputs on the elicitation screen.
2.5 Mechanisms: The Role of Awareness | 41
2.5 Mechanisms: The Role of Awareness
The preceding section revealed that the presence of different updating modes
is not random but systematically related to features of the information environ-
ment and person-fixed characteristics. The corresponding evidence from various
experiments indicates that the process by which updating modes are selected
can be described as if following a form of cost-benefit analysis. The empirical
evidence reported up to this point, however, provides no direct evidence on the
nature of the underlying processes. This section has the purpose to develop a
deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that drive inattention in be-
lief formation. To this end I will examine people’s solution strategies in fixed
information environments, their confidence (or metacognition) in their beliefs,
the dynamics of learning, and the effect of different external interventions in
the belief formation process.
To anticipate the analysis, this section revolves around the notion of aware-
ness. I will show that the agent’s awareness about specific elements of the up-
dating process is key to understanding inattention in inference. Note that the
notion of cost-benefit analysis as modeled in the conceptual framework seem-
ingly implies a conscious, willed activity. I stress that this is not necessarily the
case. Instead, the entire process of selecting a representation need not be delib-
erate but might be automatic, and the relationship between the resulting, po-
tentially reduced internal representation and the external environment can be
inaccessible to the conscious mind. The subsequent computations, by contrast,
can be accompanied by some form of awareness, or metacognitive experience,
and can be deliberate. This squares with neuroscientific, cognitive and psycho-
logical research on the interaction between goals, attention, and consciousness.
There is substantial evidence that “cost-benefit analysis” type processes operate
in unconscious reasoning, e.g., that “unconscious goal pursuit is supported by at-
tention that operates on higher cognitive processes according to principles of ex-
ecutive control and working memory. And these processes (and the information
on which they operate) seem to run below the threshold of consciousness” (Di-
jksterhuis and Aarts, 2010). More concretely, this research indicates that there
are unconscious processes of attention and inhibition that serve to interpret and
manipulate information in line with a person’s goals.
Understanding the framework as the formalization of an unconscious,
quick optimization routine has the following implications. First, the effect of
different interventions or nudges depends on whether they affect the mental
representation formed by a person, or only the cognitive operations that rely
on that representation. Second, people will generally be confident in beliefs
formed according to information or noise neglect, because the underlying
simplifications in the internal representation are inaccessible to the conscious
mind. Third, inattentive representations are persistent, even in the presence
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of feedback. Learning that a belief was deficient does not necessarily lead
to improvement if people are fundamentally unaware about the unconscious
processes at the root of their mistakes.
Hypothesis 4. Different updating modes are driven by different subjective rep-
resentations of the information environment. These representations are formed un-
consciously.
2.5.1 Overcoming Inattention: Eort versus Hints
If belief formation conforms to the distinction between an initial choice of repre-
sentation that occurs outside awareness, and a subsequent deliberate optimiza-
tion withing that representation, then some, but not other interventions should
help reduce inattention. Consciously exerted effort induced, e.g., by higher in-
centives, might make subjects try harder when computing a posterior, but it
may not affect the unconsciously formed solution strategy. On the other hand,
the framework naturally gives room for waking up after receiving hints that al-
ter the agent’s representation. A hint at the neglected dimension can extend
the agent’s representation and lead to a different posterior. Note that such hints
induce a broader representation by pointing at the signal or the noise.
I provide evidence on both types of interventions. The High Stakes stage of
the baseline laboratory experiment investigates the role of effort more directly.
This stage consists of one surprise bonus round following. Within each condi-
tion, I re-randomized whether this round would be incentivized with the same
expected payoff as the preceding tasks, or a tenfold increase thereof. Regression
results in column 1 of Table 2.E.7 of Appendix 2.E.2 document that subjects sig-
nificantly increased effort based on observed response times. At the same time,
inattention to noise was completely unaffected by the manipulation of stakes
(columns 2 and 3). Put differently, under high incentives, subjects apparently
tried harder, but that did not make them more Bayesian.
Treatment Hint was run using a separate set of 46 subjects in the laboratory.
The belief tasks were identical to those in the baseline laboratory experiment
(see Table 2.1) except that on every elicitation screen, subjects saw a hint stating
“Also think about the role of Y ”. People only guessed X , so that condition Hint
was exactly identical to Narrow in the baseline experiment except for the hint.
The hint significantly reduced inattention to noise compared to Narrow (p <
0.001, M-W U test). As illustrated in Appendix Figure 2.E.9, the distribution of
inattention is in fact much closer to that in Broad, with a majority of subjects
forming Bayesian beliefs.29
29 Still, inattention in Hint is significantly higher than in Broad (p < 0.001, M-W U test).
2.5 Mechanisms: The Role of Awareness | 43
Taking stock, I find that in line with the notion of unawareness about the
mental representation, only interventions that directly alter this representation
affect belief formation. If people are paid more, they try harder by putting in
more effort into the consciously executed steps of their updating strategy. How-
ever, this does not affect the resulting beliefs because people operate within a
narrow mental representation to begin with. That deliberately exerted effort
affects how hard people work on the tasks but does not change their perfor-
mance strongly suggests that the neglect at the root of inattentive inference
occurs outside of awareness. The hint, by contrast, broadens subjects’ mental
representation directly. People then perform the subsequent mental operation
in the correct mental frame and predominantly arrive at Bayesian beliefs.
2.5.2 The Role of Condence
I next study people’s awareness about the inference process directly by examin-
ing their confidence in their own beliefs. If people had some form of awareness
about noise neglect, they should be less confident in the resulting belief. If
instead this neglect occurs outside of awareness, people deliberately and
purposefully execute the subsequent computations and they will be confident
in the result.
Design. Two additional experimental variations in the laboratory directly
examine subjects metacognition of inference, i.e., what they think about their
own solution strategy in the belief updating tasks. In stage Confidence following
the baseline belief tasks, subjects indicate their willingness-to-accept for each
previously stated belief. To this end they again see each individual updating
task in combination with their own stated belief. They then indicate whether
they prefer to be paid out for their belief based on the scoring rule or receive a
fixed monetary amount. Subjects make this binary decision for different fixed
amounts ranging from 0 euros to 6 euros, presented in a multiple-price list for-
mat. In case this task would be chosen for payoff, their decision in one of the
rows of the list would be implemented. Note that the Confidence tasks (i) had no
time limit such that subjects could freely rethink their stated belief, and (ii) the
subjective valuation in each task provides a measure of confidence in the belief
itself, beyond the variance implied by the stated belief distribution.
In stage Switch-role at the end of the laboratory baseline experiment, each
subject played two bonus rounds in the opposite condition. Are participants in
Broad, who have previously formed Bayesian beliefs in these tasks, able to trans-
fer their successful solution strategy to an updating problem with narrow incen-
tives that is otherwise identical? This requires a metacognitive understanding
of one’s own previously implemented solution.
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Results. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 2.7 present results from the Confidence tasks
using regressions in which the dependent variable is the subjective valuation of
a stated believe, i.e., the minimal certain amount preferred over a having the
stated belief paid out. A higher value corresponds to more confidence. Strikingly,
more inattentive beliefs are not significantly associated with lower reservation
prices. Even after reconsidering the updating problem and their own belief, sub-
jects fail to recognize the necessity to account for Y and are equally confident in
their own guess. Reassuringly, the variance of the indicated belief distribution
negatively affects confidence. Restricting the sample to beliefs stated in Nar-
row, there is again no relationship between the valuation of a stated belief and
implied inattention. These results suggest that inattentive inference relies on
processes outside of a person’s awareness.
In columns 5 to 7 of Table 2.7 I analyze scores of inattention to noise on the
pooled sample of beliefs from the baseline and Switch-role tasks. I find that (i)
unsurprisingly, Narrow subjects almost immediately improve when facing the
broad setup, and display a similar level of inattention as Broad subjects in the
baseline (p > 0.7, see footer of Table 2.7), (ii) Broad subjects do transfer their
experience in forming Bayesian beliefs, as indicated by a significant improve-
ment relative to Narrow subjects in baseline (p < 0.05), (iii) this transfer, how-
ever, is far from perfect and a significant treatment effect between Narrow and
Broad persists in the Switch-role tasks, albeit now with the reverse sign. In fact,
mean inattention in Broad is 0.59 in Switch-role, compared to baseline means
of 0.11 in Broad and 0.73 in Narrow. Put differently, the improvement in Broad
is marginal and subjects effectively commit inattentive inference to a roughly
similar extent as if they had not had the baseline experience.
In sum, the combined evidence clearly suggests that the psychological mech-
anism responsible for inattentive inference operates outside of people’s aware-
ness. Selective processing of the features of an information environment shaped
by the structure of the prediction incentives leads to a narrow representation of
the problem. The subsequent cognitive computations are executed deliberately
and confidently – but rely on a flawed mental model of the environment.
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Table 2.7. Mechanisms underlying inattentive updating: Awareness about
the problem structure
Dependent variable: Condence: Valuation for stated belief Inattention θ
Condition: Narrow and Broad Narrow Narrow and Broad
Tasks: Baseline and robustness Baseline and switch-role
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0 if Broad, 1 if Narrow -0.497 -0.499 -0.104 0.617*** 0.616*** 0.616***
(0.316) (0.317) (0.300) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046)
Inattention θ -0.808 -0.801 -0.369 -0.487
(0.509) (0.508) (0.512) (0.436)
Treatment dummy * Inattention θ 0.714 0.705 0.006
(0.620) (0.619) (0.612)
Variance of belief distribution -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Willingness to take risks 0.555*** 0.645***
(0.134) (0.175)
0 if main task, 1 if reverse task 0.484*** 0.442*** 0.443***
(0.052) (0.056) (0.056)
(1 if Narrow) * (1 if switch-role task) -1.045*** -1.043*** -1.045***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Constant 4.550*** 4.555*** 3.694*** 3.011*** 0.110*** 0.126*** -0.070
(0.180) (0.181) (0.637) (0.613) (0.024) (0.031) (0.054)
Task xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
i) Mean inattention Broad, baseline .11 .13 -.07
ii) Mean inattention Narrow, switch-role .17 .14 -.06
i) vs. ii): F1,141 1.98 .09 .1
iii) Mean inattention Narrow, baseline .73 .74 .55
iv) Mean inattention Broad, switch-role .59 .57 .37
iii) vs. iv): F1,141 4.28** 6.99*** 6.71**
R2 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.40 0.41 0.42
# Observations 1135 1135 1135 607 942 942 942
Notes: OLS regressionse. Inattention to noise is calculated as θ = HBHB+HN , where HB and HN denote the Hellinger distance of
the subjective distribution to the Bayesian posterior and the inattentive posterior distribution, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at participant level in parentheses. The switch-role task is the nal, additional belief task in which we
switched experimental conditions, i.e., subjects in Broad had to guess only X and subjects in Narrow guess both X and
Y . The additional controls include gender, age, income and task-xed eect. Group means of inattention and tests of the
dierences in group means are reported in the footer. Robust standard errors clustered at participant level in parentheses.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
2.5.3 Limits to Learning and the Persistence of Biases
Prima facie, it may seem puzzling that the inferential errors documented in this
paper arise despite the substantial costs associated with it. After all, being per-
manently exposed to noisy information, why do we not learn to adequately in-
corporate them into our beliefs? There is no consensus about the origins for the
persistence of the large catalog of heuristics and biases. A prominent view holds
that they should not even be considered errors to begin with, but useful and ef-
ficient behavioral strategies in practice. Researchers reproduce these as artifacts
in ecologically invalid, stylized experimental contexts, applying false normative
views (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991; Stanovich and West, 2000). This argument, how-
ever, does not square well with evidence amassed over several decades on the
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robustness and ubiquity of many thinking errors. There are apparent limits of
learning, the reasons for which are not yet well understood.
The preceding discussions suggests a channel for limits of learning based
on awareness: if people learn from surprising feedback by reflecting on their
own solution strategy, they will first – and perhaps exclusively – address those
elements that are available to introspection. In fact, learning in most context
involves feedback, defined as the outcome of an action that is captured by the
senses (Luft, 2014). Types of feedback vary, e.g.,performance information or mo-
tivational cues such as reward or punishment, as does the learning process itself,
which can be, e.g., implicit and procedural or explicit and hypothesis-driven. All
learning shares the feature of a person linking her action to a consequence of
the action, and then modifying her action next time she encounters a similar
situation. A critical feature of inattentive inference is that the processes respon-
sible for the initial neglect appear to be implicit and inaccessible to the conscious
mind. They are unavailable to introspection and recall. This is why they cannot
be actively targeted by the learner. Other components of the solution strategy,
such as controlled thought and even intuitive reasoning accompanied by some
metacognitive experience or accessible result (Ackerman and Thompson, 2017),
can come to mind when receiving surprising feedback. These processes are more
likely to be targeted in the learning process. But they are not the source of the
error in the case of inattentive inference. Under this hypothesis, errors due to
unconscious processes can survive even in the presence of feedback.30 A com-
parative static coming out of this line of argument is that learning to overcome
inattentive inference given feedback varies with the presence of conscious steps
of reasoning involved in the solution strategy. If inattentive inference is oriented
toward the consciously accessible elements of forming a response, then more of
these will make it less likely to get to the point of challenging one’s internal rep-
resentation, holding fixed the complexity of the problem. I designed additional
treatments to directly test this hypothesis.
Design. Treatment Feedback is akin to Narrow, but further provides the most
natural unspecific type of feedback in this setting. In each of the five baseline
tasks, after guessing X , subjects see the true value of X . Under fully inattentive
inference, the true value can subjectively be a zero probability event. Still, I
expect limited improvement across tasks, because subjects may not get to the
point of reflecting on their neglect of Y .
Next, to create exogenous variation in the extent of consciously accessible
reasoning, condition Computation with Feedback inserts a simple algebraic com-
30 By feedback I mean all types of feedback that are unspecific to the specific neglect committed.
An explicit hint to Y allows to exert executive attention and directly influence the percept.
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putation to the signal structure, which is identical to that in Computation.31
Recall that these computations are extremely simple, e.g.,“+20− 30”. Notably,
standard accounts of dual processing consider these simple algebraic problems
as recruiting Type 1 reasoning, because the answer suggests itself without in-
tention (Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Thompson, 2013). A key distinction to the
nature of the processes driving inattentive inference is that it creates a metacog-
nitive experience, that is we are aware of somehow having produced a result.
The results in Computation (Section 2.3.1.6) showed that the computation is in-
consequential for the guesses about X that subjects actually submit. Presented
with surprising feedback about the actually drawn number, however, subjects
in Computation with Feedback might recall the conscious part of their inference
strategy, i.e., undoing the calculation. The computation provides an obvious –
albeit unlikely – source of error. I hypothesize that this significantly reduces
learning relative to the Feedback baseline.
Note that reduced learning when computations are added can also be the
result of increased complexity. Addingmore sources of error can reduce the likeli-
hood to question each individual one of them in the learning process. I therefore
design a third treatment, Computational Feedback, in which (i) subjects receive
the same feedback as before, (ii) the inference problem including the signal
structure is identical to the no-computations case in Feedback, and (iii) the set-
ting features identical computational complexity to Computation with Feedback.
Now, if reduced learning in Computation with Feedback is solely the result of in-
creased complexity, one should expect the same in Computational Feedback. If,
however, learning is only compromised by computations performed when doing
inference, we would not expect to see reduced learning here, since the inference
problem is identical to Feedback. I predict the latter.
In Computational Feedback, subjects receive a signal on X and Y without addi-
tional computations, i.e., the mean or sum as before. This time, however, these
same computations are added at the feedback stage. That means, instead of ob-
serving the true value of X, subjects see a different value on which they first need
to perform the computations to arrive at the true value of X. Here, the compu-
tations are clearly executed after stating a guess about X, i.e., after inference.
Seeing a surprising true value of X, now, subjects presumably recall that they
performed the calculations when provided with the feedback, and that they ear-
lier on indicated a guess, which itself was independent of these computations.
That is, the computations are not directly associated with the inference process.
Since the algebraic calculations are extremely simple, I expect subjects are in-
stead somewhat more likely to reflect on the inference stage.
31 That is, Computation with Feedback is identical to condition Computation, except for the feed-
back; and it is identical to condition Feedback, except for the simple computation that needs to
be undone.
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Results. In the first round before receiving feedback for the first time, inat-
tention is expectedly indistinguishable across the feedback treatments (see Ap-
pendix Figure 2.F.12).32 I now analyze inattention scores of beliefs stated after
feedback has been received in preceding rounds. In what follows, I restrict my
attention to the fifth and last round, since learning effects should be highest af-
ter several rounds of feedback.33 For ease of exposition, Figure 2.9 depicts mean
inattention by treatment condition. All statistical analyses, however, are based
on empirical distributions of inattention.34 Inattention in the three relevant no-
feedback conditions is displayed above the dashed horizontal line for compari-











Figure 2.9. Treatmentmeans of inattention to Y . The three treatments above
the dashed line show conditions without feedback for reference. Feedback
is about the truly drawn value of X . Displayed are implied inattention scores
in the nal baseline round, after having received feedback in the four pre-
ceding rounds. Sample sizes are N = 72 in both Narrow and Broad, N = 48 in
Feedback, and N = 24 in each of Computation, Computation with Feedback
and Computational Feedback.
32 This again shows that the computation added to the signal does not influence stated beliefs.
33 The following findings persist if beliefs from rounds two to five are pooled together. See
further results in Appendix 2.F.
34 See Appendix 2.F for distribution plots.
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tion Feedback) significantly decreases inattention relative to Narrow (p < 0.001,
M-W U test). At the same time, learning is far from perfect, as indicated by a
remaining treatment effect between Feedback and the Broad benchmark without
feedback (p < 0.001). That means, feedback about the actually drawn X gener-
ates substantial improvements, but it is no guarantee that subjects figure out
their neglect of Y .
Second, I find clear evidence for the hypothesis that additional computa-
tions in the inference process reduce learning. Inattention in Feedback and Com-
putation with Feedback significantly differ (p = 0.008). This effect presumably
operates by diminishing subjects’ propensity to realize that there are parts of
the problem that they have not attended to. Notably, the addition of simple al-
gebraic computation virtually eliminated learning. Inattention in Computation
with Feedback is not significantly lower than in Computation (p = 0.21).
Third, the documented reduction in learning is not driven by an increase in
complexity. In fact, inattention in Computational Feedback is indistinguishable
from Feedback (p = 0.48), but significantly differs from Computation with Feed-
back (p = 0.005) in the predicted direction.
Taking stock, the data clearly suggest that subjects learn to account for Y
only if they cannot attribute prediction mistakes to any steps in the reasoning
process that are available to introspection. In an attempt to do gather direct evi-
dence of this hypothesis, the design includes an additional choice in all feedback
treatments. On the feedback screen that informs about the actual draw, subjects
could choose to be reminded of up to exactly one aspect of the preceding belief
task: the distribution of X, the distribution of Y, or the signal structure. Reveal-
ing such details can help figure out the source of an erroneous guess and make
better subsequent guesses. In the first round, i.e., upon receiving feedback for
the first time, subjects are indeed more likely to reveal the distribution of Y in
Feedback than in Computation with Feedback (p = 0.044). This effect, however,
is not robust and loses significance when pooling all rounds. Procedural details
and further results are relegated to Appendix 2.F.35
2.6 Related Literature
Early work on updating patterns found that beliefs sometimes underreact to
new information as if overweighting the base rate (Edwards, 1982), and some-
times overreact in line with a neglect of the base rate (Bar-Hillel, 1980). As
35 Finally, in practice available signals are usually noisy or imprecise. The possibility that ob-
served feedback is not exactly right might provide another obvious way for subjects resolve the
conflict between their subjective belief and feedback received, again reducing learning. In con-
dition Imperfect Feedback, subjects are given feedback about the true X that is correct only with
80% probability, but would see a value of X which is not the true one with 20% probability. Again,
learning is reduced in a similar way as by adding the computation, see Appendix 2.F.4.
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discussed in Section 2.3.1.7, over-sensitivity to likelihoods is not generally com-
patible with the form of noise neglect. Information neglect, on the other hand,
is observationally equivalent to a strong form of conservatism. This paper fo-
cuses on the cognitive primitives of updating behavior, and identifies selective
attention to elements of an information environment, which hinges on origins
of over- and underreaction that are conceptually distinct from miscalibration to
likelihoods or base rates.
An increasing number of recent empirical studies examines the role of at-
tention in economic contexts (Chetty et al., 2009; De los Santos et al., 2012;
Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Lacetera et al., 2012). That certain aspects of the
environment are not properly represented by agents is the central finding of
recent work on the neglect of correlations (Enke and Zimmermann, 2017) and
unobserved signals (Enke, 2017). Unlike in these studies where agents face mul-
tiple pieces of information with possible interrelations, inattentive inference is
about how a single signal is processed, or interpreted, given that the informa-
tion structure is attended to. At the same time, my analyses on the underlying
mechanisms are inspired by – and the findings are largely consistent with – the
evidence in these papers. Moreover, Enke (2017) argues that neglect is due to a
flawed representation of a problem, modulated by a problem’s complexity. This
paper builds on this idea and focuses on how exactly representations are formed.
Inattentive inference is further connected to research on other patterns of
misreading information, such as confirmatory bias (Rabin and Schrag, 1999) or
misattribution in social learning (Eyster and Rabin, 2005, 2014). An additional
implication of my results is that two persons with standard preferences and
identical prior beliefs can draw predictably different conclusions after seeing
the same evidence.36
On the theory side, Gabaix (2014) formulates a model in which agents first
choose a sparse attention vector given fixed psychic costs of attending to each
dimension. They rationally trade off the cost of not tailoring an action to some
unobserved state of the world against the cost of attending to that dimension.
The intuition built into Gabaix (2014) is that of agents maximizing within a
sparse representation of the world. This sparse model excludes the dimensions
that are least costly to ignore in a given optimization problem, and replaces these
with default values. In the model, the agent finds out the exact realization of a
36 Blackwell and Dubins (1962) show that beliefs of people with identical priors should con-
verge if they are Bayesian. Here I show that deviations from Bayesian updating induce disagree-
ments in a predictable manner. A long literature on the origins of belief polarization partly invokes
non-Bayesian updating as a source of different opinions, including confirmatory bias (Rabin and
Schrag, 1999) and ambiguity aversion (Baliga et al., 2013).
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variable upon attending to it.37 While the notion of sparsity in attention is closely
related to the motivation of inattentive inference, Gabaix (2014) abstracts from
the implications for inference from noisy information in itself. The present paper
shows that attention to a variable is beneficial even if the optimal action does
not depend on it.38
Another strand of literature on rational inattention focuses on the acquisi-
tion of information when the amount of available sources of information ex-
ceeds the decisionmaker’s processing capabilities or processing is costly (see
also Section 2.2.2). These models assume rational inference from those signals
that an agent actually attends to (e.g., Matejka and McKay, 2014; Sims, 2003).
In learning though noticing models (Gagnon-Bartsch et al., 2017; Hanna et al.,
2014; Schwartzstein, 2014), people face uncertainty about which dimensions
are important for predicting a relevant variable. While learning through notic-
ing models explicitly describe a failure to process given data, as is the case in
my experiments, a crucial difference is that inattentive inference is not driven
by uncertainty about the structure of the world but occurs even in the absence
of such uncertainty.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper reports causal evidence frommore than twenty different experiments
on how people update from noisy information. In my view, it provides four core
messages.
First, belief formation is not sufficiently homogenous to be described by a
single rule or some “representative agent”. At the same time, updating rules
are drawn from a discrete set that can be precisely characterized. There is little
evidence for the use of mixtures of these inference modes.
Second, the primitive of different updating modes are subjective represen-
tations of a context. These representations correspond to the set of elements of
an information structure that an agent attends to, i.e., that he processes into a
mental model. This mental model forms the basis for subsequent computations
that result in a posterior. The distinction between mental representations and
computations on those representations leverage insights from the computational
theory of mind.
Third, the relative prevalence of updating modes is not random but system-
atic and predictable. People’s inference strategies respond to variations in the
37 In Proposition 16 and Online Appendix, Sextion XI, Gabaix (2014) considers an extension
where the agent perceives the realization of a variable with noise and decides on a signal precision.
Inference from a noisy signal is assumed to be optimal.
38 This is because attending to a dimension can have a positive externality for learning about
other variables that directly affect actions.
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expected benefits and costs. This paper avoids making general statements about
whether people over- or underreact to information on average. Instead, I stress
that average patterns are likely to vary systematically with features of the con-
text. Inattentive inference is in line with overreaction in some situations and un-
derreaction in others, yet does not give arbitrary flexibility but provides testable
comparative statics. One interesting example is the hypothesized relationship
to average cognitive skills in a group of people. As cognitive skills increase, the
propensity to neglect noise increases at the expense of information neglect, im-
plying a switch from underreaction to overreaction. As cognitive skills further
increase, people become increasingly Bayesian and thus well-calibrated to in-
formation. These and other predictions provided by the conceptual framework
could be an interesting avenue for further research.
Fourth, this paper highlights the role of awareness for understanding belief
formation. The processes that lead to the adoption of a representation, as well as
the representation itself, appear to live below people’s threshold of awareness.
This has far-reaching implications, some of which are explored in this paper.
More generally, I suggest that the characterization of behavioral mechanisms in
terms of associated awareness can help better understand and potentially unify
the diverse corpus of behavioral deviations from rationality. In fact, the aware-
ness result and other findings on the psychological mechanisms are not easily
accounted for by the dominant approach to belief formation in economics that
focuses on higher-level cognitive processes such as intuition and reasoning (Kah-
neman, 2003). Instead, the combined evidence on inattentive inference might
be much better captured by the mechanisms of perception. Perception is the pro-
cessing of sensory information to make sense of a situation by creating an inter-
nal representation of it (Bernstein, 2013). Future work can help to clearly draw
out the implications of this distinction.
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Appendix 2.A Treatment Overview
Table 2.A.1. Overview of laboratory treatments
Condition Description Covered in
Baseline experiment:
Narrow and Broad
(Elements of baseline experiment in respective order below)
Baseline Tasks 5 updating tasks in randomorder. X and Y follow independent
discrete uniform distributions with outcome spaces smaller
than 10. The information is the mean or the sum of the draws.
Appendix 2.C
Robustness Tasks 5 updating tasks in random order. Data are correlated, drawn
from a larger sample space, discretely normally distributed, or
the information is outside of the range of X .
Appendix 2.D.1
Bonus Task 1 surprise task with similar conguration to baseline. Within
each condition, subjects are re-randomized and face either
the same expected incentive size as before, or tenfold incen-
tives.
Main text
Condence For each baseline and robustness problem, subjects indicate
their valuation for their stated belief using a multiple-price
list method.
Appendix 2.E.4
Switch-role 2 taskswith similar conguration as baseline, but subjects face
incentives from opposite treatment condition. That means
Narrow is paid for X and Y , while Broad paid for X only.
Appendix 2.E.5
Computation Identical to Narrow baseline, except that a simple, task-
varying algebraic calculation is added to the information struc-
ture (e.g., “the mean +20− 30”).
Appendix 2.D.2
Simplication Identical to Narrow baseline, but deciphering stage and all
time limits removed.
Appendix 2.D.4
Narrow with joint elici-
tation
Identical to Narrow baseline, but subjects indicate the joint




Identical to Broad baseline, but subjects indicate the marginal
distributions of X and Y in sequential order, such that the rst
screen is identical to Narrow baseline.
Appendix 2.D.3
Hint Identical to Narrow baseline, but subjects receive a reminder
on the elicitation screen, stating “Also think about the role of
Y ”.
Appendix 2.E.3
Feedback Identical to Narrow baseline, but subjects observe the actual




Identical to Computation, but subjects observe the actual draw




Identical to Computation with feedback, except that the com-
putation is added to the feedback instead of the information.
Appendix 2.F.3
Imperfect feedback Identical to Feedback, but subjects receive the true draw as
feedback only with 80% probability, while seeing another
value with 20% probability.
Appendix 2.F.4
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Table 2.A.2. Overview of online treatments
Condition Description Covered in
Baseline experiment
(Narrow only)
5 updating tasks in random order (Table 2.3). X and Y follow
independent distributions. Subjects only state a mean poste-
rior belief about X . No deciphering stage.
Main text
Form of Noise Neglect 10 updating tasks in random order (Table 2.D.5). Identical to
baseline online experiment but dierent information struc-
tures to analyze dierent candidates for the belief formation
rule under noise neglect.
Appendix 2.D.5
Signal-to-Noise Ratio 7 updating tasks in random order. Identical to baseline online
experiment but dierent information structures (Table 2.4).
The signal-to-noise ratio is varied between tasks.
Main text
Directional Bias 5 updating tasks in random order. Identical to baseline online
experiment but dierent information structures (Table 2.5). All
elements of the information structure are kept xed across
tasks except the mean of Y .
Main text
Appendix 2.B Conceptual Framework
2.B.1 An Endogenous Characterization of Signal and Noise
The basic framework presented in Section 2.2 focused on the belief formation
problem and took the classification of variables as signal (X ) or noise (Y ) as
given. In the simplest case, both X and Y were one-dimensional. X was charac-
terized as affecting the agent’s utility given an action, while Y did not. This is to
say that Y was only relevant for the agent in the belief formation process, i.e., to
form a more accurate belief about X , but not the in selection of an action given
a belief about X.
This crude distinction can be refined to better suit information structures in
practice. X is usually multi-dimensional, i.e., there are more than one and often
thousands of variables that affect utility given an action, even if to a minimal
degree. In that case, it is impossible for the agent to form beliefs about and
tailor his actions to all of those variables. The reason is again that tailoring an
action optimally to a belief about a variable is cognitively costly. Instead, agents
can restrict their optimization to a subset of the dimensions in X , accounting
for those that change actions most and have the biggest impact on utility, while
ignoring those that only change actions and utility by a little bit.
In the following I endogenize the characterization of variables as belonging
to X or Y by modeling an initial step in which the agent selects the variables
that he will tailor his actions to. This initial step is a crucial input for any subse-
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quent belief formation processes, which has been left out from the framework
presented in the main text.
Concretely, this initial stage classifies each stochastic variable in the world
into the following three types:
Category 1 Variables that do affect utility given an action, and which are considered
by the agent in selecting an action. These variables form the consideration
vector. Only variables included in the consideration vector can play the
role of X in the belief formation framework.
Category 2 Variables that do affect utility given an action, but which are not consid-
ered by the agent in selecting an action. This type is a subset of Y in the
belief formation framework.
Category 3 Variables that do not affect utility given an action, and which are not con-
sidered by the agent in selecting an action. This type corresponds to Y in
the belief formation framework.
The only new class is Category 2, which are variables that only change ac-
tions by a little bit, so that accounting for them would not affect utility by much.
The agent ignores these variables in his optimization. Moreover, when new infor-
mation is received prior to taking an action, the agent would treat these variables
exactly like Y , i.e., as noise. All variables in an information structure that do not
form part of a consideration vector classify as noise, or Y , even if they affect
utility given an action.
To illustrate, assume a consumer wants to buy a printer. Printers are fully
characterized by three unobservable attributes: durability, ease of handling and
maintenance cost, Z = (Zdurabil i t y , Zhandling , Zmaintenance). The utility derived
from the consumer’s action, a choice of printer, depends on the durability and
ease of handling, but not on maintenance cost. It also depends much more on
the durability than on ease of handling. Tailoring the subjective assessment of
a printer to each additional dimension comes at a cognitive cost, which can be
thought of as forming an explicit belief about the dimension and selecting an op-
timal action based on that belief. Similar to the belief formation framework, I as-
sume that the agent can either fully account for a variable or not at all, and there
is a fixed psychic cost per dimension, d.39 The agent can now choose the dimen-
sions that he will base his action on. For example, he might reasonably choose to
asses a given printer based only on his expectations about its durability, while ig-
noring both ease of handling and maintenance cost, since he cares little or not at
all about those. Crucially, this process occurs before learning about any informa-
tion structures and is entirely unconnected to considerations about belief forma-
tion. Instead, this is purely about the “importance” of an attribute in the agent’s
39 Cost d might be different from the cost of forming a posterior q.
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utility function. However, this selection process is an input to any following be-
lief updating. Assume the agent now receives a relevant piece of information
about a printer that is influenced by the unobserved levels of all three variables,
e.g., a customer rating. He will then treat durability as signal, X = Zdurabil i t y ,
and the other two variables as noise, Y = (Zhandling , Zmaintenance).
More generally, I conceptualize the process of selecting Category 1 variables,
or his consideration vector, as follows:
1. For each candidate consideration vector, the agent determines his opti-
mal actions given his prior belief about the distribution of variables in the
consideration vector. He solves the problem of finding the optimal action
based on the (false) assumption that his utility not does depend on any
variable that is excluded from the consideration vector.
2. Given these hypothetical actions, he calculates his expected benefit from
each consideration vector, based on his true utility function. He selects the
consideration vector with highest expected benefit net of cognitive cost.
Let Z ∈ Rn be a variable with dimension corresponding to the number of
variables that affect utility given an action, i.e., all variables except those in Cate-
gory 3. The agent’s prior belief is a distribution h ∈∆(Z1 × Z2 × · · · × Zn). Action
m (h) ∈ M has arbitrary dimension. Utility is u(m, z) = u(m, z1, z2, . . . , zn). The
consideration vector Zconsid consists of some, but not necessarily all dimensions
of Z . Which elements are contained in Zconsid is specified by an n-dimensional
vector b of zeros and ones that indicates the dimensions of Z that are accom-
modated when selecting an action. Let ub a modified utility function in which
utility only depends on the variables in the consideration vector, ub(m, zconsid).40
I further call hb ∈∆(Zconsid) the belief about variables in the consideration set
and mb(hb) the action that optimizes ub.
The agent selects a consideration vector as follows, where d is a fixed psychic
cost per dimension:
b = argmin




mb(hb), z1, z2, . . . , zn
 − n∑
i=1
bi · d (2.B.1)
Intuitively, the agent determines optimal actions in lower-dimensional space,
ignoring some dimensions as dictated by a candidate consideration vector, and
then evaluates these actions based on his true utility function. Changing the
consideration vector does not change the range of available actions, e.g., “buy”
and “don’t buy” a given printer model. The consideration vector always needs
to include at least one dimension.
40 ub is the projection of u onto the space (M × Zconsid).
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This notion of how people focus on “more relevant" dimensions is closely
related to and inspired by the “sparse max” of Gabaix (2014). In fact, b is a
sparse vector which has similarities to Gabaix’ (2014) attention vector m.41
What happens if the agent receives information before taking an action? The
consideration vector specifies the dimensions in an information structure that
the agent always attends to. The intuition is that because the agent tailors his
actions to a given variable, he forms a belief about that variable in any case and
thereby incurs a fixed cognitive cost. One example relating to the experimental
paradigm is the action of guessing a realization of X directly: it is impossible to
not think about X when stating a guess even if subjects would not receive an
additional piece of information. This is one justification for noise neglect that
is absent in all other work on attention such as rational inattention. Because
people attune their action to their beliefs about some attributes, but not others,
they give attentional priority to those dimensions even in the absence of new
information. When new information arrives, they benefit from already thinking
about X which makes it less costly to relate the new information to that variable.
This can generate overreaction where rational inattention models would predict
inertia.
Appendix 2.C Baseline Experiments
2.C.1 Procedure of Updating Tasks: Laboratory Experiment
• Learn joint prior 
distribution of random 
numbers X and Y.
• Learn signal structure: 
sum or average, 
depending on task.
• Receive encrypted signal,
i.e. a sequence of letters.
• Decipher signal using 
algorithm in instructions.
• Indicate full posterior 
distribution:
- Narrow: Marginal 
distribution of X.
- Broad: Joint distribution 
of X and Y.
Figure 2.C.1. Timeline of updating task in laboratory experiment.
41 There are some differences. The sparse max stresses the importance of defaults for each
variable, which are assumed to be their respective means. The above formalization abstracts from
explicit default values, suggesting that people truly ignore dimensions outside of the consideration
vector, rather than using defaults. Gabaix (2014) also allows for continuously chosen attention
and closes the model by approximating the expected utility losses relative to the full attention
case, while I focus on the simpler, binary case. More generally, the sparse max has a different
goal than the present paper and is not specifically geared to the specific role of attention for
belief formation.
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2.C.2 Consistency of Attention Across Tasks
In this section I examine how consistently inattentive or consistently Bayesian
subjects behave across tasks. Figure 2.2 in the main text includes five beliefs
per subjects. But does each subject exhibit a stable level of attention? Figure
2.C.2 shows kernel density estimates of subject-level mean inattention. While
there is a strong clustering of subjects in the Broad condition who always form
beliefs that are close to an implied inattention of zero, there are no such two
clusterings in the Narrow treatment – one at each end of the attention spectrum
– as could be expected from Figure 2.2. Instead, there is a smaller clustering at
mean inattention values of between 0.8 and 1. Indeed, I find that many subjects
in Narrow condition formed close to Bayesian beliefs in some tasks, and close
to fully inattentive beliefs in other tasks. In fact, 15.5% of subjects in Narrow
indicated both a fully Bayesian and a fully inattentive belief at least once. This
may suggest that a subject’s degree of attention to Y varies across situations to
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Estimated subject-level mean of inattention
Condition Narrow Condition Broad
Figure 2.C.2. Subject-level mean of inattention to Y . N=144. For each sub-
ject I calculate the mean inattention in the ve baseline tasks. The curves
show kernel density estimates for each treatment (both N=72). A parame-
ter of θ = 0 is consistent with Bayesian updating. θ = 1 means complete
inattention. Epanechnikov kernel with bandwith 0.1.
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Appendix 2.D Robustness Treatments
2.D.1 Task Variations
Table 2.D.3. Overview of robustness tasks
Task Sample space X Sample space Y Signal type Signal value
Correlated data (r=0.7) {95,96, . . . , 104,105} {−15,−14, . . . , 14,15} (X + Y )÷ 2 104
Larger sample space (> 10) {190,191, . . . , 209,210} {180,181, . . . , 219,220} (X + Y )÷ 2 208
Discrete normally distributed numbers {170,180, . . . 220,230} {−50,−40, . . . 40,50} X + Y 220
Signal out of X range {240,241, . . . , 259,260} {−15,−14, . . . , 14,15} X + Y 230
Notes: This table provides an overview of the four robustness belief tasks. The distributions of X and Y as well as the
signal structure are identical in both treatment conditions. X and Y were independently drawn from two discrete uniform
distribution, i.e., every indicated outcome was equally likely.
Table 2.D.4. Median inattention in robustness tasks






Correlated data (r=0.7) 0.59 0.00 < 0.001
Larger sample space (> 10) 1.00 0.33 < 0.001
Discrete normally distributed numbers 0.44 0.27 < 0.001
Signal out of X range 0.49 0.17 < 0.001
Notes: This table displays group medians of implied inattention parameters by treatment condition
for four additional belief formation tasks. Inattention is calculated as θ = HBHB+HN , where HB and HN
denote the Hellinger distance of the subjective distribution to the Bayesian posterior and the inatten-
tive posterior distribution, respectively. Task order was randomized within each of the two blocks. 72


































































Condition Narrow Condition Broad Bayesian posterior
Figure 2.D.3.Distribution of elicited belief distributions about X in each one of four robustness tasks. N=72 for each condition
in each task. The horizontal axis shows possible outcomes of X . The Bayesian posterior belief is provided for reference. The
observed signal is indicated by the vertical dashed line. The conrresponding task congurations are shown in Table 2.D.3.
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2.D.2 Face Value Heuristic and Anchoring
In treatment Computation, a simple algebraic computation was added on top
of the signal structure. The resulting signals provided in the five baseline tasks
were “average of X and Y minus (3·5) plus 35”, “sum of X and Y plus (2·10)
minus 30”, “sum of X and Y plus 40 minus (4·5)”, “average of X and Y minus
(8·5) plus 10”, and “average of X and Y plus (3·5) plus 10”. Note that given the
simplicity of these calculations, it is possible that subjects did not have to execute
these computations effortfully but the results automatically came to mind. This
is suggested by research on dual processing (Thompson, 2013).
The computations were chosen such anchoring on the signal value remains
equally plausible. If subjects apply a simple face value heuristic, they should
ignore both the the computation and the variation of Y. Figure 2.D.4 shows raw
beliefs in condition Computation, including the signal value and the signal value
after accounting for the computation. There is limited evidence for anchoring on
the signal value. Subjects do not simply take the signal at face value, but they






















































































































Computation in Narrow Bayesian posterior
Figure 2.D.4. Distribution of elicited belief distributions about X in condition Computation. N=24 in each task. The horizontal
axis shows possible outcomes of X . The Bayesian posterior belief is provided for reference. The observed signal is indicated
by the solid dashed line, and the signal value after undoing the computation is shown by the dashed line. In all ve tasks, X
and Y follow independent discrete uniform distributions that were shown to subjects. Task order was randomized.













Narrow with joint elicitation Broad with sequential elicitation
Figure 2.D.5. Subject-level mean of inattention to Y in four conditions.
Based on N=216. For each subject I calculate the mean inattention in the
ve baseline tasks. The curves show kernel density estimates for each treat-
ment (Narrow N=72, Broad N=72, Narrow with joint elicitation N=24, Broad
with sequential elicitation N=48). A parameter of θ = 0 is consistent with
Bayesian updating. θ = 1 means complete inattention. Epanechnikov ker-
nel with bandwith 0.1.
In treatments Narrow and Broad, prediction incentives are different, but the
elicitation method also differs. In Narrow, subjects only indicate the marginal of
X, while in Broad, subjects indicate the joint distribution of X and Y. To rule out
that treatment effects are driven by this difference in what is elicited, I designed
two additional treatments. In Narrow with joint elicitation, only X is paid for (as
in Narrow) but the joint distribution is elicited exactly as in Broad. In Broad with
sequential elicitation, X and Y are paid for (as in Broad) but now the subject first
indicates the marginal of X, and then indicates the marginal of Y on a separate
screen. This way, the first screen (for the marginal of X) is exactly identical to
Narrow. Figure 2.D.5 plots kernel density estimates of the within-subject mean
of inattention in the five belief tasks for all four treatments. Mean inattention in
the four treatments is 0.25 (Broad), 0.34 (Broad with sequential elicitation), 0.47
(Narrow with joint elicitation), and 0.57 (Narrow). These findings imply that the
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treatment effect is not an artifact of different elicitation methods. Harmonizing
the elicitation procedure somewhat reduces the effect in the predicted direction,
















 Narrow without deciphering and time limit
Figure 2.D.6. Implied inattention to Y in three conditions. Based on 1,944
stated beliefs. The curves show kernel density estimates for each treatment
(Narrow N=864, Broad N=864, Simplication N=216). A parameter of θ = 0
is consistent with Bayesian updating. θ = 1 means complete inattention.
Epanechnikov kernel with bandwith 0.1.
To study the role of complexity in the experimental setting, an additional condi-
tion drastically simplifies the experimental procedure by removing the decipher-
ing stage as well as all time constraints. In this treatment, subjects are paid to
predict X as in Narrow, but they do not have to decipher the signal and have un-
limited time to indicate their guess. Effectively, they are given the distributions
of X and Y, and directly see the value of the signal. There is a statistically signif-
icant reduction in inattention relative to Narrow in this case (p = 0.00). At the
same time, inattention remains far higher than in Broad (p = 0.00). Mean inat-
tention is 0.57 in Narrow, 0.40 in Simplification, and 0.25 in Broad. Also, there is
somewhat reduced bunching at fully inattentive and fully Bayesian beliefs. Con-
siderable simplifications improve predictions, but do not eliminate the effect of
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Narrow incentives. Figure 2.D.6 plots kernel density estimates of the distribu-
tion of inattention parameters in Simplification together with Narrow and Broad
for reference.
2.D.5 The Form of Noise Neglect
Table 2.D.5. Online experiment on form of noise neglect
X Y Info structure I Observed info i
U{75,76, . . . , 125} U {90,91, . . . , 110} X+Y2 Individual drawU{75,76, . . . , 125} U {−25,−24, . . . , 25} X + Y Individual draw
N (100,400) N (50,100) X+Y2 Individual drawN (100,400) N (100,100) X+Y2 Individual drawN (100,400) N (100,100) X + Y Individual draw
U{50,51, . . . , 150} U {50,51, . . . , 150} X + Y 145
U{75,76, . . . , 125} U {90,91, . . . , 110} X+Y2 116N (100,400) N (100,100) 2 · X + 2 · Y 412
N (100,400) N (100,100) 2 · X + Y 266
N (100,400) N (100,100) X + Y 110
Notes: This table provides an overview of the ten belief tasks in the online experiment on the form of
noise neglect. Note that for all normally distributed variables, the support was discretized to integers,
truncated at µ− 50 and µ+ 50 and then the distributions were scaled such that the they have unit
probability mass.
Table 2.D.5 displays the ten tasks used in an online experiment on the form of
noise neglect with 79 subjects recruited from Mturk. In five of those tasks, infor-
mation values were drawn individually for each subject, while in the remaining
tasks one information value was drawn jointly for all subjects to obtain higher
power for a specific realization.
Figures 2.D.7 and 2.D.8 illustrate the corresponding results, which are also
discussed in the main text in Section 2.3.1.7. In each of the tasks in 2.D.7, the
solid reference line corresponds to Bayesian posteriors while the dashed line
indicates reference beliefs under noise neglect.
Figure 2.D.8 demonstrates that the form of noise neglect is not generally
in line with people using a modified distribution of Y . To see this, the green
line indicates a corresponding threshold: all belief on the opposite side of the
Bayesian posterior are not compatible with any possible implied distribution of
Y on the actual support of Y . At the same time, these tasks indicate that noise
neglect is not easily reconciled with oversensitivity to the likelihood (or neglect
of base rates), as would be in line with, e.g., diagnostic expectations (Bordalo et
al., 2018). Consider for example the task displayed in the upper right corner of
Figure 2.D.8, where X ∼U{50,51, . . . , 150}, Y ∼U{50,51, . . . , 150}, I = X +
Y and i = 145. Here, an information value of 145 indicates that a relatively small
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value of X , i.e., x < 100, has been drawn, and the likelihood increase is greatest
for values of X below 100. However, people predominantly choose values above

























































Figure 2.D.7. Raw beliefs in online experiment on the form of noise neglect.
The solid reference line indicates the Bayesian posterior, the dashed line
shows noise neglect. N = 79 in each task. Displayed are the ve out of ten
tasks in which the information value was individually drawn for each sub-
ject. The task order (of all ten tasks) was randomized at the individual level.


























































I = X + Y
Figure 2.D.8. Raw beliefs in online experiment on the form of noise neglect.
The solid red reference line indicates the Bayesian posterior, the dashed red
line shows noise neglect. The green line indicates a threshold. All belief on
the opposite side of the Bayesian posterior are not compatible with any
possible implied distribution of Y on the actual support of Y . These tasks
therefore provide evidence against the idea that noise neglect is in line with
people using amodied distribution of Y . N = 79 in each task. Displayed are
the ve out of ten tasks in which all subjects observed the same information
value. The task order (of all ten tasks) was randomized at the individual
level.
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Appendix 2.E Mechanism Treatments
2.E.1 Directional Bias




1 if rel. distance from
noise neglect < 0.1
(1) (2)
Y ∼N (−50,100) 0.088** -0.128**
(0.044) (0.061)
Y ∼N (−25,100) 0.142** -0.176**
(0.058) (0.084)
Y ∼N (25,100) 0.154*** -0.211***
(0.043) (0.064)
Y ∼N (50,100) 0.169*** -0.238***
(0.056) (0.084)





# Observations 548 549
Notes: The dependent variables are computed based on dNNdNN+dB+dIN where d· is the
distance of a stated belief m to the respective benchmark belief for each of three
updating modes, e.g., dB =
m−mB is the dierence to the Bayesian belief. Hence the
dependent variable in (1) is the distance of a belief to a hypothetical belief under noise
neglect, relative to the summed distances of the elicited belief to all three updating
modes. The dependent variable in (2) is a dummy for whether this relative distance is
smaller than 0.1, such that a belief is plausibly classied as noise neglect. In all tasks,
X ∼N (100,100) and I = X + Y . OLS regressions. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
2.E Mechanism Treatments | 73
2.E.2 The Role of Eort: Manipulation of Stake Size
Table 2.E.7. Inattentive inference and eort
Tasks: Bonus round (variation of stakes)
Conditions: Narrow and Broad Narrow
Dependent variable: Response time Inattention θ
(1) (2) (3)
High stakes in bonus task 19.778** -0.017 0.001
(8.711) (0.054) (0.100)
0 if Broad, 1 if Narrow -32.444*** 0.502***
(7.538) (0.084)
Treatment dummy * High stakes -3.830 0.019
(11.795) (0.113)
Constant 66.111*** 0.101** 0.603***
(5.671) (0.042) (0.073)
R2 0.24 0.37 0.00
# Observations 144 144 72
Notes: OLS regressions. In the bonus round I randomly vary within each treatment
whether incentives are 1 euro or 10 euros. Response time is the duration in sec-
onds the subject spent on the belief elicitation page. Inattention is calculated as
θ = HBHB+HN , whereHB andHN denote the Hellinger distance of the subjective distri-
bution to the Bayesian posterior and the inattentive posterior distribution, respec-
tively. Robust standard errors clustered at participant level in parentheses. *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

















Figure 2.E.9. Implied inattention to Y in three conditions. Based on 950
stated beliefs. The curves show kernel density estimates for each treatment
(Narrow N=360, Broad N=360, Hint N=230). A parameter of θ = 0 is consis-
tent with Bayesian updating. θ = 1 means complete inattention to noise.
Epanechnikov kernel with bandwith 0.05.
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2.E.4 Condence Ratings
After finishing the baseline, robustness and bonus belief tasks in the laboratory,
each of the tasks was again presented successively including all previously shown
information as well as the subject’s stated guess. In a list with fixed monetary
amounts from 0 euros to 6.25 euros in steps of 0.25 euros, subjects then indi-
cated whether they prefer to be paid out for their stated belief, or receive this
fixed amount, in case this belief task would be selected to count. Single switch-
ing was enforced. Figure 2.E.10 shows that implied inattention of the belief and















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
 
Inattention parameter
Condition Narrow Condition Broad
Linear fit Narrow Linear fit Broad
Figure 2.E.10. Scatterplot and linear regression ts for valuations of stated
beliefs and implied inattention by condition. Based on N=360 each for con-
dition Narrow and condition Broad.
76 | 2 Inattentive Inference
2.E.5 Switch-Role Tasks
As the last part of the main baseline experiment, i.e., following the confidence
tasks, subjects were (unexpectedly) presented with two additional tasks in
which roles were switched with the respective other condition. The switch-role
task configurations were comparable to those of the baseline tasks. Figure 2.E.11
displays group means of inattention for each of the blocks of tasks by condition.
Having previously predicted X and Y in condition Broad makes subjects some-
what less inattentive than in the Narrow baseline, but not by much. A highly






















Baseline tasks Switch-role tasks
 
Task block
Condition Narrow Condition Broad
Figure 2.E.11. Group means of inattention by task block and condition.
Based on N=360 baseline beliefs and N=144 switch-role beliefs each for
condition Narrow and condition Broad .
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Appendix 2.F Learning Treatments
In the first baseline round, i.e., before receiving feedback for the first time, inat-










Figure 2.F.12. Treatment means of inattention to Y in the rst round. Dis-
played are implied inattention scores in the initial baseline round. Subjects
have not previously received feedback when stating these guesses. Sample
sizes are N = 48 in both Feedback N = 24 each in all other three conditions.
78 | 2 Inattentive Inference
2.F.1 Feedback
From the initial experiments we know that the neglect of Y is typically confident
and occurs outside subjects’ awareness. The key hypothesis motivating the feed-
back treatments is that people fail to reflect on steps of their solution strategy
that are not available to introspection or recall, interfering with learning even
in the presence of surprising feedback. Condition Feedback is akin to Narrow,
but also shows the actually drawn number of X after guessing it. Relative to
the no-feedback benchmark (condition Narrow), there is marginally significant
learning after receiving feedback for the first time (p=0.06, in a regression of
inattention in the second round on a treatment dummy and including task-fixed
effects). After having received feedback four times, mean inattention is .27 as
compared to .69 in the no-feedback baseline. Despite this sizable improvement,
inattention is still significantly greater than in the fifth round of the no-feedback
setting with Broad incentives (mean inattention 0.10, p=0.00). Figure 2.F.13
shows a histogram of inattention parameters, and Figure 2.F.14 histograms of
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Implied inattention parameter
Figure 2.F.13. Histogram of implied inattention to Y in condition Feed-
back. Based on 216 stated beliefs. A parameter of θ = 0 is consistent with





























































































































Figure 2.F.14. Distribution of elicited belief distributions about X in each one of ve baseline tasks of condition Feedback.
N=24 for each condition in each task. The horizontal axis shows possible outcomes of X . The Bayesian posterior belief is
provided for reference. The observed signal is indicated by the vertical dashed line. Task order was randomized.
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2.F.2 Computation with Feedback
To directly test the hypothesis that people fail to reflect on the non-accessible
elements of their solution strategy, Computation with Feedback provides feed-
back that is identical to Feedback, but the initial signal about X and Y is mod-
ified by a simple algebraic computation. This condition is identical to the an-
choring treatment Computation, but including the feedback stage. As found in
the Computation condition and confirmed here, the additional computation is
inconsequential for the guesses about X that subjects submit (see also Figure
2.F.12). Virtually every subject correctly accounts for the computation but then
tends to forget about Y. Presented with surprising feedback about the actually
drawn number, however, subjects might now first remember the conscious part
of their inference strategy, i.e., undoing the calculations. The computations pro-
vide them with "a place to hang their coat" in the sense of an obvious – albeit
unlikely – source of error. This is what I find: Adding the computation virtually
eliminates learning. Figure 2.F.15 shows a histogram of inattention parameters,
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Implied inattention parameter
Figure 2.F.15. Histogram of implied inattention to Y in condition Computa-
tion with Feedback. Based on 216 stated beliefs. A parameter of θ = 0 is





























































































































Figure 2.F.16. Distribution of elicited belief distributions about X in each one of ve baseline tasks of condition Computation
with Feedback. N=24 for each condition in each task. The horizontal axis shows possible outcomes of X . The Bayesian poste-
rior belief is provided for reference. The observed signal is indicated by the vertical dashed line. Task order was randomized.
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2.F.3 Computational Feedback
Reduced learning when algebra is added could result from increased complexity.
In condition Computation Feedback, therefore, subjects have narrow incentives
and receive a signal on X and Y without additional computations, i.e., the mean
or sum as before. This time however, the same computations as in Computation
with Feedback are added at the feedback stage. That means, instead of seeing
the true value of X, subjects see a different value on which they first perform
the computations and then arrive at the true value of X. The results suggest it
is not computational complexity of a problem per se that reduces learning form
feedback. Instead, it is precisely the consciously accessible steps of reasoning
performed when doing inference that interfere with reflecting on the role of Y.
Figure 2.F.17 shows a histogram of inattention parameters, and Figure 2.F.18
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Implied inattention parameter
Figure 2.F.17. Histogram of implied inattention to Y in condition Compu-
tational Feedback. Based on 216 stated beliefs. A parameter of θ = 0 is





























































































































Figure 2.F.18.Distribution of elicited belief distributions about X in each one of ve baseline tasks of condition Computational
Feedback. N=24 for each condition in each task. The horizontal axis shows possible outcomes of X . The Bayesian posterior
belief is provided for reference. The observed signal is indicated by the vertical dashed line. Task order was randomized.
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2.F.4 Imperfect Feedback
Learning in practice is often based on imprecise signals. The possibility that
observed feedback is not exactly right might provide another obvious way for
subjects to explain a conflict between their stated belief and received feedback,
reducing learning. In an additional treatment, feedback about the true X was
only correct with 80% probability, and the remaining 20% subjects would see
a value of X which is not the true one. Pooling beliefs following the first four
rounds of feedback, there is only a small and marginally significant positive
effect of receiving this feedback on inattention relative to receiving no feedback
at all (p = 0.09). As predicted, simple solutions for why beliefs conflict with the
feedback compromise the ability to reflect on the role of Y. Figure 2.F.19 shows
a histogram of inattention parameters, and Figure 2.F.20 histograms of the raw
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Implied inattention parameter
Figure 2.F.19. Histogram of implied inattention to Y in condition Imperfect
Feedback. Based on 216 stated beliefs. A parameter of θ = 0 is consistent





























































































































Figure 2.F.20. Distribution of elicited belief distributions about X in each one of ve baseline tasks of condition Imperfect
Feedback. N=24 for each condition in each task. The horizontal axis shows possible outcomes of X . The Bayesian posterior
belief is provided for reference. The observed signal is indicated by the vertical dashed line. Task order was randomized.
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Appendix 2.G Experimental Instructions
2.G.1 Main Instructions in Narrow and Broad
All instructions were computerized. Translated from German into English.
Welcome. For your participation you will receive a fixed payment of 10.00
€ , which will be paid to you in cash at the end. In this study you will take
decisions on the computer. Depending on how you decide you can earn addi-
tional money. During the study it is not allowed to communicate with other
participants. Note also that the curtain of your cubicle must be closed
during the entire study. Please turn off your mobile phone now, so that other
participants will not be disturbed. Please only use the designated functions on
the computer and make your entries using the keyboard and the mouse. If you
have questions, please make a hand signal. Your question will be answered at
your seat. To proceed click "Next".
Your Task
You will successively receive 9 different guessing tasks. The guessing tasks are
about guessing numbers that are randomly drawn. The better your guess, the
more money you can earn. In each guessing task there is a random number
X. The computer randomly picks X from a range of possible numbers. You will
receive an encrypted hint about which number was actually drawn, and you
can then indicate your guess about X. There are 9 rounds in total. In each round
you receive a new guessing task. That means, in each round the computer
again determines a number X independently of the other rounds. Your payoff
depends on how precisely you guess, that means how accurate your guess is. At
the end of the study, one of the 9 rounds is picked at random and you will be
paid according to the precision of your guess in that round.
The Guessing Tasks
Example. Imagine there are exactly 3 balls. These 3 balls have the following
numbers on them: 10, 20, 30. In this example, the number X is determined
as follows: The computer randomly draws one of these three balls. Each ball is
drawn with equal probability. It is equally likely that the “10” will be drawn, that
the “20” will be drawn, or that the “30” will be drawn. The number X is then
the number of the ball that was randomly drawn by the computer. However, you
will not be told which number X was drawn. Instead you receive an additional
hint. You can look at this hint, before you guess the number X. Please note:
• For each guessing you will be informed about which numbers can be
drawn. In different guessing tasks, different numbers can be drawn. Some-
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times the numbers repeatedly occur across rounds. However, the draws in
these rounds are completely independent of one another.
• The additional hint can give you different types of information in different
rounds. In each round youwill learn anew, what the additional hint means.
Therefore you should pay attention in every new guessing task to which
information the hint indicates.
Your guess. You can state your guess by allocating 100 percentage points
to the different numbers. The more certain you are, that a particular number
was drawn, the more points you should allocated to this numbers. Similarly,
the more certain you are, that a particular was not drawn, the fewer points
you should allocate to this numbers. The sum of your allocated points must be
exactly 100. In the example above, if after receiving the additional note you
are, for example, sure that X = 30, then you should allocate 100 points to the
number 30, and 0 points to both the numbers 10 and 20. In the example above,
if after receiving the additional note you are, for example, sure that X = 20,
then you should allocate 100 points to the number 20, and 0 points to both the
numbers 10 and 30. In the example above, if after receiving the additional note
you think, for example, that the number 30 have definitely not been drawn, but
the 10 and 20 have been drawn with equal probability, then you should allocate
50 points each to the number 10 and 20, and 0 points to the number 30. You
can arbitrarily allocate the points. However you can only allocate full points,
that means for example that you cannot allocate half points. For instance, you
could allocate 21 points to number 30, 47 points to number 20, and 32 points
to number 10. The more points you assign to the number that was actually
drawn, the more money you can earn. Similarly, the fewer points you
allocate to those numbers, that are not equal to X, the more money you
can earn. The calculation of your payoff will be explained in greater detail in
the following section.
Your payment
In addition to your show up fee you will be paid based on how precisely you
guessed. To this end one of the 9 rounds will randomly be picked and you will
be paid according to the precision of your guess in that round. This means
for you that each one of your guesses is potentially relevant for your payment
and accordingly you should carefully think through every guess. You can
either earn and additional 10 € or 0 € from your guessing task. While the
following explanation might look difficult, the basic principle is very simple:
the better your guess, that is the more percentage points your guess
assigns to the actually drawn number and the fewer percentage points
it allocates to every wrong number, the more likely it is that you receive
the 10€ . Concretely this means the following: In expectation you will earn
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most money if you allocate your points according to how probable you find it
that the respective numbers was drawn (with 1 point = 1 percent). If you have
understood this, it is not necessary for the maximization of your earnings to
read the following section on the details of the calculation of your additional
payment. You can then directly click on “Next.”
For your information: Details on the calculation of your additional earnings.
For working on the guessing tasks it is not necessary that you read and fully
understand the following section on the calculation of your payoff. you can also
skip this part. After you have stated your guess, the computer will randomly
draw another number kj This number is between 0 and 20,000. (More precisely,
this numbers is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution on the interval from
0 to 20,000.) You will then receive the 10 € if the sum S is smaller or equal to
k. S is the sum of the following elements:
• The squared deviation between the number of points that you allocated
to the actually drawn numbers X, and 100 points.
• For each possible number, that has not been drawn (i.e., every other num-
ber than X): The squared deviation between 0 points and the number of
points that you allocated to this numbers.
An exact mathematical formula of the sum S is displayed in the footnote.42 If
the sum S is bigger than k you will receive 0 € . Accordingly, the payoff rule is
as follows:
Payment = 10.00 € , if S ≤ k
Payment = 0.00 € , if S > k
This means the following: If the sum of the squared deviations exceeds a partic-
ular value k, you will receive 0€ . If, however, the sum of the squared deviations
is smaller than k, you will receive 10 € in addition. You can notice here that it
should be your goal a) to keep the difference between the points allocated to X
and 100 points as low as possible, that is to allocate as many points as possible
to X, and b) to allocate as few points as possible to ever other number than X. An
example: Let us assume that the computer has randomly drawn the number X =
30, while the numbers 10, 20 and 30 could have been drawn with equal proba-
bility. Also the number k = 5,000 For the following guesses you would receive
the indicated payments.
42 Footnote text: Exact mathematical formulation: There are N possible number from which X
is drawn. In the example, N = 3. The number of points that you allocate to the ith of the N
numbers is pi . The indicator function 1i takes the value 1, if X is the ith number, and 0 otherwise.
The sum S is calculated as follows: S =
∑N
i=1(1i − pi)2. The expected payoff amount is maximized
by indicating the probability distribution of the numbers after receiving the additional hint.
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In particular this means the following: If you allocate all 100 points to the
right number X, you will received the 10 € in any case. However, you will
also receive 10 € in many cases in which you allocate less than 100 points
to X. The more points you allocate to the right number X, the more likely it is,
that you receive the 10 € . In expectation, you will earn the most money if
you allocate the points according to how probable you think it is that the
respective number was drawn. Please note:
• It is not necessary, to allocate 100 points to the number that you think is
most likely. As you can see in the examples of the table, you can also win
10 € if you have allocated less than 100 points to the right number X.
Your earnings depend on the randomly drawn number k.
• Your guess in one randomly picked round will be paid. The guessing task
that is payoff relevant for you is determined by the computer at the end of
the study. Therefore you should indicate your best guess in each guessing
task, independent of all other guessing tasks.
Summary
In each round it is your task to state a guess about the number that was
randomly drawn by the computer. Before this, you will get a computer-
generated, encrypted hint. For each guessing task you will see this additional
hint and you can subsequently indicate your guess. Which hint you will receive,
and how this hint is encrypted will be explained in the following. For the
deciphering of the hint and your subsequent guess there is a time limit. You will
previously be informed about how much time you have. The remaining time
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will be displayed while working on the tasks.
Encryption of Hints
You receive additional hints that have been encrypted by an encryption device.
The encryption device transforms each hint (a number) into a letter code. You
first need to decrypt the letter code back into a number in order to use the hint.
Decryption of the additional hint. When you get an encrypted sequence of
letters as hint, you can decipher this hint by following these steps:
a. Transform the sequence of letters into a number using the code table.
b. Add 20 to the number
Before every guessing task you will receive an encrypted hint that you can
decipher before stating your own guess. Whenever you receive a hint, you will
see the code table as well as the decryption instructions. That means you
don not have to remember the decryption procedure. You will soon get the
opportunity to practice the decryption on an example hint.
Control Questions
Please notify one of the experiments now if you have questions about the in-
structions so far. If there is something that is unclear to you, please re-read the
respective information carefully. You can return to the previous pages by clicking
“Back”. If you click on “Proceed to control questions”, you will receive several
control questions, which ensure your understanding of the instructions. You will
not get paid for the control questions. However, you have to correctly answer all
control questions to proceed to the guessing tasks. After you have correctly an-
swered all control questions, you will be presented with the first guessing task.
2.G.2 Control Questions
Control Question 1 of 9
What is your main task in this study?
• There are several number from which X can be drawn. I need to add these
numbers up to a sum.
• I guess the drawn number X.
2.G Experimental Instructions | 91
Control Question 2 of 9
The numbers from which X is drawn vary across rounds. Sometimes the num-
bers occur in different rounds. For example, it could be that in two different
rounds, the number X is randomly drawn from the number “10”, “20”, and “30”.
Please evaluate the following statement: “In both round, each of the 3 numbers
is drawn with equal probability.”
• Wrong. If, for example, the “10” was drawn in the first round, it is more
probable that “10” will not be drawn in the next round.
• Correct. Both rounds are completely independent. The draw in the first
round has no influence on which number is drawn in the second round.
Control Question 3 of 9
In guessing X, how can you make most money?
• By allocating the points to the numbers as precisely as possible based on
how certain I am, that the respective number is X.
• By varying my guess and allocating by instinct sometimes more points to
high numbers and sometimes more points to low numbers.
Control Question 4 of 9
After you have read the description of the guessing task and received the ad-
ditional hint, you think that the number “20” is the most likely drawn number
among the numbers. However you are not certain that it is the “20”. Assess the
following statement: “To maximize my payoff I have to put all 100 points on the
number “10”.”
• Correct. It is only this way that I can earn the 10 euros.
• Wrong. While I should put more points on the “20” than on all other
numbers, I should not putt all points on the “20” , because I am not
certain. If for example i am 60% sure that X = 20, I should put exactly
60 points on the “20”, and allocate the remaining 40 points to the other
numbers. This way it is most probably that I earn the 10 euros.
Control Question 5 of 9
Which of your guess is payoff-relevant?
• Every guess is paid out.
• No guess is paid out.
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• A randomly picked guess is paid out.
Control Question 6 of 9
Imagine the number X is drawn with equal probability from the following four
numbers: 50, 60, 70, 80. You have no additional information. Please indicate
how in this case you should allocate the 100 points to the four numbers such
that you make winning the 10 euros as likely as possible. Start by picking a
number in the selection box to the left and assign a number of percentage
points in the input field to the right. Use further input rows if you want to
assign percentage points to other numbers.
Control Question 7 of 9
As before the number X is drawn with equal probability from the following four
numbers: 50, 60, 70, 80. Please imagine now that after deciphering the hint
you are certain that the “70” was drawn. Please indicate how in this case you
should allocate the 100 points to the four numbers such that you make winning
the 10 euros as likely as possible. If you want to allocate 0 percentage points
to a number then you do not have to enter this into an extra row, but you can
simply skip this number (0 points will automatically be allocated).
Control Question 8 of 9
Imagine you receive the hint: AJ. Please decipher the hint and enter your result
below.
a. Transform the sequence of letters into a number using the code table.
b. Add 20 to the number
The decrypted hint reads:
Control Question 9 of 9
Imagine now you receive the hint: ACJ. Please decipher the hint and enter your
result below.
a. Transform the sequence of letters into a number using the code table.
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b. Add 20 to the number
The decrypted hint reads:
2.G.3 Task Instructions
Next to X another number was drawn by the computer, Y. Whether a participant
has to guess Y as well was randomly determined at the beginning of the study
and has no impact on the size of possible earnings.
[ Treatment Narrow: To you applies the following: You indicate a guess only
about X and will be paid for your guess of X as described. ]
[ Treatment Broad: To you applies the following: You guess both drawn
numbers, X and Y. One of the numbers will later be picked and you will be
paid for your guess of this number as described. ]
[ The following description varies by task ]
X was randomly drawn from the following 5 numbers between 80 and 120,
where each number was equally likely: 80, 90, 100, 110, 120.
Y was randomly drawn from the following 7 numbers between -30 and 30,
were each number was equally likely: -30, -20, -10, 0, 10, 20, 30.
X and Y were drawn independently.
[ Treatment Broad: You will guess X and Y simultaneously, that means in each
entry row you have to pick both a number for X and a number for Y and
indicate a percentage alongside, which is your guess that these two numbers
were drawn together. ]
When you click “Next”, you will first receive your additional hint on the follow-
ing page. You have 5 minutes time to decipher the hint. Then you have another
5 minutes of time to indicate you guess. The remaining time will be displayed
on the upper right corner of the pages.
Your Additional Hint
Your additional hint for the guess of X [ X and Y ] is: FJ. The completely decrypted
hint indicates the sum of the 2 drawn numbers, i.e., X + Y.
Decryption Instructions.
a. Transform the sequence of letters into a number using the code table.
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b. Add 20 to the number
[ Calculator provided. ] On the next page you will see the entry fields for your
guess. You can now enter your decrypted additional hint below, then it will be
displayed again on the next page.Your deciphered additional hint reads: ...
Once you click on “Next” you have 5 minutes time to indicate your guess.
2.G.4 Decision Screens: Laboratory, Baseline Study
Figure 2.G.21. Exemplary decision screen in condition Narrow (translated
from German). The number 230 indicates the average of X and Y. Subjects
state their belief by indicating a full posterior distribution for X. They have
to select values for X using the dropdown menu and enter a number of
percentage points in the elds on the right. They can use arbitrary many
entry lines. The current sum of percentage points is indicated and has to
equal exactly 100 before one can proceed. On the bottom of the screen, the
distributions of X and Y are indicated as a reminder.
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Figure 2.G.22. Exemplary decision screen in condition Narrow (translated
from German). Use of dropdown menu.
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Figure 2.G.23. Exemplary decision screen in condition Narrow (translated
from German). Use of multiple entry rows to indicate the full subjective
distribution.
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Figure 2.G.24. Exemplary decision screen in condition Broad (translated
from German). The number 230 indicates the average of X and Y. Subjects
state their belief by indicating a full posterior distribution for X and Y. They
have to select values using the dropdown menu and enter a number of per-
centage points in the elds on the right. They can use arbitrary many entry
lines. The current sum of percentage points is indicated and has to equal
exactly 100 before one can proceed. On the bottom of the screen, the dis-
tributions of X and Y are indicated as a reminder.
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Figure 2.G.25. Exemplary task in online experiment. One number eachwould
be drawn from Urn X and Urn Y. In this example, subjects would also learn
the average of the drawn numbers. Subjects state their belief by indicating
the mean of their posterior belief about the number drawn from Urn X.
3Heterogeneity of Loss Aversion
and Expectations-Based
Reference Points
Joint with Lorenz Goette, Alexandre Kellogg and Charles Sprenger
3.1 Introduction
Models of reference-dependent preferences are regarded as a major advance
in behavioral economics, rationalizing a range of observations at odds with the
canonical model of expected utility over final wealth (Camerer et al., 1997; Kah-
neman et al., 1990; Odean, 1998; Rabin, 2000). Critical to such applications is
the formulation of the reference point around which gains and losses are en-
coded. Given flexibility in this reference point, the model is endowed with a
powerful degree of freedom, limiting its ability to be coherently applied across
contexts.
Several prominent views on the source of reference points have been artic-
ulated, from the status quo formulation of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), to
adaptive formulations based on “customary” wealth or endowments (Baucells
and Sarin, 2007; DellaVigna et al., 2017; Lattin and Bucklin, 1989; Markowitz,
1952; Putler, 1992; Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Wathieu, 1997). More recently,
a literature has examined forward-looking characterizations of the reference
point, based on rational expectations of potential outcomes (Kőszegi and Rabin,
2006, 2007) (henceforth KR).1 Expectations-based models have the promise to
1 Our analysis will focus on the formulations of KR. An earlier literature also provided formu-
lations of reference dependence grounded in rational expectations, but without the equilibrium
concepts we analyze (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986).
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be readily and broadly applicable, closing the degree of freedom with a founda-
tion to which economic tools are already adapted.
Our study begins with an observation: even with reference points grounded
in rational expectations, heterogeneity in the model’s key behavioral parameter,
loss aversion, can confound inference. In the case of KR preferences, heterogene-
ity in loss aversion breaks down comparative static tests that have been used to
test the model (see Section 3.2 for detail). Given both the number of contra-
dictory empirical studies for expectations-based models (see, e.g., Abeler et al.,
2011; Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Gneezy et al., 2017; Goette et al., 2016; Hef-
fetz and List, 2014), and the recognized variation in individual measures of loss
aversion (see, e.g., Erev et al., 2008; Harinck et al., 2007; Nicolau, 2012; Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2009; Sprenger, 2015), heterogeneity is potentially an issue of
first order importance.
We design an exchange experiment with the objective of examining the force
of expectations-based models while recognizing heterogeneity in loss aversion.
Our central treatment plausibly alters expectations of exchange for a given ob-
ject, and we experimentally control the prior experiences of agents. The manipu-
lation of experience allows us to collect, and validate, a measure of loss aversion
for an alternate object, providing an assessment of heterogeneity. Our objective
is achieved through between-subjects variation and a purposeful parsimony of
choices, with a single binary decision per subject.
We implement our study in a sample of 607 subjects. In a first stage, subjects
are randomly endowed with one of two objects. Though no choices are made,
subjects are asked to provide ratings of both objects, and their initial mood is
measured using standard psychological scales. Subsequently, based on a ran-
domization device, the endowed object is taken away for half of the subjects
and replaced with the alternative object, after which mood is measured again.
The initial ratings allow us to form a taxonomy of types, constructed from a sim-
ple structural model of rating statements.2 The randomized confiscation and
corresponding changes in mood measures provide for an initial validation of
2 We also provide reduced form evidence based only on the ratings themselves. The structural
model assumes ratings are driven by consumption utilities and loss aversion. Though no choices
are made, the core assumption is that subjects rate the object truthfully. The measure of loss
aversion estimated is consistent with rational expectations as subjects were not told in advance
that their their endowed object may be taken away when the ratings data was collected. An
alternative design would attempt to precisely measure loss aversion either through statements of
small stakes risk aversion (Fehr and Goette, 2007; Sprenger, 2015) or some other choice. Such
tests would require both additional assumptions (e.g., about the correlation between consumption
utility and loss aversion) and additional experimental choices. Recognizing both the polluting
potential of such choices and the challenge of modeling the full body of experimental behavior
through the lens of the KR model (for discussion, see Sprenger, 2015), we opted for this more
broad categorization. Failure to correctly categorize types should lead to a lack of predictive
validity in Stage 2 of the experiment, working against our identified results.
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our taxonomy, ensuring that people who are classified as loss averse actually do
experience sensations of loss in their measured mood.
In a second stage, subjects are again endowed with one of two objects. The
second stage objects have no plausible complementarities with either object in
the first stage, eliminating the desire to construct bundles of objects across the
two stages. In this second stage, subjects make their only choice in the experi-
ment. Forty percent of subjects are asked a baseline endowment effect question
of whether they would like to trade their object for the alternative. The other
sixty percent of subjects are asked whether they would like to trade their object
under a probabilistic forced exchange mechanism akin to Goette et al. (2016).
With probability 0.5, regardless of their decision, exchange will be forced. Un-
der the KR model, individuals who are loss averse should grow more willing to
exchange relative to baseline when probabilistically forced to do so, while those
who are loss loving should grow less willing to exchange (statements which we
formalize in Section 3.2).
The second stage provides for two central analyses. First, in the baseline
condition we further validate our taxonomy of loss averse types by examin-
ing whether individuals coded as loss averse in Stage 1 are also unwilling
to exchange for a completely different object in Stage 2. Second, we study
expectations-based forces by examining sensitivity of behavior to probabilistic
forced exchange. Given these predictions depend upon the heterogeneity in loss
aversion, this exercise is conducted separately for the different types identified
in Stage 1.
We document three key findings. First, on average subjects do appear to
prefer their randomly endowed object in Stage 1, indicating an endowment ef-
fect in ratings.3 Correspondingly, we estimate loss aversion on aggregate. At the
individual level 36% of subjects are classified as loss averse in our structural
analysis, 40% as potentially loss neutral, and 25% as loss loving. Our relative
proportion of loss averse and loss loving is comparable to other recent findings
on the heterogeneity of loss aversion (Chapman et al., 2017).4
Second, the taxonomy of loss aversion is respected in the responsiveness of
mood to randomized experience. Loss averse types have significantly larger de-
creases in mood than loss loving types if their Stage 1 object is confiscated. More
compellingly, this taxonomy is reflected in Stage 2 behavior. In the Stage 2 base-
3 47% of subjects report a higher rating for their endowed object, 22% report the same rating,
and 31% percent report a higher rating for the alternative object.
4 Based on willingness to pay and willingness to accept data for lotteries from a representative
sample, Chapman et al. (2017) find an endowment effect for 60% of the respondents, no endow-
ment effect for 10% of the subjects, and a reverse endowment effect for approximately 30% of
the sample. Loss averse types in our data are 1.44 times more likely than loss loving types. In
their data loss averse types are twice as frequent.
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line condition, loss averse types are less willing to trade than others, delivering
a substantial endowment effect for a different, randomly-assigned object.
Third, the comparative statics of expectations-based models are decisively
supported in Stage 2. Following KR predictions, loss-averse types grow signif-
icantly more willing to trade under probabilistic forced exchange, while loss-
loving types grow significantly less-so. Recognizing and accounting for the het-
erogeneity in types is critical as the aggregate data reproduce the null findings
of Goette et al. (2016) for a similar forced exchange mechanism.
We believe our results add to the discussion of reference-dependent pref-
erences and exchange anomalies in general. First, recognizing and accounting
for heterogeneity in loss aversion allows for more nuanced tests of expectations-
based reference dependence. Given different findings across prior studies (Eric-
son and Fuster, 2011; Heffetz and List, 2014), the null aggregate effects here
and in Goette et al. (2016), and our theoretical development demonstrating that
KR comparative statics change sign for different types of loss aversion, hetero-
geneity appears to be a confound of first order importance. We show, in a simple
setting, that the forces of expectations-based models are reliably recovered once
heterogeneity in loss aversion is accounted for.
Second, a body of research has questioned the generality of exchange anoma-
lies such as the endowment effect. One line in particular has argued that trad-
ing experience can increase the willingness to engage in exchange (List, 2003,
2004), with the implication that the endowment effect should be “selected”
out in markets. Indeed, Engelmann and Hollard (2010), show that even a very
minute body of experience can eliminate the endowment effect. In Section 3.4.3,
we link the experiences of Stage 1, and the subjective perception thereof, to ex-
change behavior in Stage 2. Even accounting for heterogeneity in types, there
remains a marked distaste for exchange in Stage 2. This “residual” endowment
effect is related to experience in Stage 1. Interestingly, the effects of experience
are not reflected in the objective outcome of keeping or losing one’s object, but
rather in the subjective perception of this experience.5 Individuals with a nega-
tive perception of their Stage 1 experience are less willing to exchange in Stage
2. Such an observation may help to explain the findings of Engelmann and Hol-
lard (2010). In their study, experience is induced through trading rounds, in
which subjects must make an exchange in order to keep any object. Making
such an explicit connection between exchange and positive experience should
indeed lead to more willingness to trade. This also suggests a path by which ex-
change anomalies may persist: negative experiences (both for exchanging and
not exchanging) can lead to less willingness to exchange subsequently. As such,
5 Subjectively, the experience could be positive or negative depending on the subject’s loss
aversion.
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the endowment effect need not be selected quickly out of the market through
trading experience alone if perceptions thereof are not uniformly positive.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we set the theoretical back-
ground and derive behavioral predictions. Section 3.3 and 3.4 present the ex-
perimental design and results, respectively. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Considerations and Design Guidance
We examine the forces of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences
in simple exchange settings with two goods, recognizing heterogeneity of loss
aversion. The theoretical development hues closely to our experimental design,
providing motivation for our analyses.
Consider a two-dimensional utility function over the two objects of interest,
good X and good Y. Let c= (mX ,mY ) and r= (rX , rY ) represent vectors of con-
sumption utility and reference utility, respectively. The KR model specifies a util-
ity function with two components, consumption utility, m(c)≡ mX +mY , and
gain-loss utility, n(c|r)≡ nX (mX |rX ) + nY (mY |rY )≡ µ(mX − rX ) +µ(mY − rY ),
with separability across consumption dimensions. Let mX ∈ {0,X } and mY ∈
{0,Y } stand for both the outcome and the corresponding consumption utility
of owning no or one unit of good X, and no or one unit of good Y, respectively.
Overall utility is described by
u(c|r) = u(mX ,mY |rX , rY ) = mX + nX (mX |rX ) + mY + nY (mY |rY )




ηz if z ≥ 0
ηλz if z < 0.
In this piece-wise linear gain-loss function, the parameter η captures the mag-
nitude of changes relative to the reference point, and λ is the degree of loss
aversion.
3.2.1 Determination of the Reference Point
For the KR model, the vector r is determined as part of a consistent forward-
looking plan for behavior. The KR model posits a reference-dependent expected
utility function U(F |G), taking as input a distribution F over consumption out-
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A Personal Equilibrium is a situation where, given that the decision-maker ex-
pects as a reference some distribution F , she indeed prefers F as a consump-
tion distribution over all alternative consumption distributions, F ′. Ex-ante opti-
mal behavior has to accord with expectations of that behavior. Formally, given a
choice set,D, of lotteries, F , over consumption outcomes c= (mX ,mY ), Personal
Equilibrium states the following:
Personal Equilibrium (PE): A choice F ∈ D, is a personal equilibrium if
U(F |F) ≥ U(F ′|F) ∀ F ′ ∈ D.
Regardless of endowment, if good X is to be chosen in a PE, then r= (X , 0) and
if good Y is to be chosen in a PE then r= (0,Y ).
3.2.1.1 Manipulating r: Probabilistic Forced Exchange
As noted above, the PE concept requires a consistency between c and r. In
a simple exchange experiment over two objects, potential PE selections are
[c, r] = [(X , 0), (X , 0)] and [c, r] = [(0,Y ), (0,Y )]. Depending on the endow-
ment of X or Y, only one of these choices represents an unwillingness to trade. As-
suming an endowment of X, the individual can support not exchanging [c, r] =
[(X , 0), (X , 0)] in a PE if






Note that the smallest value of X at which the individual can support not ex-
changing, X = 1+η1+ηλY , is inferior to Y if λ > 1. As such, loss averse individuals
can support not exchanging X for Y even if Y would be preferred on the basis
of consumption utility alone. This describes the mechanism by which the KR
model generates an endowment effect. Figure 3.1 graphs X against λ for Y = 1,
η= 1, showing that as λ increases, the lowest value of X at which the agent can
support not exchanging decreases following a simple inverse relationship.
Also graphed in Figure 3.1 is the alternate PE cutoff value corresponding to
an agent who fulfills an expectation to exchange their endowed object X for Y.
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Figure 3.1. Loss aversion and personal equilibrium values. PE cuto values
for an agent endowed with good X, having consumption utility Y = 1 and
η= 1. For X > X = 1+η1+ηλY , agents can support not exchanging as a PE in
standard exchange environment. For X < X = 1+ηλ1+η Y , agents can support
exchanging as a PE in a standard exchange environment. With forced ex-
change probability of 0.5 X (0.5) = Y and X (0.5) = X = 1+ηλ1+η Y . Endowed
with X, loss averse agents withλ > 1 (as in point A) can support not exchang-
ing in PE in standard exchange environment, but cannot with probabilistic
forced exchange. Loss loving agents with λ < 1 (as in point B) cannot sup-
port not exchanging in PE in standard exchange environment, but can with
probabilistic forced exchange.
The highest value of X at which the agent can support exchanging, X = 1+ηλ1+η Y ,
increases linearly with λ. Note that for X < X < X , there will be multiple equilib-
ria, with the agent able to support both exchanging and not exchanging as a PE.
The KR model is constructed with a notion of equilibrium refinement, Preferred
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Personal Equilibrium (PPE), in which ex-ante utility is used as a basis for selec-
tion and, hence, for making more narrow predictions. We provide our results
without appeal to equilibrium selection, assuming only that actions are more
likely to be taken if they are PE than if they are not.6
Now, consider a setting of probabilistic forced exchange.With probability 0.5
the agent, assumed endowed with X, will be forced to exchange X for Y regard-
less of their choice. If the individual wishes to retain her object, she is subject to
a stochastic reference point, as with probability 0.5 it will be confiscated. She
can support attempting not to exchange if
U(0.5(X , 0) + 0.5(0,Y )|0.5(X , 0) + 0.5(0,Y )) >
U(0,Y |0.5(X , 0) + 0.5(0,Y )),
or
X > Y. (3.2)
The attempt to retain X is only supported on the basis of consumption utility
values, regardless of the level of loss aversion. The manipulation of probabilis-
tic forced exchange changes the PE cutoff for X from X = 1+η1+ηλY to X (0.5) = Y .
Figure 3.1 illustrates the changing PE cutoff values associated with not exchang-
ing. Loss averse agents can no longer support not exchanging in PE at values of
X lower than Y.
Though probabilistic forced exchange alters the PE considerations associated
with not exchanging, it leaves unchanged the PE considerations associated with
exchanging. The agent can support exchanging in PE if
U(0,Y |0,Y ) > U(0.5(X , 0) + 0.5(0,Y )|0,Y ),





X (0.5) = X is noted in Figure 3.1.
Manipulating forced-exchange probability carries clear value for testing the
KR model. Under the standard assumption of loss aversion, λ > 1, agents can
support not exchanging in PE for values of X < Y in a standard exchange exper-
iment, but cannot do so with forced exchange probability of 0.5. The intuition
is simple: attempting to retain the object exposes the agent to potential losses
under forced exchange. She cannot support accepting these losses. Under the
6 Goette et al. (2016) discuss PPE considerations with probabilistic forced exchange, ensuring
that the core comparative statics associated with probabilistic forced exchange are maintained
under equilibrium refinement.
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assumption that actions are more likely to be taken if they are PE than if they
are not, agents’ willingness to exchange should increase with forced exchange.
This is a unique prediction of expectations-based models not shared by prior for-
mulations of the reference point. Importantly, this comparative static prediction
hinges on agents being loss averse. In the next subsection, we investigate het-
erogeneity in loss aversion, showing that the comparative static associated with
probabilistic forced exchange can reverse sign if individuals have λ < 1.
3.2.2 Heterogeneity in Loss Aversion
A number of recent studies have questioned the universality of loss aversion (see,
e.g., Chapman et al., 2017; Erev et al., 2008; Harinck et al., 2007; Nicolau, 2012;
Sprenger, 2015)).7 Heterogeneity in loss aversion can confound the identifica-
tion of expectations-based models. Under KR preferences, different values of λ
can lead to different directional predictions for the effects of forced exchange.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the logic, graphing the PE cutoff values for not exchanging,
X = 1+η1+ηλY and X (0.5) = Y , and for exchanging, X = X (0.5) =
1+ηλ
1+η Y .
Consider the case of a point like A, with λ > 1 and a valuation X slightly be-
low Y = 1. In the standard exchange experiment this individual can support not
exchanging even though X < Y as X > X . With forced exchange probability 0.5,
this individual can no longer support not exchanging as X < X (0.5). Assuming
that actions are more likely to be taken when they are PE than when they are
not leads to the Goette et al. (2016) comparative static prediction: individuals
should grow more willing to exchange with probabilistic forced exchanged.
Now, consider a point like B with λ < 1 and a value of X slightly above
Y = 1. Such an individual cannot support not exchanging as a PE in the stan-
dard exchange experiment even though X > Y as X < X .8 With forced exchange
probability of 0.5 this individual can now support not exchanging as a PE as
X > X (0.5). Again, assuming that actions are more likely to be taken when
they are PE than when they are not leads to the opposite prediction from the
prior case. An agent with λ < 1 grows less willing to exchange with probabilis-
tic forced exchange, reversing the sign of the previously described comparative
static.9
7 Though λ > 1 obtains for the majority of subjects, a substantial fraction are found to be close
to loss neutral, λ= 1, and loss loving, λ < 1.For example, in the individual estimates of Sprenger
(2015), 27% of the sample has λ < 1 within the 95% confidence interval of their estimated λ,
while the remaining 73% are significantly loss averse.
8 This individual can also not support exchanging as a PE given his loss-lovingness as X > X .
That is, no PE selections exist for this individual. KR note the possibility of multiplicity and absence
of equilibria in their theoretical development.
9 Note that the example provided relied on both differences in loss aversion, λ, and consump-
tion utility, X , between points A and B. This is only for illustrative purposes. If two agents instead
had the same value of X , either above or below Y , with one being loss averse and the other loss
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Taken together the analysis of probabilistic forced exchange and heterogene-
ity give insights for our experimental design. Our study adapts Goette et al.’s
(2016) central manipulation of probabilistic forced exchange to a binary ex-
change situation with two objects, and also manipulates prior experiences to
deliver and validate measures of loss aversion.10
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
Our design is comprised of two stages. In Stage 1, a taxonomy of loss averse
types is created, exchange experience is manipulated via random confiscation,
and the effects of this experience on mood are measured. In Stage 2, subjects are
assigned to either a standard exchange study or one with probabilistic forced
exchange, making their only choice in the experiment. Stage 1 experiences and
measures of loss aversion can then be connected to Stage 2 behavior. Figure 3.2
illustrates the experimental order of events.
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Figure 3.2. Timeline of laboratory experiment. The gure displays the course
of events in both treatment conditions, baseline (p = 0.0) and forced ex-
change (p = 0.5).
loving, then one of them would be affected by probabilistic forced exchange (either positively or
negatively) and the other would not. This implies that if X is symmetrically distributed around Y ,
and X and λ are independent, the sign of comparative statics can differ depending on whether
λ > 1 orλ < 1. Loss averse agents will growmore willing to exchange on average while loss loving
agents will grow less willing to exchange on average as exchange is probabilistically forced.
10 Unlike Goette et al. (2016), we also study a direct exchange mechanism that does not require
eliciting the willingness to pay or willingness to accept in monetary terms using price lists.
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3.3.1 Stage 1: Measures of Loss Aversion and Manipulation of
Experience
Procedures. The experimenter welcomed the participants in a presentation
room and informed them that the study would consist of two stages. At each
seat there was a card with a number (placed face down). Then, without further
explanation, the experimenter projected on the wall two equally-sized pictures
of the respective Stage 1 objects for that session along with the description and
two short bullet points on the characteristics of the product. The exact informa-
tion presented to subjects is reproduced in Appendix 3.C.
After allowing sufficient time (three minutes) to study the projected infor-
mation, the experimenter asked subjects to turn the card in front of them over
and move to the cubicle with the corresponding number in the adjacent com-
puter laboratory. In their private cubicle, which was separated and not visible
from the outside, subjects would find one of the two presented goods. Computer
instructions then informed the subject that she possesses the object in front of
her, and that she is free to inspect it more closely.
After three minutes allotted for inspection of the good, we asked subjects
how much they liked and wanted each one of the goods. Specifically, for each
object we asked “How much do you like this product?” and “How much would
you want to have this product?” with response scales ranging from 0=“Not at
all” to 8=“Very much”. These ratings data are used to construct our measures
of loss aversion, notably collected without experimental choice. These ratings
are collected before any further instructions are given, including instructions
related to confiscation.
Next, the computer instructions announced that the experimenter would ran-
domly draw a number between 1 and 20 using a rotating lottery device placed
on a table in the middle of the room. Half of the subjects learned that they would
lose their current good and receive the other one in return in case a number be-
tween 1 and 10 is drawn. Instructions for the other half read that this exchange
would only take place if a number between 11 and 20 is drawn.11 The exper-
imenter drew the number in a way that both the lotto device containing the
20 balls and the drawn number was visible from every cabin. The exchange was
executed after the draw by the experimenter, who, without further comment, re-
placed the object for subjects who had lost their good due to the drawn number.
Subsequent instructions informed subjects that they would keep their current
object and asked them to return to the lecture room for the second stage.
Immediately before and immediately after the random confiscation was con-
ducted, we elicited subjects’ mood using standard psychological scales (Bradley
11 This loss conditionwas counterbalanced within each subsample endowed with the same good,
such that irrespective of the draw, exchange would take place for exactly half of the subjects
initially endowed with either good.
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and Lang, 1994). Subjects answered the question “Please answer the following
questions about how you currently feel. Which expressions better apply to you at
the moment?” by positioning a slider on an 11-point response scale. The lower
end (0) was labeled using the words “Unhappy, Angry, Unsatisfied, Sad, Desper-
ate” and the upper end (10) was labeled “Happy, Thrilled, Satisfied, Content,
Hopeful”. The individual change in these scores are used to provide an initial
validation of our taxonomy of types.
3.3.2 Stage 2: Probabilistic Forced Exchange, Heterogeneity and Prior
Experience
Procedures. The basic procedures in the second stage were deliberately kept ex-
actly identical to those in the first stage. Upon their return to the lecture room,
the experimenter projected another page onto the wall, this time presenting the
objects of the Stage 2 goods bundle of that session. In the meantime, a second
experimenter allocated objects to the cubicles in the computer laboratory next
door in a pre-specified order. Subjects were ushered back to their cubicle where
again they found their second object, learned that it belonged to them and were
allowed sufficient time for inspection. We studied two conditions.
Baseline treatment. In the baseline condition, subjects received an opportunity
to voluntarily exchange their endowed good for the other one. Whichever way
they chose, they would keep or receive their desired object and there would be
no further exchange. The baseline condition is a standard exchange setting.
Forced exchange treatment. The second condition implemented an exchange
study with probabilistic forced exchange. The instructions specified that irre-
spective of their choice of exchanging their endowed object, exchange would
take place anyway with a probability of 50% based on a draw from the lotto
device as in the first stage. This means that for a subject who decided to trade
voluntarily, the forced exchange did not bear any consequences. However, for a
subject who chose to keep her object, there was an additional chance of losing
it.
Several noted issues with experimental investigations of market exchange
motivated our purposefully simple design (Plott and Zeiler, 2005, 2007). First,
subjects take a simple binary choice, alleviating potential concerns related to
the use of multiple-price lists in exchange experiments. Specifically, we do not
need to elicit a willingness to pay or willingness to accept in monetary terms,
but simply ask whether the subject is willing to trade the endowed good for the
other one. As such, mistaken perceptions of market power do not play a role,
nor do income effects. Second, unlike previous market exchange experiments,
we create a private environment that limits confounds from social interaction.
In particular, subjects take their decisions anonymously in a private cabin; they
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find their endowment placed in front of themwhen entering the cabin instead of
receiving it personally through the hands of the experimenter (which has been
criticized for triggering the misperception of the endowment as a gift (see, e.g.,
Plott and Zeiler, 2005, 2007); and subjects do not interact with other subjects
at any stage during the experiment.
3.3.3 Sample Details
A sample of 607 students from the University of Bonn participated in the ex-
periment which was conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007)
in June and July 2015 at the BonnEconLab. We conducted 31 sessions with 17
to 20 participants each. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the subject pool by
treatment conditions.
Table 3.1. Summary statistics and treatment assignment
Stage 1
Bundle 1 Bundle 2
USB stick Pen set Picnic mat Thermos
A) Initial Endowment 160 152 150 145
– in % of subject pool 26.36% 25.04% 24.71% 23.89%
B) Lost Endowment 80 76 75 72
– in % of A) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 49.66%
Stage 2
Bundle 1 Bundle 2
USB stick Pen set Picnic mat Thermos
C) Initial Endowment 150 145 160 152
– in % of subject pool 24.71% 23.89% 26.36% 25.04%
D) Baseline Condition 60 58 60 55
– in % of C) 40.00% 40.00% 37.50% 36.18%
E) Probability 0.5 Condition 90 87 100 97
– in % of C) 60.00% 60.00% 62.50% 63.82%
Total number of observations 607
Notes: Stage 2 condition (baseline or probability 0.5 of forced exchange) is randomized
within each session. The use of each bundle as the Stage 1 bundle was counterbalanced
at the session level.
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The objects used for the exchange experiment included a USB stick, a set of
three erasable pens, a picnic mat and a thermos.12 We selected these four ob-
jects on the basis of a pre-experimental survey evaluation of 12 candidate goods
to ensure that all items were of approximately equal value to potential partic-
ipants. We put particular emphasis on ruling out complementarities between
items across rounds. The former two (USB stick and pens) and the latter two
objects (picnic mat and thermos) each constituted a bundle. Every subject faced
exactly one exchange situation with each bundle of objects. The use of each
bundle as Stage 1 bundle was counterbalanced at the session level, with the re-
spective other bundle used in Stage 2. Within each session, the endowments of
one of the two objects within the bundle was counterbalanced in both stages.13
3.4 Experimental Results
We present the results in three subsections. First, we examine stated good rat-
ings and the effect of experience in Stage 1, providing our taxonomies of loss
averse types and validating these taxonomies with evidence on the change in
mood induced by forced exchange. Second, we examine behavior in Stage 2,
linking heterogeneity in loss aversion to probabilistic forced exchange. A third
subsection is dedicated to the effects of subjective experience on exchange be-
havior.
3.4.1 Stage 1: Loss Aversion, Experience, and Mood
Though no choices were made in Stage 1, we collect two pieces of evidence.
First, subjects provide their ratings for both objects. Second, subjects provide a
measure ofmood once before being informed about the randomized confiscation
procedure and once after they learned their random outcome and the exchange
was carried out where applicable.
Figure 3.3 provides histograms of subject’s liking of their endowed and the
alternative object. Given random assignment of endowed objects and the coun-
terbalanced design, the distributions of ratings should be identical. Instead, the
distribution of ratings for subjects’ own object skews higher than the alterna-
tive, yielding a statistically significant stated preference for the endowed good
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 4.57, p < 0.01).
12 Pictures and information presented to subjects are reproduced in Appendix 3.C.
13 That is, if for a given session the USB stick and pens bundle constituted the first stage bundle,
the picnic mat and thermos bundle would be the second stage bundle. Half of the subjects were
initially endowed with the USB stick in the first stage. Among this half of the session participants,
again half would initially receive the picnic mat and the other half the thermos at the beginning
of the second stage.
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Figure 3.3. Preferences and endowments. Self-reported scores of liking for
the endowed and alternative goods. (Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic z =
4.57, p < 0.01,N = 607).
Within subject we also find a tendency towards preferring the endowed ob-
ject relative to the alternative. 47% of subjects report a higher liking score for
their endowed object, 22% report the same score, and 31% report a higher score
for the alternate object.14
The liking scores for the endowed and alternative object provide a basis for
measuring loss aversion at the aggregate and individual level. We construct a
simple structural model of these ratings based upon standard random utility
methods (McFadden, 1974). Consider an individual endowed with X that is
asked to provide ratings statements for both X and Y prior to being informed
of the random confiscation implemented in Stage 1. Through the lens of the KR
model such an individual evaluates X based upon U(X , 0|X , 0). Given that the
agent is endowed with X and is uninformed of the possibility of confiscation at
the time of the ratings, she plausibly evaluates Y based upon U(0,Y |X , 0). With
standard logit shocks, εX and εY , the parameters associated with these utilities
are easily estimated. Unlike choice data, agents may provide the same rating
14 Our design also collects a score for “wanting” each object. The corresponding percentage
shares for wanting scores are virtually identical (48%, 23%, 29%, respectively). For analysis using
these wanting scores as the basis of analysis see Figure 3.A.1, Table 3.A.2, and Table 3.A.3.
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score for both objects. As such, the estimator must account for identical ratings,
something to which standard logit techniques are also already well adapted (see,
e.g., Cantillo et al., 2010). We assume agents will provide a higher rating for
their endowed object, X , if
U(X , 0|X , 0) + εX > U(0,Y |X , 0) + εY + δ,
where δ is a discernibility parameter to be estimated. Similarly agents provide
a higher rating for the alternative object, Y , if
U(0,Y |X , 0) + εY > U(X , 0|X , 0) + εX + δ,
and provide the same rating if
|U(X , 0|X , 0) + εX − (U(0,Y |X , 0) + εY )| ≤ δ.
Under the functional form assumptions of η= 1 and mX = X ,mY = Y , for some-
one given object X , we obtain familiar probabilities for the ranking of ratings
R(X ) and R(Y ),
P(R(X ) > R(Y )) =
exp(U(X , 0|X , 0))
exp(U(X , 0|X , 0)) + exp(U(0,Y |X , 0) + δ) =
exp(X )
exp(X ) + exp(2Y − λX + δ)
P(R(Y ) > R(X )) =
exp(U(0,Y |X , 0))
exp(U(0,Y |X , 0)) + exp(U(X , 0|X , 0) + δ) =
exp(2Y − λX )
exp(X + δ) + exp(2Y − λX )
P(R(X ) = R(Y )) = 1 − P(R(X ) > R(Y )) − P(R(Y ) > R(X )),
where the consumption utilities values, X and Y , the discernibility parameter
δ, and the loss aversion parameter, λ, are the desired estimands. For someone
endowed with object Y , these same ratings probabilities are
P(R(X ) > R(Y )) =
exp(U(X , 0|0,Y ))
exp(U(X , 0|0,Y )) + exp(U(0,Y |0,Y ) + δ) =
exp(2X − λY )
exp(Y + δ) + exp(2X − λY )
P(R(Y ) > R(X )) =
exp(u(0,Y |0,Y ))
exp(U(0,Y |0,Y )) + exp(U(X , 0|0,Y ) + δ) =
exp(Y )
exp(Y ) + exp(2X − λY + δ)
P(R(X ) = R(Y )) = 1 − P(R(X ) > R(Y )) − P(R(Y ) > R(X )).
The likelihood contribution of someone endowed with X or Y follows precisely
the formulations above. It will not generally be possible to estimate both utility
values, X and Y , separately. So we normalize one of the goods values to be Y = 1
and estimate the remaining parameters via maximum likelihood.
Table 3.2 provides aggregate estimates of consumption utilities, λ and δ,
separately for each bundle of goods. For Bundle 1, we restrict the utility value
of USB sticks to be Y = 1 and for Bundle 2 we restrict the utility value of the
thermos to be Y = 1. Quite similar results obtain across the two bundles. For
Bundle 1, λ is estimated to be 1.559 (robust s.e. = 0.139), while for Bundle 2 it
is estimates to be 1.289 (0.121). For both bundles we reject the null hypothesis
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of no loss aversion λ= 1, consistent with the reduced form ratings results.15
The utility of pen sets and picnic mats are estimated to be lower than those of
USB sticks and Thermoses, respectively. And, discernibility is estimated close to
δ = 0.5 in both cases.
Table 3.2. Aggregate parameter estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimate (Std. Error) Estimate (Std. Error)
Bundle 1 Bundle 2
Loss Aversion:
λˆ 1.559 (0.139) 1.289 (0.121)
Utility Values:
Xˆ1 (Pen Set) 0.632 (0.049)
Yˆ1 (USB Stick) 1 -
Xˆ2 (Picnic Mat) 0.837 (0.051)
Yˆ2 (Thermos) 1 -
Discernibility:
δˆ 0.549 (0.061) 0.446 (0.052)
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses.
The aggregate estimates show evidence of loss aversion. To construct bounds
for estimates of individual loss aversion, we evaluate individual choices assum-
ing average utility and discernibility values. For example, consider an individual
endowed with the pen set in Bundle 1. At the aggregate estimates of δ and X
for Bundle 1, if this individual were to state a higher ranking for the pen set
than for the USB stick, it would imply a loss aversion parameter of λˆ > 3.03.16
Similarly, stating a higher ranking for the USB stick would imply λˆ < 1.30,17
and stating the same ranking implies λˆ ∈ [1.30,3.03]. Of these three possible
cases, two demonstrate evidence of loss aversion λˆ > 1, while the other case
is plausibly loss neutral as λˆ= 1 can rationalize the rankings.18 In total, there
exist twelve cases of endowments and rank orders. Table 3.3 enumerates the
15 For Bundle 1, the null hypothesis of λ= 1 is rejected, χ2(1) = 16.13 (p < 0.01). For Bundle
2, the null hypothesis of λ= 1 is also rejected, χ2(1) = 5.73 (p < 0.05).
16 To state a higher ranking for the pen set implies 0.632> 2− λˆ · 0.632+ 0.549 or λˆ > 3.03.
17 To state a higher ranking for the USB implies 2−λ · 0.632> 0.632+ 0.549 or λ < 1.30.
18 It may seem prima-facie surprising that providing the same ranking in this case is consistent
with loss aversion. The logic is simple: given that the pen set has substantially lower consumption
utility than the USB stick, one must be loss averse to rank them equally.
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cases and the corresponding categorization into loss averse, loss neutral, and
loss loving types. Overall 217 subjects (35.7%) are categorized as loss averse,
240 (39.5%) are categorized as loss neutral, and 150 (24.7%) are categorized
as loss loving. This is the taxonomy of individual types used in our analysis.
Table 3.3. Individual classications
Case #Obs Structural Bounds Taxonomy Reduced Form Taxonomy
Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Bundle 1
Endowed Pen Set
R(Pen Set) > R(USB Stick) 42 λˆ > 3.03 X
R(USB Stick) > R(Pen Set) 69 λˆ < 1.30 X
R(USB Stick) = R(Pen Set) 41 1.30≤ λˆ≤ 3.03 X
Endowed USB Stick
R(USB Stick) >R(Pen Set) 109 λˆ > 0.81 X
R(Pen Set) > R(USB Stick) 23 λˆ < −0.29 X
R(USB Stick) = R(Pen Set) 28 −0.29≤ λˆ≤ 0.81 X
Bundle 2
Endowed Picnic Mat
R(Picnic Mat) > R(Thermos) 55 λˆ > 1.92 X
R(Thermos) > R(Picnic Mat) 61 λˆ < 0.86 X
R(Thermos) = R(Picnic Mat) 34 0.86≤ λˆ≤ 1.92 X
Endowed USB Stick
R(Thermos) > R(Picnic Mat) 79 λˆ > 1.12 X
R(Picnic Mat) > R(Thermos) 38 λˆ < 0.23 X
R(Thermos) = R(Picnic Mat) 28 0.23≤ λˆ≤ 1.12 X
Totals: 607 217 240 150 285 131 191
Notes: Structural bounds taxonomy of types based on individual rankings at estimated aggregate utility values and discernibility parameters from Table 3.2.
Reduced form taxonomy derived from whether subject exhibits higher, lower, or equal rankings for their endowed good relative to the alternative.
Also presented in Table 3.3 is an alternate taxonomy based only on raw
ranking information. Ignoring utility values and discernibility, this reduced form
taxonomy codes someone as loss averse, neutral, or loving depending only on
whether the individual provides a higher, equal, or lower ranking for their en-
dowed object. Based on this reduced form taxonomy, 285 subjects (47%) are cat-
egorized as loss averse, 131 (22%) are classified as loss neutral, and 191 (31%)
are classified as loss loving.19 Though the structural taxonomy provides a more
conservative classification of types, there is broad agreement between the struc-
tural and reduced form taxonomies (Pearson’s χ2(4) = 315.2, p < 0.01). For
completeness, we provide all our analysis with both the structural and reduced
form bounds provided in Table 3.3.
A minimal validation to eschew random response and lend credence to our
two classifications is provided by our mood measures. Table 3.4 provides a sum-
mary of reported mood regressing the change in Stage 1 Happiness, ∆ Stage
1 Happiness, on the objective experience of losing one’s object for the full sam-
ple and our different identified types. Panel A presents the results based on the
structural taxonomy, while Panel B uses the reduced form classification of types.
19 This follows exactly the relative rankings data noted above.
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Table 3.4. Preference types and subjective experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable:∆ Stage 1 Happiness
Full Sample Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Panel A: Structural Bounds Taxonomy
Lost Stage 1 Endowment -0.826*** -2.679*** -0.715** 1.560***
(0.210) (0.385) (0.291) (0.403)
Constant 0.582*** 1.198*** 0.715*** -0.818**
(0.159) (0.254) (0.231) (0.337)
R-Squared 0.0249 0.252 0.0106 0.129
# Observations 607 217 240 150
Panel B: Reduced Form Taxonomy
Lost Stage 1 Endowment -0.826*** -3.169*** -0.443 2.454***
(0.210) (0.282) (0.420) (0.303)
Constant 0.582*** 1.841*** 0.226 -1.264***
(0.159) (0.194) (0.319) (0.256)
R-Squared 0.025 0.308 0.009 0.265
# Observations 607 285 131 191
Notes: Ordinary least squares or two-stage least squares regression. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Signicance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Panel A: taxonomy
of types based on structural bounds from Table 3.3. Panel B: taxonomy of types based on
reduced form rating statements from Table 3.3.
For both taxonomies, individuals categorized as loss averse have substantial de-
terioration in mood if they lose their endowment, while individuals categorized
as loss loving grow happier. Individuals categorized as loss neutral experience in-
termediate effects, growing somewhat less happy when their endowment is lost.
This initial validation indicates that random response is unlikely to be driving
our ratings statements, and provides evidence supporting our structural classi-
fication.
3.4.2 Stage 2: Heterogeneous Treatment Eects
Our Stage 2 design relies on between subjects variation. Forty percent of sub-
jects participate in a baseline standard exchange study, choosing whether to
keep their endowed object or exchange for the alternative. The other sixty per-
cent make the same choice but with probability 0.5 exchange is forced. Ta-
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ble 3.5 presents the choices of subjects across these two conditions with lin-
ear probability models for the effect of treatment assignment on an indicator,
Exchange(= 1).20
Before turning to the effects of probabilistic forced exchange, we exam-
ine behavior in our baseline design. Baseline results are conveyed as the esti-
mated constants in least squares regression of exchange behavior in Table 3.5.
Overall 36.5 percent of subjects choose to exchange, demonstrating a signifi-
cant endowment effect relative to the null hypothesis of fifty percent exchange,
F1,605 = 18.32 (p < 0.01). A second validation of our taxonomies is derived from
examining differential baseline behavior across types. Panel A of Table 3.5 shows
that 33 percent of subjects coded as loss averse according to our structural model
choose to exchange, yielding a significant endowment effect relative to 50 per-
cent exchange, F1,215 = 12.21 (p < 0.01). The fraction of subjects exchanging
increases monotonically from loss averse to loss loving types. 42.9 percent of
subjects who are coded as loss loving choose to exchange, which cannot be dif-
ferentiated from the 50 percent benchmark, F1,148 = 1.15 (p = 0.29). Similar
conclusions are reached in Panel B of Table 3.5, based only on the reduced form
classification of types. These qualitative differences in Stage 2 baseline exchange
behavior are closely in line with theoretical predictions — loss averse agents are
unwilling to exchange, while loss loving types are more eager too — further
validating the Stage 1 taxonomies. It must be noted, however, that though the
groups differentially deviate from the 50 percent benchmark, the difference-in-
differences does not fall within standard measures for statistical significance for
either the structural, p = 0.23, or reduced form, p = 0.05, taxonomies.
Behavior in conditions with probabilistic forced exchange is also reported
in Table 3.5, separately for the different types of agents. Probabilistic forced ex-
change yields substantially different effects across types of loss aversion. Panel
A documents that subjects who are coded as loss averse increase their exchange
probability by nearly 16%-age points (∼ 50 percent), under probabilistic forced
exchange, F1,215 = 5.64, (p < 0.05). The sizable endowment effect from base-
line is eliminated, such that exchange can no longer be differentiated from the
50 percent benchmark, F1,215 = 0.07 (p = 0.78).
The positive treatment effect for loss averse types is mirrored by a signifi-
cant negative treatment effect for loss loving types. Subjects coded as loss loving
decrease their exchange probability by nearly 25%-age points (∼ 60 percent),
20 The analysis of Table 3.5 is conducted with robust standard errors. Table 3.A.1 repeats this
analysis with standard errors clustered at the session level. The statistical conclusions are un-
changed. The results based on the structural taxonomy of types increase in statistical significance,
while the results based on the reduced for taxonomy decrease in significance when clustering at
the session level. Given our focus on the structural taxonomy, Table 3.5 represents the more con-
servative set of conclusions.
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Table 3.5. Exchange behavior and probabilistic forced exchange
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Exchange (=1)
Full Sample Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Panel A: Structural Bounds Taxonomy
Forced Exchange 0.004 0.158** 0.0271 -0.248***
(0.040) (0.067) (0.066) (0.078)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.330 0.361 0.429
(0.032) (0.049) (0.053) (0.067)
R-Squared 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.072
# Observations 607 217 240 150
H0: No Baseline Endowment Eect F1,605=18.32 F1,215=12.21 F1,238=6.85 F1,148=1.15
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p = 0.29)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Eect F1,605=27.48 F1,215=0.07 F1,238=8.14 F1,148 = 63.77
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.78) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 1.45
(p = 0.23)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 15.89
(p < 0.01)
Panel B: Reduced Form Taxonomy
Forced Exchange 0.004 0.119** -0.030 -0.149**
(0.040) (0.057) (0.088) (0.074)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.304 0.392 0.448
(0.032) (0.043) (0.069) (0.061)
R-Squared 0.000 0.015 0.001 0.022
# Observations 607 285 131 191
H0: No Baseline Endowment Eect F1,605=18.32 F1,283=20.65 F1,129=2.45 F1,189=0.73
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p = 0.12) (p = 0.39)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Eect F1,605=27.48 F1,283=4.04 F1,129=6.45 F1,189 = 23.82
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.045) (p = 0.012) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 3.71
(p = 0.054)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 8.32
(p < 0.01)
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Null hypotheses tested for 1) zero baseline endowment eect, regression (Constant
= 0.5); 2) zero forced exchange endowment eect (Constant + Forced Exchange = 0.5); 3) Identical baseline
behavior across loss averse and loss loving agents (Constant (col. 2) = Constant (col. 4)); 4) Identical treatment
eects of forced exchange across loss averse and loss loving agents (Forced Exchange (col. 2) = Forced Exchange
(col. 4)). Hypotheses 3 and 4 tested via seemingly unrelated regression. Panel A: taxonomy of types based on
structural bounds from Table 3.3. Panel B: taxonomy of types based on reduced form rating statements from
Table 3.3.
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under probabilistic forced exchange, F1,148 = 10.18 (p < 0.01).21 The heteroge-
neous treatment effect over types closely follows our theoretical development
on the sign of comparative statics, and is significant at all conventional levels,
χ2(1) = 15.89 (p < 0.01). Quite similar results are found in Panel B, basing
the analysis only on the reduced form taxonomy. Loss averse agents respond to
forced exchange by exchanging more often while loss loving agents respond by
exchanging less often.
Figure 3.4 presents more granular analysis of treatment. For each of the
twelve structural types identified in Table 3.3, we take as a measure of loss aver-
sion the lower bound (upper bound, midpoint) for those subjects who provided
a higher (lower, equal) ranking for their endowed object relative to the alter-
native in Stage 1. Figure 3.4 graphs these values of loss aversion against each
group’s treatment effect noting the classification of type. The size of each point
corresponds to the number of observations. An effectively monotonic pattern of
treatment effects is observed. All four groups coded as loss loving exhibit neg-
ative treatment effects, all four groups coded as loss neutral deliver effectively
zero treatment effect, and all four groups coded as loss averse exhibit positive
treatment effects. Even within loss averse and loss loving groups, subjects coded
as more loss averse respond more positively to forced exchange.
Also graphed in Figure 3.4 are predicted treatment effects for each group. At
the corresponding values of λ and aggregate utility values, we predict the prob-
ability of exchange following closely the logit formulation elaborated in Section
21 Given these worsened attitudes towards exchange, loss loving agents in the forced exchange
condition deliver a substantial endowment effect relative to the 50 percent benchmark, F1,148 =
63.77 (p < 0.01).


















0 1 2 3
Stage 1 Loss Aversion
Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Prediction Prediction (smoothed)
Figure 3.4. Loss aversion and treatment eects. Stage 1 Loss Aversion corre-
sponds to the lower bound (upper bound) of λˆ for those who prefer their
own endowment (prefer the other good), and the midpoint for those who
rate the goods the same. Treatment Eect refers to the dierence in the
probability of exchange between forced exchange and baseline. Circles rep-
resents the treatment eect for each group in the data, with size of circle
corresponding to number of observations. Prediction uses the estimated
structural parameters (at the relevant bounds and midpoints) to calculate
the logit probability of exchange.
3.4.1.22 Given that these treatment effects will depend on Stage 2 assignment,
and the corresponding aggregate utility values, Figure 3.4 also provides a locally
22 This formulation maps PE values to choices via the assumption that an agent will exchange
based on the probability that they cannot support not exchanging as a PE. For someone endowed
with good X in the baseline condition, the exchange probability is thus calculated as the proba-
bility of choosing Y :
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weighted smoothed prediction. The magnitude of observed treatment effects are
broadly in line with those predicted from the structural analysis of Stage 1 be-
havior.
3.4.3 Additional Results: Subjective Experience and Exchange
The comparative statics and magnitude of treatment effects match well the
theoretical developments. The taxonomy of loss aversion is respected in the
responsiveness of behavior to forced exchange. Nonetheless, Table 3.5 high-
lights a marked reticence to exchange in the forced exchange condition overall.
This “residual” endowment effect falls outside the narrow predictions of the KR
model, which, under our assumptions, would predict 50 percent exchange in
this condition. In Table 3.6, we explore the effects of experience on subsequent
exchange behavior by linking the variation in experience in Stage 1 to Stage 2
exchanges controlling for interactions between treatment and loss aversion type.
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 3.6 show that actual experience of having their
endowed object confiscated and replaced with the alternative in Stage 1 is not
statistically related to exchange behavior in Stage 2. Controlling for the interac-
tion of treatment and type, simply experiencing exchange via confiscation and
replacement does not engender a greater willingness to exchange. If anything,
the effects are directionally negative, with the experience of confiscation and
replacement in Stage 1 leading to lower trading probabilities in Stage 2.
In columns (2) and (5) of Table 3.6, we examine the correlation between
subjective experience in Stage 1 and exchange behavior in Stage 2. Subjects with
more positive subjective Stage 1 experiences are significantly more willing to
exchange in Stage 2 controlling for type and treatment assignment. Columns (3)
and (6) ensure that it is the subjective evaluation of this experience, rather than
the objective event of confiscation that leads to changes in exchange behavior.
P(Choice = Y )Basel ine =
exp ˆ(U(0,Y |X , 0))
exp( ˆU(0,Y |X , 0)) + exp( ˆU(X , 0|X , 0)) =
exp(2Yˆ − λˆXˆ )
exp(Xˆ ) + exp(2Yˆ − λˆXˆ ) ,
where X and Y are the aggregate utility values for the goods in question estimate in Table 3.2 and
λˆ is the measure of loss aversion taken as the lower bound (upper bound, mid point) of the range
of parameters for the relevant group in Table 3.3. Similarly, in the forced exchange condition,
where not exchanging can be supported in PE based only on utility values, this is
P(Choice = Y )Forced =
exp(Yˆ )
exp(Xˆ ) + exp(Yˆ )
.
And the predicted treatment effect is calculated as
Predic t ion = P(Choice = Y )Forced − P(Choice = Y )Basel ine.
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Table 3.6. Stage 1 experience and stage 2 exchange behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Exchange (=1)
Lost Stage 1 Endowment -0.049 -0.033 -0.053 -0.038
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
∆ Happiness (Stage 1) 0.020*** 0.019** 0.020*** 0.019**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.453 0.428 0.445 0.475 0.453 0.472
(0.069) (0.067) (0.070) (0.065) (0.061) (0.065)
Treatment X Structural Taxonomy Yes Yes Yes No No No
Treatment X Reduced Form Taxonomy No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.041 0.051 0.052 0.018 0.026 0.027
# Observations 607 607 607 607 607 607
Notes: Ordinary least squares or two-stage least squares regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sig-
nicance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The findings of Table 3.6 highlight the importance of the subjective percep-
tion of experience. Objectively being forced to exchange seems less critical than
the subjective representation of this experience for fostering future exchange.
An understanding of the subjective perception of experience helps to evaluate
research on the persistence of exchange anomalies like the endowment effect
(Engelmann and Hollard, 2010; List, 2003, 2004). The view from this research
indicates that the endowment effect is reduced by experiences of exchange, and
even aminute body of experience (over the course of one experimental session in
Engelmann and Hollard (2010)) can eliminate the phenomena. Our data show
that it is not the objective experience of exchanging one item for another which
fosters market participation, but rather its subjective evaluation. Importantly,
our results should not be read as inconsistent with those of Engelmann and
Hollard (2010). Their design makes an explicit connection between exchange
and positive experience as subjects must trade their endowed item in order to
keep anything. As such trade is very likely to be viewed as subjectively positive
and naturally leads to increased trading behavior.23 Beyond such short-term ex-
periments, our data also help to contextualize longer-term results such as List
(2003, 2004), who shows that more experienced traders are less likely to exhibit
an endowment effect. Though exchange should, on average, be a positive expe-
rience, it need not be uniformly so. Our data indicate that negative subjective
23 We discuss further differences in the implementation of trading experience between our de-
sign and the previous examination of Engelmann and Hollard (2010) in Appendix 3.B.1.
124 | 3 Heterogeneity of Loss Aversion and Expectations-Based Reference Points
evaluations of exchange may slow the speed at which the endowment effect is
eliminated by market experience.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006)
(KR) represent a key advance in behavioral economics, but a host of conflicting
evidence for the theory exists. In this paper we aimed to reconcile this con-
flicting evidence by explicitly recognizing and evaluating heterogeneity in loss
aversion. Heterogeneity is critical both because the model’s comparative statics
can change sign depending on the level of loss aversion, and because prior work
has noted that loss aversion is, by no means, a universal characteristic.
We measure loss aversion by evaluating ranking statements for a first bundle
of goods without choice, and then place subjects in an exchange environment
where they make choices over a second, different bundle of goods. We show that
explicitly accounting for the heterogeneity in loss aversion by and large restores
behavior in line with KR predictions. Individuals that are measured to be loss
averse for the first bundle of goods deliver a substantial endowment effect for
the second bundle, validating our taxonomy of types. Using a mechanism of
probabilistic forced exchange, we then show that individuals who are measured
to be loss averse grow more willing to exchange when probabilistically forced
to do so; and individuals who are measured as loss loving grow less willing to
exchange. These findings, and the magnitudes of the observed treatment effects
are closely in line with the predictions of the KR model.
Our results help to reconcile conflicting results in the empirical study of the
KRmodel (Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Goette et al., 2016; Heffetz and List, 2014)
and follow naturally from the broad recognition of heterogeneity in loss aversion
(Chapman et al., 2017; Erev et al., 2008; Harinck et al., 2007; Knetsch and
Wong, 2009; Nicolau, 2012; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Sprenger, 2015). If we
are to recognize that loss aversion is not a universal trait, we must also recognize
it as a confound of first-order importance for the KR model.
The conclusions drawn from this work rely on ex-ante measurement of the
taxonomy of loss aversion. Though predicted and actual treatment effects gen-
erally coincide, our measures of loss aversion are admittedly broad. Future work
could tighten the prediction using more refined measurements. Of course, more
refined measurements come with potential challenges. If measurement is based
on subject choices (e.g., for willingness to pay for lotteries), these choices them-
selves must be evaluated as part of a rational expectations equilibrium plan.
Overcoming this joint challenge would represent a helpful advance over the cur-
rent work.
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Even accounting for KR forces, our data show a residual endowment effect
of subjects being generally unwilling to exchange. Our results shed light on the
mechanisms underlying such behavior. We show that unwillingness to exchange
is related to prior experience, particularly the subjective perception thereof. Neg-
ative experience, regardless of objective outcome, leads to decreased exchange.
This result may helpfully add to the literature on experience effects and ex-
change anomalies (Engelmann and Hollard, 2010; List, 2003, 2004), showing
that exchange experience, even short-lived, can reduce the endowment effect. If
the perception of experience influences subsequent exchange, it is possible for
exchange anomalies to persist. Though exchange should generally be viewed as
a positive event, with both parties gaining from trade, negative ex-post percep-
tions may still engender a hesitance to trade. Experiments which make explicit
connection between trade and positive experience may thus be overstating the
speed at which the endowment effect dissipates. And, provided that exchange
is not a uniformly positive event, exchange anomalies may indeed persist with
experience.
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Appendix 3.A Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests
3.A.1 Robustness Specications
Below we display regression results with standard errors clustered at the session
level. Table 3.A.1 corresponds to Table 3.5 in the main text.
All analyses in the main text are based on a taxonomy of preference types
based on liking scores. Below (Figure 3.A.1, Table 3.A.2, and Table 3.A.3) we
report corresponding analyses for a categorization using the wanting scores
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Figure 3.A.1. Preferences and endowments. Self-reported scores of wanting
for the endowed and alternative goods. (Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic z =
5.86 (p < 0.01), N=607).
Appendix 3.B Comments on Related Literature
3.B.1 Engelmann and Hollard (2010)
In the laboratory study of Engelmann and Hollard (2010), subjects play three
trading rounds prior to a final trading situation with the experimenter. They
show that the endowment effect in the final (voluntary) exchange vanishes for
those who have been forced to trade their endowed good in the training rounds,
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but persists for those who were allowed to voluntarily exchange during the train-
ing round. The implementation of forced trading in Engelmann and Hollard
(2010) differs from ours in important ways. In the training rounds, subjects in
the treatment group are forced to exchange in the sense that otherwise, they
lose their endowed good and do not receive anything in return. If endowed
with good X, subjects choose between a situation of exchanging X for good Y,
and losing X without receiving Y either. This way, the training rounds, in a broad
sense, “condition” subjects to perceive exchange favorably by exposing them to
the threat of leaving empty-handed. One explanation that reconciles their find-
ings with our observation that the subjective perception of experience, i.e. its
valence, determines subsequent willingness to trade, is that subjects who were
forced to trade three times in a row in Engelmann and Hollard (2010) precisely
grew more willing to trade because they learned to associate the no trade choice
with not getting anything. Our notion of exchange – be it forced or voluntary –
is motivated by typical trading situations and involves giving up the endowment
in return for something else, instead of sacrificing the endowment for nothing in
return. In any case, participants in the trade-it-or-lose-it design of Engelmann
and Hollard (2010) were indeed more likely to make a subjectively positive ex-
perience than in our setting.24
Conceptually, Engelmann and Hollard (2010) attribute exchange asymmetries
to “trade uncertainty” about market procedures, specifically that individuals mis-
perceive and exaggerate the costs or risks of market transactions absent experi-
ence. Even in the simple, stylized and short-lived experimental exchange setting,
they suggest, people grow accustomed to trading in that the perceived risks or
costs of trading decrease significantly.25 While the notion of trade uncertainty
is recognizably broad and potentially incorporates our valence finding, our ex-
perimental design attempts to eliminate potential sources of uncertainty about
the trading mechanism by giving it a precise, transparent and simple structure,
as well as by limiting social interaction.
24 Amore critical interpretation is that training people to trade under the threat of losing leaving
empty-handed otherwise is susceptible to experimenter demand effects because subjects could
infer that the experimenter wants them to trade in the subsequent exchange situation.
25 The training and second stages of Engelmann and Hollard (2010) still differ in important
dimensions, however: The training rounds take place in a setting “without any restriction” where
subjects can “interact, bargain, move, and so on” (Engelmann and Hollard, 2010, p.2008), while
the final round is set in an isolated room facing the experimenter alone. The general setup is
subject to a methodological criticism of laboratory exchange situations (Plott and Zeiler, 2005,
2007), because exchange is implemented as a direct social interaction that triggers, e.g., social
comparison processes.
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Table 3.A.1. Exchange behavior and probabilistic forced exchange: Clustered standard
errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Exchange (=1)
Full Sample Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Panel A: Structural Bounds Taxonomy
Probabilistic Forced Exchange 0.004 0.158*** 0.027 -0.248***
(0.034) (0.050) (0.071) (0.060)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.330 0.361 0.429
(0.028) (0.042) (0.055) (0.049)
R-Squared 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.072
# Observations 607 217 240 150
H0: No Baseline Endowment Eect F1,605=23.85 F1,215=16.44 F1,238=6.30 F1,148=2.13
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.05) (p = 0.16)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Eect F1,605=40.85 F1,215=0.19 F1,238=6.23 F1,148 = 83.39
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.67) (p < 0.05) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 1.95
(p = 0.16)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 25.61
(p < 0.01)
Panel B: Reduced Form Taxonomy
Probabilistic Forced Exchange 0.004 0.119** -0.030 -0.149*
(0.034) (0.052) (0.096) (0.087)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.304 0.392 0.448
(0.028) (0.032) (0.070) (0.076)
R-Squared 0.000 0.015 0.001 0.022
# Observations 607 285 131 191
H0: No Baseline Endowment Eect F1,605=23.85 F1,283=36.46 F1,129=2.39 F1,189=0.47
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p = 0.13) (p = 0.50)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Eect F1,605=40.85 F1,283=3.46 F1,129=4.25 F1,189 = 22.79
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.073) (p = 0.048) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 2.88
(p = 0.090)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 6.22
(p < 0.05)
Notes: Ordinary least square regression. Standard errors clustered at session level in parentheses. Signicance
levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Null hypotheses tested for 1) zero baseline endowment eect, re-
gression (Constant = 0.5); 2) zero forced exchange endowment eect (Constant + Forced Exchange = 0.5); 3)
Identical baseline behavior across loss averse and loss loving agents (Constant (col. 2) = Constant (col. 4)); 4)
Identical treatment eects of forced exchange across loss averse and loss loving agents (Forced Exchange (col.
2) = Forced Exchange (col. 4)). Hypotheses 3 and 4 tested via seemingly unrelated regression. Panel A: taxonomy
of types based on structural bounds from Table 3.3. Panel B: taxonomy of types based on reduced form rating
statements from Table 3.3.
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Table 3.A.2. Aggregate parameter estimates: Based on wanting scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimate (Std. Error) Estimate (Std. Error)
Bundle 1 Bundle 2
Loss Aversion:
λˆ 1.617 (0.132) 1.346 (0.113)
Utility Values:
Xˆ1 (Pen Set) 0.674 (0.049)
Yˆ1 (USB Stick) 1 -
Xˆ2 (Picnic Mat) 0.927 (0.050)
Yˆ2 (Thermos) 1 -
Discernibility:
δˆ 0.557 (0.060) 0.478 (0.053)
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses.
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Table 3.A.3. Exchange behavior and probabilistic forced exchange: Type categorization
based on wanting scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Exchange (=1)
Full Sample Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Panel A: Structural Bounds Taxonomy
Probabilistic Forced Exchange 0.004 0.129** -0.003 -0.177**
(0.040) (0.065) (0.067) (0.081)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.327 0.383 0.407
(0.032) (0.048) (0.054) (0.067)
R-Squared 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.035
# Observations 607 223 239 145
H0: No Baseline Endowment Eect F1,605=18.32 F1,221=13.29 F1,237=4.68 F1,143=1.89
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.05) (p = 0.17)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Eect F1,605=27.48 F1,221=0.97 F1,237=9.62 F1,143 = 36.65
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.33) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 0.97
(p = 0.32)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 8.78
(p < 0.01)
Panel B: Reduced Form Taxonomy
Probabilistic Forced Exchange 0.004 0.103* -0.093 -0.092
(0.040) (0.056) (0.085) (0.079)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.297 0.439 0.431
(0.032) (0.042) (0.066) (0.065)
R-Squared 0.000 0.011 0.009 0.008
# Observations 607 293 138 176
H0: No Baseline Endowment Eect F1,605=18.32 F1,291=23.24 F1,136=0.86 F1,187=1.11
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p = 0.36) (p = 0.29)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Eect F1,605=27.48 F1,291=7.24 F1,136=8.40 F1,187 = 13.50
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 3.01
(p = 0.08)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 4.12
(p < 0.05)
Notes: Ordinary least square regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Null hypotheses tested for 1) zero baseline endowment eect, regression (Constant
= 0.5); 2) zero forced exchange endowment eect (Constant + Forced Exchange = 0.5); 3) Identical baseline
behavior across loss averse and loss loving agents (Constant (col. 2) = Constant (col. 4)); 4) Identical treatment
eects of forced exchange across loss averse and loss loving agents (Forced Exchange (col. 2) = Forced Exchange
(col. 4)). Hypotheses 3 and 4 tested via seemingly unrelated regression. Panel A: taxonomy of types based on
structural bounds from wanting scores. Panel B: taxonomy of types based on reduced form rating statements
from wanting scores.
3.C Instructions and Material Presented to Participants | 133
Appendix 3.C Instructions and Material Presented to
Participants
All instructions and information presented to participants have been translated
from German to English.
3.C.1 Images of Objects Presented to Participants
The following images (Figure 3.C.2 and Figure 3.C.3) were projected to the wall
of the lecture room at the beginning of the respective stage. For the displayed
example, the Stage 1 bundle consisted of the USB stick and erasable pens, but
this was counter-balanced at the session level.
Part 1
USB stick
• 8GB, USB 2.0, from brand Kingston
• Slim metallic case, eye for key ring
Erasable pens
• Erasable rollerball, from brand Pilot
• 3 pieces: black, blue, red
Figure 3.C.2. Image 1 projected on the wall to present objects. For Stage 1
with goods bundle consisting of USB stick and erasable pens.
3.C.2 Instructions (Computer-Based)
Welcome to part 1 of 2 in this experiment!
Please close the curtain of you cabin and read the following information. All
computer entries that you make in this experiment are fully anonymous and
cannot be traced back to you. Speed is not important at any point in this
experiment. Please always take sufficient time to read and understand the
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Part 2
Thermos bottle
• Stainless steel, 500ml, double-wall insulated
• For warm and and cold drinks
Picnic mat
• Foldable, water-resistant PVC bottom side
• Ca. 120x140cm, with Velcro fastener
Figure 3.C.3. Image 2 projected on the wall to present objects. For Stage 2
with goods bundle consisting of thermos and picnic mat.
instructions.
The [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] now belongs to you.
You can touch and inspect it at any time. However, please do not yet open
the packaging and do not use the object yet. The two objects presented to
you ( [ USB stick and erasable pens / thermos and picnic mat ] ) have been
randomly allocated to the cabins in equal quantities. Your cabin number was
also randomly determined based on your choice of seat in the presentation
room.
Please click on OK when you have read these information. If you have questions,
please call an experimenter.
Please answer the questions.
[ USB stick / thermos ]
How much do you like this product?
How much would you want to have this product?
[ Erasable pens / picnic mat ]
How much do you like this product?
How much would you want to have this product?
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Please read the following information carefully.
The experimenter will soon draw a random number between 1 and 20 using
a lotto drum. The drawn number will then be announced loudly. If the drawn
number is a number [ from 11 to 20 / from 1 to 10 ], your [ USB stick /
erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] will be taken away from you and you
instead receive [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ]. If the
drawn number is a number [ from 1 to 10 / from 11 to 20 ], you will keep your
[ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] and nothing happens. After
the number has been drawn and the exchange of objects has taken place (if
applicable), nothing else happens in this part of the experiment. You can then
keep your object for good.
Please only confirm below once you have understood everything. If you have
questions, please call the experimenter and wait until he comes to your cabin.
[ Mood elicitation 1 ]
Please answer the following questions about how you currently feel. Which
expressions better apply to you at the moment?
“Unhappy, Angry, Unsatisfied, Sad, Desperate” – “Happy, Thrilled, Satisfied,
Content, Hopeful”
The time has come. Please wait until the number has been drawn.
Remember: If the drawn number is a number [ from 11 to 20 / from 1 to 10 ],
your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] will be taken away
from you and you instead receive [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic
mat ]. If the drawn number is a number [ from 1 to 10 / from 11 to 20 ], you
will keep your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ].
The drawn number is [ 1 / 2 / ... / 20 ].
This number is a number [ from 1 to 10 / from 11 to 20 ]. Therefore [ you can
keep your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] / your [ USB
stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] will be taken away from you
and you instead receive [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] ].
Please wait while the experimenter carries out the exchange in all cabins.
[ Mood elicitation 2 and control question. ]
Please answer the following questions about how you currently feel. Which
expressions better apply to you at the moment?
“Unhappy, Angry, Unsatisfied, Sad, Desperate” – “Happy, Thrilled, Satisfied,
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Content, Hopeful”
Regarding the lottery draw, that has just taken place: What was the probability
(in percent) that you would lose your initial object? Please enter a number
between 0 and 100.
Part 1 of the experiment is over!
Please follow the instructions.
• Memorize your cabin number.
• You can no go back to the presentation room.
• Please leave your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] in
the cabin. You will be back in the same cabin in a few minutes.
• Remember: The object now belongs to you for good and you will take it
away from this experiment.
Welcome to part 2 in this experiment!
Please close the curtain of you cabin and read the following information. The
[ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] now also belongs to you.
You can touch and inspect it at any time. However, please do not yet open the
packaging and do not use the object yet. The two objects presented to you for
part 2 ( [ USB stick and erasable pens / thermos and picnic mat ] ) have again
been randomly allocated to the cabins in equal quantities.
Please click on OK when you have read these information. If you have questions,
please call an experimenter.
[ Instructions Stage 2 – ONLY BASELINE (p=0.0) ]
Please read the following information carefully. The [ USB stick / erasable pens
/ thermos / picnic mat ] from part 2 of the experiment now belongs to you
and you can keep it for good. If you like, you can exchange your [ USB stick /
erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] voluntarily for [ USB stick / erasable
pens / thermos / picnic mat ]. Whichever way you decide, your choice is final
and you will take your selected object with you from this experiment.
Please only confirm below once you have understood everything. If you have
questions, please call the experimenter and wait until he comes to your cabin.
[ Instructions Stage 2 – ONLY FORCED EXCHANGE (p=0.5) ]
Please read the following information carefully. You have received a new object
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in part 2 of the experiment ( [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat
] ). You will soon get the opportunity to exchange your [ USB stick / erasable
pens / thermos / picnic mat ] voluntarily for [ USB stick / erasable pens /
thermos / picnic mat ].
If you decide to exchange, you will receive [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos
/ picnic mat ] as requested for your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos /
picnic mat ] and you can then keep your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos
/ picnic mat ] for good. The experiment is then finished.
If you decide against an exchange, there will be a probability of 50% that the
exchange will be forced anyways and you have to exchange nevertheless.
Concretely, the following happens in the case that you decide against a volun-
tary exchange: The experimenter will draw a random number between 1 and
20 using a lotto drum (as in part 1 of the experiment). The drawn number will
then be announced loudly. If the drawn number is a number [ from 11 to 20 /
from 1 to 10 ], your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] will
be taken away from you and you instead receive [ USB stick / erasable pens
/ thermos / picnic mat ]. If the drawn number is a number [ from 1 to 10 /
from 11 to 20 ], you will keep your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos /
picnic mat ] and nothing happens. After the number has been drawn and the
exchange of objects has taken place (if applicable), nothing else happens in this
part of the experiment. You can then keep your object for good.
Please only confirm below once you have understood everything. If you have
questions, please call the experimenter and wait until he comes to your cabin.
[ Mood elicitation 3 ]
Before you get the opportunity to exchange your object, please answer the
following questions about how you currently feel. Which expressions better
apply to you at the moment?
“Unhappy, Angry, Unsatisfied, Sad, Desperate” – “Happy, Thrilled, Satisfied,
Content, Hopeful”
Do you want to exchange your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos /
picnic mat ] for a [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ]?
Yes, I want to exchange.
No, I do not want to exchange.
[ ONLY BASELINE (p=0.0) ]
You have decided [ for / against ] a voluntary exchange. Please wait while the
experimenter carries out the exchange in all cabins.
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[ ONLY FORCED EXCHANGE (p=0.5) ]
You have decided [ for / against ] a voluntary exchange. Please wait while the
experimenter carries out the exchange in all cabins.
[ ONLY NON-TRADERS ] After this, it will be determined whether you have to
exchange anyways.
[ ONLY TRADERS ] Please wait until the experiment continues. A random
number will now be drawn for those who decided against a voluntary exchange.
After that the experiment continues for you.
[ ONLY NON-TRADERS ] Remember: If the drawn number is a number [ from
11 to 20 / from 1 to 10 ], your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic
mat ] will be taken away from you and you instead receive [ USB stick /
erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ]. If the drawn number is a number [
from 1 to 10 / from 11 to 20 ], you will keep your [ USB stick / erasable pens /
thermos / picnic mat ].
[ ONLY NON-TRADERS ]
The drawn number is [ 1 / 2 / ... / 20 ]
This number is a number [ from 1 to 10 / from 11 to 20 ]. Therefore [ you can
keep you [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] / your [ USB
stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] will be taken away from you and
you instead receive [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ]. Please
wait while the experimenter carries out the exchange in all cabins.
[ Mood elicitation 4 ]
Please answer the following questions about how you currently feel. Which
expressions better apply to you at the moment?
“Unhappy, Angry, Unsatisfied, Sad, Desperate” – “Happy, Thrilled, Satisfied,
Content, Hopeful”
The experiment is over!
You can keep both your objects. You will also receive a show-up fee of 4 euros.




On the Persistent Eect
of Economic Crisis Experience
Joint with Tom Zimmermann
4.1 Introduction
Trust is a fundamental prerequisite for economic exchange. A mounting body of
evidence shows that measured levels of trust vary substantially across geograph-
ical locations and over time (Falk et al., 2017; Nannestad, 2008; Robinson and
Jackson, 2001). This affects economic outcomes at the individual, group and so-
cietal levels.1 But what are the determinants of the geographical and temporal
variation of trust? This paper provides evidence that trust is partially determined
by individuals’ experience of catastrophic macroeconomic events that are jointly
made by people living at the same place and at the same time.
Exploiting cohort, time and regional variation in different datasets, we find
a persistent negative effect of living through times of financial crises on inter-
personal trust. Our analysis is motivated by a trust breach argument, positing
that trust is not easily restored once it has been violated (Lewicki and Bunker,
1995, 1996; Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000; Slovic, 1993). In support of this hy-
pothesis, the effect is only observed for crises in domains that strongly rely on
trust. Banking crises and bank failures serve as a proxy for the increased likeli-
hood of people in affected regionsmaking adverse experience in trust-dependent
1 Trust supports cooperative behavior (Gambetta, 1988), determines the performance of large
organizations (Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Porta et al., 1997), reduces transaction costs and con-
tributes to differences in growth between countries (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Beugelsdijk et al.,
2004; Knack and Keefer, 1997).
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economic interactions.2 We show that the aggregate consequences of financial
crises operating through a population’s tendency to distrust others are sizable
and long-lived.
Identifying the effect of experience on trust comes with both theoretical and
methodological challenges. First, there are different ways of how experience
might accumulate over time, and each possibility implies a different definition
for aggregated personal crisis experience. For example, a person’s stock of per-
sonal crisis experience could depend both on the time distance to a past event
and the person’s age at that time, but there is little ex ante conceptual guidance
to favor one specific formalization over another.
Second, macroeconomic crises are no ceteris paribus events, but have both
concurrent and delayed effects experienced in conjunction with the crises. If fi-
nancial crises were closely followed by recessions, then experience effects based
on indicators for financial crises may falsely attribute the effect of living through
recessions to the occurrence of financial crises. Therefore, disentangling differ-
ent types of experience is essential.
Third, previous evidence on experience effects typically comes from either
cross-country comparisons or within-country regional variation. These levels of
comparisons require different identifying assumptions and findings in one do-
main are not easily generalized to the other.
Our empirical strategy addresses these concerns. First, we allow for differ-
ent characterizations of accumulated crisis experience. Second, instead of esti-
mating the effect of one specific type of macroeconomic crisis in isolation, we
accommodate the fact that crises occur jointly with other crises and have reper-
cussions in other economic domains. Our analyses account for the co-movement
of different crises and measures of economic activity.
Third, we exploit two distinct individual-level data sets, one exploiting cross-
country variation, and the other using within-country regional variation. In the
first part of our analysis, we estimate the effect of personal experience of country-
level financial and economics crises using trust data spanning over 30 years from
a large-scale individual-level data set, the World Values Survey. In the second
part we test the effect of local banking crises in the United States using detailed
regional information on bank failures and more than 40 years of trust data from
the General Social Survey. Together, our data allow to examine the breach of trust
hypothesis about the origins of systematic heterogeneity in trust levels, using an
empirical strategy that is more conservative than in previous experience studies,
addressing potential confounds in the identification of experience effects.
2 Our empirical approach assumes a broad notion of what constitutes such adverse experience.
Both being directly affected – e.g., by losing assets due to a bank failure or having increased
financial concerns – and being indirectly affected – e.g., by seeing friends or acquaintances lose
money – potentially bears on trusting behavior.
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We document two key findings from our cross-country study. First, we esti-
mate a highly persistent effect of living through financial crises on trust in other
people. Intriguingly, this effect is specific to those types of financial crises — in
particular, banking crises – that occur in spheres in which individual behavior
has been shown to strongly depend on trust, but not for crises in other, less trust-
intensive areas, such as inflation or public debt crises. These findings hold in a
broad range of specifications. Second, zooming in on specific channels, we iden-
tify two potential mechanisms: For one thing, individuals with relatively more
banking crisis experience are not less likely to trust financial institutions, but
they do tend to distrust political institutions. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014)
showed that experiencing recessions, by contrast, increases trust in such insti-
tutions, which is replicated in our data. We document that banking crises that
often occur simultaneously with recessions work in the other direction to offset
the positive effect of recessions on confidence in the political system. For another
thing, financial crisis experience does not shift measures of risk preferences. In-
stead, the effect on trust appears to operate via changes in beliefs.
Our benchmark estimate implies that experiencing a banking crisis in the
previous year decreases trust by 1.6 percentage points. To put the effect size and
horizon into perspective, a crisis that happened 20 years ago reduces trust today
by about as much as one-third of the effect of a personal traumatic experience,
e.g., a divorce or disease, in the preceding year.3
Our subsequent within-country study uses U.S. survey data from the Gen-
eral Social Survey in combination with historical information on bank failures
provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We reports two
findings. First, our main results from the cross-country study are strongly sup-
ported using only within-country variation. Again, we control for a battery of
cohort, age, region and survey year fixed effects, household-level characteris-
tics, and recognize alternative ways for how experience accumulates. This repli-
cation in a different data set, at a different level of regional aggregation, using
different measures to construct experience stocks speaks to the robustness of the
identified relationship and provides external validation. Second, an advantage
in this setting over the cross-country study is that we can construct a continuous
measure of the severity of a local banking crisis, using information about the esti-
mated losses from bank defaults. Our data confirm that experience stocks based
on estimated losses are also associated with lower interpersonal trust levels.
We believe this paper makes three contributions. First, we provide evidence
that sheds light on the determinants of trust over time and locations at the aggre-
gate level. The literature on trust mostly focuses on its role as a determinant of
3 Based on estimates of Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), who find that recent traumas decrease
trust by 2-3 percentage points, only a bit more than the effect of a banking crisis experience in
our benchmark specification, but the effects of banking crises are long-lasting.
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individual or aggregate economic outcomes (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Beugels-
dijk et al., 2004; Knack and Keefer, 1997), or on the determinants of trusting
behavior in personal interaction (Schwerter and Zimmermann, 2016). Our find-
ings suggest that shared adverse experience in trust-sensitive areas permanently
affects public trust levels. They hint at a potential feedback effect between trust
and economic crises.
Second, this study points out a specific dimension of the welfare costs of
economic disturbances that received little previous attention. For example, it
has been argued that distrust is costly in personal interactions, organizations,
and at the community level (Kosfeld and Falk, 2006; Kramer, 1999; Malul et
al., 2010). As such, a persistent erosion of trust potentially increases the wel-
fare burden of crashes such as the 2008/09 global financial crisis. Moreover,
interpersonal trust has been linked to political preferences, in particular prefer-
ences for redistribution (Hetherington and Husser, 2012; Jaime-Castillo, 2016;
Yamamura, 2014). By breaking interpersonal trust, macroeconomic crises could
contribute to a diminished taste for redistribution in a society.
Third, we add to an emerging line of research devoted to studying how ex-
periences shape preferences and beliefs. Previous work documents effects of
macroeconomic experiences in the domains of risk taking (Malmendier and
Nagel, 2011), inflation expectations (Malmendier and Nagel, 2015; Malmendier
et al., 2017) and political preferences (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014). Our
paper shifts the focus to social preferences. Relatedly, Alesina and La Ferrara
(2002) analyze correlates of trust in U.S. data. They report a negative relation-
ship between trust and self-reported traumatic events within the previous year.
Among other adverse experiences such as a divorce, diseases and financial mis-
fortune exhibit the strongest negative correlation with trust. Moreover, our study
complements work examining trust as a determinant of societal outcomes. Guiso
et al. (2004) identify trust as a driver of the financial development of societies. In
their view, a financial contract constitutes “the ultimate trust-intensive contract”
(Guiso et al., 2004, p. 527). We analyze the reverse direction and show that trust
levels are partly driven by the shared experience of financial meltdowns in the
first place.
Our findings on the persistent negative effects of macroeconomic crises
are remarkable in light of previous studies on the implications of other, non-
economic forms of experience for trust. For example, Cassar et al. (2011) find
a positive effect of natural disaster experience on trust and trustworthiness in
their study of the 2004 tsunami in Thai villages. Looking at armed conflict in
Uganda, De Luca and Verpoorten (2015) estimate a short-term negative effect of
experiencing violence on trust, but find a rapid recovery in trust levels thereafter.
Section 4.2 sets out our empirical strategy. Section 4.3 discusses the first part
of our analysis using cross-country data, and Section 4.4 present the second part
that focuses on U.S. data. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Empirical Strategy and Identication
We present the model specification and identification strategy, and discuss mea-
surement of variables and data in the subsequent sections. Our baseline specifi-
cation is akin to the approach taken in recent work on the experience hypothesis.
We model trust as
t rust i j t = β0 + β1Ci j t + β2‘X i j t + crisis j t + γa + µt
+νb + α j + α j · age + εi j t ,
(4.1)
where t rust i j t is a self-reported measure of trust of individual i in year t and
country j.
The parameter of interest is β1, the effect of individual-level crisis experience
Ci j t , which we model as an experience stock that an individual has accumulated
over their lifetime. Our experience stock variable nests the main approaches
used in the literature. Our preferred measure, which we call delta experience, is
adapted from Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2015) and based on a simple de-
preciation interpretation of past experience. Delta experience assumes that the
effect of crises fade over time and that past years are discounted exponentially
based on their time distance relative to the survey year,




Here, i denotes the individual and t is the survey year. Crises are summed over
an individual’s lifetime up to the survey year, with weighting factor δ. The indi-
cator function takes value 1 if the individual experienced a crisis in year s and
0 otherwise.
In this view, the time distance to a past crisis matters irrespective of age. This
specification captures the notion of an experience capital stock that depreciates
as time passes and is governed by a single parameter δ. We favor this speci-
fication because of its transparency and simplicity while capturing the central
insight that past events are forgotten over time (δ < 1). At the same time, delta
experience also nests the trivial case of no differential weighting of past events
(δ = 1).4
An alternative approach that puts the age range during which an event is
experienced center stage but does not account for differential time distance to
a past event is suggested in Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), who look at the
4 Even a case with δ > 1 is conceivable in this setup when, e.g., crisis experience becomes grad-
ually less important the later in life it occurs. See below for an alternative model that explicitly
considers age ranges to account for this idea.
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effect of experience in specific age intervals.5 Both considerations, time distance
and age-specific effects, can be combined in a joint specification of the experi-
ence stock as in Malmendier and Nagel (2011). Malmendier and Nagel (2011)
introduce a single parameter that simultaneously regulates how weights for past
years depend on an individual’s age back then and the time elapsed since that
event, suggesting that a 20-year-old person with a relatively short life history
may be swayed much more by an abnormal event than a 60-year-old who has a
richer life experience. Table 4.1 provides an overview of alternative experience
specifications considered in this paper. We investigate different plausible speci-
fications to shed light on the importance of different modeling assumptions for
our results.
Table 4.1. Overview of experience specications
Specication of experience Approach recognizes...
time distance to an
event at survey date
respondent’s age
at time of event
Delta experience
(Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015)
Ø
Age range experience
(Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014)
Ø
Lambda experience
(Malmendier and Nagel, 2011)
Ø Ø
Notes. Displayed are dierent denitions from the previous literature for how
individual experience can be aggregated into a single measure.
We relegate further details and report results for our alternative specifica-
tions, i.e. age range experience and lambda experience to the appendix. To antic-
ipate our results, we will show that the effect of some types of macroeconomic
crises are sensitive to the choice of experience specification. Our main finding on
the effect of banking crises or local banking failures on trust, however, is compa-
rable in both magnitude and significance with those in the main text, regardless
of how the experience stock is defined. To our knowledge, our paper is the first
in the experience literature that considers multiple specifications for the experi-
ence stock and shows robustness of results across several such specifications.
Our identification is based on the inclusion of a myriad of fixed effects
to absorb confounding variation. In particular, equation (4.1) includes unob-
served age fixed effects (γa), time fixed effects (µt), country fixed effects (α j),
5 This formulation assumes that experiences at a certain age matter independently of elapsed
time, i.e., experience does not fade. The effect of having experienced some event of interest during
their 20s is the same for a person of age 31 and a person of age 65.
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birth-year-cohort fixed effects (νb), as well as country-specific linear age trends
(α j · age). Age fixed effects remove systematic life cycle effects in the evolu-
tion of trust. Survey-year fixed effects eliminate aggregate effects such as time-
varying trust. Country fixed effects deal with unobserved heterogeneity in trust
between countries. Because our experience measure varies not only between but
also within cohorts over time, we can accommodate birth-year-cohort fixed ef-
fects that absorb unobserved cohort-level variation in trust.6 To avoid attributing
other time-varying country-specific factors to experience, we include country-
specific age trends. Moreover, we use a full set of crisis-in-survey-year dummies
(crisis j t) to capture contemporaneous effects of living through a crisis on trust.
We further include observable individual-level characteristics, X i j t , to isolate
the effect of crisis experience. In some specifications, we additionally include
experience stocks of other macroeconomic variables to rule out spurious attribu-
tions to specific types of crises. The latter approach is more conservative than
the specifications in the extant literature that focus on a sole crisis type and do
not control for simultaneous occurrences of other crises.
Our identification of β1 comes from individual-level cross-sectional differ-
ences in trust and experience stocks and on changes in these cross-sectional
differences over time. The variation in Ci j t has two main components at the
cross-sectional level: different geographical locations and age differences. The
identifying assumption of our analysis is that there are no unobserved variables
varying at the country-year-age-birth-year level that correlate with both our con-
structed individual experience measure and trust.
4.3 Cross-Country Evidence
Part 1 of our empirical analysis uses cross-country data to examine the effect of
country-level macroeconomic shocks on trust.
4.3.1 Data and Measurement
Our data come from three sources. We use the World Values Survey (WVS) for
individual data on trust and other individual characteristics. The WVS is a
compilation of repeated cross-sections of national surveys at the individual level
that covers a broad range of topics. Most of the questions are consistent across
countries and survey dates. Six waves of the survey are currently available, with
survey years spanning 1981 to 2012.
The WVS includes a standard item on generalized trust, which is the most
6 Since we observe every cohort in our sample at least twice, the full set of cohort dummies is
not perfectly collinear to the age and survey year effects.
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widely studied survey question to measure trust (cf. Naeff and Schupp, 2009).7
The trust measure is included throughout all years of the survey. The exact
wording is as follows:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t
be too careful in dealing with people?
• Most people can be trusted.
• Can’t be too careful.
In addition, we use individual-level demographic variables from the WVS as con-
trols in equation (4.1). We employ information on education, income, marital
status, the number of children, gender, religion and a self-assessment of an in-
dividual’s social class.
Our central objective is to distinguish macroeconomic crises by type and
investigate potential differences in their respective effects on trust. The main
source of cross-country data on crises is the data set provided by Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009),8 who date financial crises and classify them as inflation, currency,
banking, stock market, domestic debt or foreign debt crises using objective cri-
teria. The data cover 70 countries and start in 1800. Crises are coded as binary
events for each country-year.
We complement these data on financial crises with yearly GDP data collected
by Barro and Ursua (2008) covering a wide range of countries starting in 1870.
As in Barro and Ursua (2008), we define a GDP crisis as a year-on-year drop of
GDP by more than 10%.
Figure 4.A.1 in the Appendix depicts the distribution of crisis events over
countries and years. Macroeconomic crises occur frequently over time and in
different countries, and some countries are much more frequently affected than
others. Such heterogeneity makes it impossible to identify effects of macroeco-
nomic crises on individual outcomes from a single cross-section of country data
alone.
We calculate each individual’s experience stock for each crisis type following
equation (4.2), joining information on the timing of crises with age and survey
7 The question elicits people’s expectations about the trustworthiness of people in general, in
line with the interpretation of trust as a belief rather than a preference (Sapienza et al., 2013).
8 Bordo et al. (2001) and Laeven and Valencia (2013) provide alternative datasets on financial
crises, but with a less detailed breakdown of types. The former is largely similar to Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) but covers fewer countries and a shorter period. The latter only starts in
1976, which is too late for our analysis. Moreover, C. D. Romer and D. H. Romer (2017) create
continuous measures for crises, which would be desirable for our analysis. However, their data
only covers OECD countries since the 1970s. For estimations using a continuous measure see also
Section 4.4.
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year information from the WVS. Alternative experience stock specifications are
considered in the Appendix.
It is important to note that a systematic concurrence of different crisis types
undermines the analysis of single crisis types in isolation. Figure 4.1 illustrates
this point for banking and GDP crises. Banking crises were frequent in the pre-
1950 period and then again post-1980. GDP crises are somewhat more evenly
distributed over time (but still with only a few countries experiencing GDP crises
between 1950 and 1970). Note that banking crises and GDP crises sometimes
happen concurrently. When constructing experience stocks for banking crises as
described above, we may falsely attribute any observed effect of such an expe-
rience to a banking crisis, when it really is due to the experience of events that
typically go hand in hand with banking crises.
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The problem of concurrent events is typically not addressed in research about
macroeconomic experiences on individual outcomes. One way to deal with this
problem is to simultaneously include experience stocks for other experiences. If
different types of events are usually experienced in combination, this is reflected
in a co-movement of their respective experience stocks. Some of our specifica-
tions will therefore control for experience stocks of a range of other macroeco-
nomic events to rule out spurious relationships, reduce omitted variable bias and
give a sense of the robustness of the results.
4.3.2 Results: Eects of Macroeconomic Crises on Trust
Table 4.2 considers each type of macroeconomic crisis available in our data in
isolation. In line with Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2015), we initially set
the depreciation rate of the experience stock at 2% per year (δ = .98), but later
show that the results are robust to varying that parameter. Table 4.2 shows two
specifications for each experience stock: a baseline specification that controls for
age, country, year, and cohort effects, as well as crisis-in-survey-year dummies
and a baseline set of contemporaneous individual-level controls, and a more de-
manding specification that adds country-age trends and an additional, extensive
set of controls. Table 4.2 displays least squares regressions for linear probability
models. Probit estimates for all tables in the main text are provided in Appendix
4.C and yield similar results.
Note first that most crisis types are unrelated to trust, with very small coef-
ficients that are statistically insignificant. Banking crises in columns (5) and (6)
are a pronounced exception and exhibit a strong and persistent negative rela-
tion with trust. The coefficient of -.013 (or -.016 in column (6)) suggests that
individuals who experienced a banking crisis 20 years ago are about 1% less











Table 4.2.World Values Survey: Experience of dierent types of crises and the eect on trust
Dependent variable: 1 if trusting
Delta denition of experience stock with δ = 0.98
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Experience stock of output crises 0.011 0.020
(0.014) (0.019)
Experience stock of ination crises 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.004)
Experience stock of banking crises -0.013*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.006)
Experience stock of stock market crises -0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.005)
Experience stock of currency crises 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.005)
Experience stock of domestic debt crises 0.004* 0.008
(0.002) (0.008)
Experience stock of foreign debt crises 0.001 0.005
(0.002) (0.004)
Constant 0.038 0.038 0.097* -0.023 0.205*** 0.093* 0.167*** -0.090 0.116*** -0.011 0.137*** 0.008 0.132*** -0.012
(0.044) (0.031) (0.049) (0.081) (0.038) (0.050) (0.050) (0.075) (0.042) (0.075) (0.027) (0.037) (0.027) (0.035)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crisis at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.130 0.140 0.121 0.130 0.122 0.131 0.127 0.136 0.121 0.130 0.122 0.131 0.122 0.131
N 97702 81713 120427 100405 120427 100405 108827 89658 120427 100405 120427 100405 120427 100405
# countries 33 32 44 43 44 43 39 38 44 43 44 43 44 43
# survey years 15 14 17 16 17 16 15 14 17 16 17 16 17 16
Notes. Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Crisis at the
time of survey is a dummy for whether there was a respective type of crisis in the year in which the respondent answered the survey. Baseline controls include gender, level of
education and (subjective) social class. The additional controls include income decile, indicators for unemployment and marital status, subjectively assessed religiousness and
number of children.
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To put the effect size in perspective, consider Alesina and La Ferrara’s (2002)
estimate of how personal traumatic experiences (e.g., divorce or disease) in the
preceding year affect trust. They find that recent traumas decrease trust by 2
to 3 percentage points and at the same time argue that traumas are among the
best predictors of trust in their data. Our estimate implies that a banking crisis
in the previous year decreases trust by 1.6 percentage points, only somewhat
lower than the effect of a personal trauma. But the effects of banking crises are
long-lasting: Even if the crisis happened 20 years ago, its effect on trust today
is about one-third of the effect of a recent personal traumatic experience.
Exploiting the main insight from Table 4.2, Table 4.3 reports additional anal-
yses on the effects of banking crises. Columns (1) to (4) show that including vari-
ous controls and fixed effects has negligible effects on the size and significance of
the estimate. Moreover, in column (5) we also control for other macroeconomic
experience stocks which leaves the coefficient estimate virtually unchanged.
Columns (6) and (7) of Table 4.3 replicate the effect for a faster depreciation
rate in the experience specification. A delta of .95 (.90) implies that experience
depreciates at a rate of 5% (10%) per year, much faster than the 2% annual
depreciation in our baseline specification. The effect of banking crises remains
highly significant in these alternative specifications, with a similar magnitude
for crises experienced recently and, owing to the faster depreciation, somewhat
smaller magnitudes for crises experienced further in the past.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the effect size for two different depreciation rates and
for individuals of two different ages. A recent crisis reduces trust by around 2
percentage points on average. Owing to faster depreciation of the experience
stock, past crises have less of an effect on today’s trust when depreciation is 5%
rather than 2%. Still, our estimates imply that a banking crisis that occurred 15
years ago is associated with about 1 percentage point lower trust today, even
assuming faster depreciation.
Note that age effects are not apparent in this specification: The effect of a
crisis 10 years ago is the same for a 25-year-old as for a 45-year-old. The reason
is that delta experience by construction only depends on the time that has passed
since the crises occurred.
Our specifications are demanding and more conservative than identification
strategies employed in other examinations of experience effects. The latter typ-
ically do not consider the role of concurrent experiences and presume a sin-
gle specification for the accumulation of experience. We performed analogous
analyses for alternative definitions of the experience stock in Appendix 4.B. All
specifications strongly support the negative relationship between banking crisis
experience and trust. In accordance with previous research, our results also in-
dicate a potential age effect: Younger individuals are relatively more affected by
recent crises than older people with a longer life history.
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Table 4.3.World Values Survey: Trust and banking crisis experience using delta denition
of experience stock
Dependent variable: 1 if trusting δ = 0.98 δ = 0.95 δ = 0.90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience stock of banking crises -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.015** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.022**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Constant 0.186*** 0.205*** 0.133** 0.093* 0.027 0.039 -0.005
(0.038) (0.038) (0.050) (0.050) (0.109) (0.128) (0.118)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Banking crisis at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other macro crisis experience Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.121 0.122 0.127 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.132
N 120427 120427 100405 100405 100405 100405 100405
# countries 44 44 43 43 43 43 43
# survey years 17 17 16 16 16 16 16
Notes.Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance
levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Other macroeconomic experiences include average percentage change in GDP,
as well as ination, stock market and domestic debt crises. Baseline controls include gender, level of education and
(subjective) social class. The additional controls include income decile, indicators for unemployment and marital status,
subjectively assessed religiousness and number of children.
4.3.3 Results: Condence in Institutions
One interpretation of our result is that banking crises erode trust in institutions,
particularly banks. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that aggregate levels
of trust in banks dropped in the aftermath of the 2008/09 financial crisis
(Sapienza and Zingales, 2012). The observed long-term effect on interpersonal
trust could be a byproduct of a breach of institutional trust. This idea encapsu-
lates the hypothesis that banking crises induce a loss of trust in a certain group
of people who are blamed, or viewed as responsible, for the crises, such as
bankers. Individuals might then extrapolate this attitude to other people more
generally.
We test this reasoning by examining the effect of different types of domestic
macroeconomic crises on measures of trust in different institutions. The spec-
ifications presented in Table 4.4 closely conform to our baseline analyses in
Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
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For a 25 year old with delta = 0.98
For a 45 year old with delta = 0.98
For a 25 year old with delta = 0.95
For a 45 year old with delta = 0.95
Figure 4.2. Estimated eect of experiencing a banking crisis X years ago
on trust today, for dierent parameter values. Calculated eects sizes are
based on our estimation results using the Fuchs-Schündeln and Schün-
deln (2015) experience specication with a xed depreciation rate. The red
curves assume a depreciation rate of 5%, the dark curves assume depre-
ciation at 2%. Even at the faster depreciation rate, our estimates imply a
decrease in the likelihood to be trusting due to a banking crisis 15 years
ago of about 1 percentage point.
We make the following observations. First, there is no persistent effect of
banking crises on trust in banks (columns (7) and (8)).9 Second, note that bank-
ing crises have a strong and consistent negative effect on trust in the political
class, represented by the government, parliament and political parties. This ef-
fect is notable given that we replicate the reverse effect of output crises on trust
in the political class, whichwas put forward by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014).
Other crises do not produce consistent effects across specifications. Therefore,
we reconfirm Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) in estimating a permanently im-
proved attitude toward the government after depressions, but further add that
banking crises have a striking effect in the opposite direction. Our findings are in
line with evidence reported by Rainer and Siedler (2009). In their study on the
relationship between democracy and trust after the reunification of Germany,
they both find that social distrust is driven by negative economic outcomes in
9 However, note that the question on trust in banks is only available for a reduced sample of
the WVS. While the effect goes in the expected direction in column (8), statistical power is much
lower due to the limited number of available observations.
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Table 4.4.World Values Survey: Condence in institutions using delta denition of expe-
rience stock with δ = 0.98
Condence in institutions
Dependent variable: Government Parliament Political parties Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience stock of banking crises -0.033*** -0.059*** -0.035** -0.060** -0.022** -0.039** 0.010 0.019
(0.010) (0.018) (0.015) (0.023) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.019)
Experience stock of output crises 0.129** 0.180** 0.087** 0.135*** 0.062** 0.092** 0.017 -0.365
(0.063) (0.067) (0.033) (0.046) (0.031) (0.035) (0.045) (0.171)
Experience stock of ination crises 0.016** 0.018* 0.012*** 0.009 0.009** 0.006 0.016*** 0.080
(0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.028)
Experience stock of stock market crises -0.003 0.000 -0.000 0.013 0.001 0.012 -0.006 0.029
(0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.058)
Experience stock of domestic debt crises 0.044** 0.043 0.030*** 0.015 0.025*** -0.017 -0.031 -0.123
(0.020) (0.035) (0.011) (0.027) (0.009) (0.017) (0.020) (0.123)
Constant 2.252*** 3.241*** 1.876*** 1.702*** 1.758*** 1.400*** 2.562*** 2.153**
(0.144) (0.154) (0.113) (0.287) (0.097) (0.193) (0.157) (0.284)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Any crisis at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.124 0.134 0.162 0.153 0.147 0.129 0.176 0.228
N 145673 86754 147606 88492 146911 88815 37495 4118
# countries 44 36 44 37 44 37 27 3
# waves 4 4 5 4 4 4 2 2
# survey years 17 13 18 13 17 13 4 2
Notes. Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The dependent variables have four levels: 1=“None at all”, 2=“Not very much”, 3=“Quite a lot”, and 4=“A great
deal”. Alternative specications with ordinal regressions are reported in Appendix 4.C. Baseline controls include gender, level of education
and (subjective) social class. The additional controls include income decile, indicators for unemployment and marital status, subjectively
assessed religiousness and number of children. We do not use additional controls in specication (8) as this reduces the available sample
to a single wave.
the past – rather than living in a democracy per se –, and that “in sharp con-
trast to social trust,” levels of institutional trust converge over time (Rainer and
Siedler, 2009, p. 251).
Another corresponding question on the underlying behavioral channels is
whether the effect on trust is driven by changes in beliefs versus preferences.
To shed light on this issue, we performed additional analyses, which similarly
support the interpretation as a belief-based mechanism. These analyses are re-
ported in Appendix 4.D.1.
Taken together, our cross-country analyses provides three insights. First, only
banking crises, but not other types of crises, have a significant and persistent ef-
fect on trust in our data. We interpret the robustness of this effect to numerous
different specifications and alternative plausible approaches to formalize expe-
rience as compelling evidence for the strength of the relationship. It is worth
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noting that other types of experience are occasionally at the margin of signif-
icance, but these effects are unstable and disappear in the more demanding
specifications. This observation suggests care when drawing conclusions about
experience effects from observational data. Second, the estimated magnitude
is sizable, suggesting that banking crises can have substantial repercussions on
societies. Third, while we replicate the key finding of Giuliano and Spilimbergo
(2014), our data suggest that the erosion of interpersonal trust due to banking
crises is not an artifact of reduced trust in financial institutions, but goes hand
in hand with distrust in political institutions.
4.4 Evidence from the U.S.: Regional Bank Failures
Part 2 of our empirical analysis investigates the relationship between regional
bank failures and trust in U.S data. This section serves three objectives. First, the
examination of local bank failures has the potential to corroborate the specific
relationship between trust and adverse breach of trust experience in a strongly
trust-dependent domain, the banking sector, which we observe at the country
level. It that sense, it may lend credence to the behavioral foundation for the
estimated effect of macro-level events. Second, it shifts the analysis to a more
granular level, exploiting variation across regional populations with much lower
heterogeneity than in a cross-country study. Third, unlike in our cross-country
analysis, we can construct a continuous banking crisis variable that measures
the severity of a local banking crisis, using information on the estimated losses
from bank defaults.
4.4.1 Data and Measurement
Our main source of data is the sensitive geocoded data of the General Social Sur-
vey (GSS). The GSS has been conducted annually from 1972 to 1994 (with few
exceptions) and every other year afterwards. Each sample typically comprises
around 3000 individuals and the sample is aimed to be representative of the
United States. For our purposes, it is important to note that the trust question
in the GSS is identical to the question in the WVS. The GSS contains a large
number of individual demographic variables, similar in scope to the WVS. In ad-
dition, we obtained confidential geographic information about the locations of
survey respondents at the time of the survey and at age 16 (state-level).
Our second source of data is a list of banks that failed between 1934 and
2010, provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Our sample
contains more than 3800 bank failures including bank names, locations, assets,
deposits and dates of failure, as well as estimated losses. The majority of our
sample of failures is made up of small and medium-sized local banks: Median
deposits of the banks in our sample at the time of their failure was around USD
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65 million, and median losses are estimated at USD 15 million. This is crucial
for the interpretation of estimated effect magnitudes. Figure 4.3 displays the
heterogeneity in bank failures over states and time.10 Such geo-temporal varia-
tion forms the basis for our analysis. We aggregate the data on historical bank
failures into two binary variables: An annual binary banking crisis indicator at
the state level, and an annual continuous measure of the estimated losses from
bank failures at the state level. Individual-level experience stocks of bank fail-
ures and losses from bank failures are constructed exactly as in section 4.2 based
on these two variables. Since estimated losses are provided in nominal dollars,
we harmonized historical losses by first converting these figures to real dollars
based on yearly CPI (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017). That respondents
move their place of residence between U.S. states during their lifetime is com-
mon, so we cannot generally infer that a person actually experienced the the
bank failures that previously occurred at her place of residence when the sur-
vey was conducted. To limit this concern, we restrict our attention to subjects
who live in the same states at the time of survey as they did at the age of 16. If
anything, any residual migration should bias our estimates downwards.
4.4.2 Results: Eects of Regional Bank Failures on Trust
We report results for experience stocks built from both crisis event measures, the
binary one and the continuous one. First, columns (1) to (4) of Table 4.5 display
results for the delta experience stock regression specifications of the same form
as in equation (4.1) and Table 4.3. Here, crisis experience is computed based
on the binary crisis indicator as before. The results are qualitatively similar to
those in the the cross-country analysis above, indicating a strongly significant
negative effect of experiencing bank failures on trust. The magnitude of coeffi-
cients, however, are not directly comparable to those of section 4.3.11 Given our
scaling of experience stocks, the coefficients in columns (1) to (4) imply that
the experience of 100 small bank failures 20 years ago makes individuals about
1.3 percentage points less likely to answer our trust question in the affirmative.
This effect size for the experience of 100 small bank failures is about the same as
experiencing one country-level banking crisis based on our estimates in section
4.3. To put this into perspective, recall the median estimated loss in our sample
of failures of only about USD 15 million.
10 The figures show variation in states’ exposure to the absolute number of bank failures. We
also used relative figures such as the number of bank failures per population and obtained similar
degrees of heterogeneity.
11 We scaled experience stocks of bank failures such that the experience of one country-level
crises as coded in section 4.3 would result in the same experience stock as the experience of 100









(a) 1930s and 1940s (b) 1950s and 1960s
(c) 1970s and 1980s (d) 1990s and 2000s
Figure 4.3. Bank failures over time and states. Displayed is the frequency of bank failures in U.S. states for two-decade
intervals. The maps are based on quartile splits for each period of 20 years. Darker shades imply more bank failures. The
combined gure shows strong heterogeneity over time as to which states have been aected relatively more by bank failures.
For example, residents of California or Florida have experienced an increasing exposure to bank failures over time – relative
to other states –, whereas Texas has seen a comparably high number of bank failures throughout.
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Our second measure is based directly on estimated losses for each failure,
aggregated as for the binary measure.12 Regressions results for this continuous
crisis measure are reported in columns (5) to (8) in Table 4.5. The sign and
significance and sign of estimated coefficients provide additional support for
the negative effect of bank failures on trust.
Table 4.5. General Social Survey: Trust and banking crisis experience
Dependent variable: 1 if trusting Delta denition of experience stock with δ = 0.98
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience stock of bank failures -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Estimated losses -6.853*** -7.077*** -7.345*** -6.361***
(1.300) (1.255) (1.281) (1.659)
Constant 1.333*** 1.295*** 1.274*** 1.782*** 1.329*** 1.290*** 1.269*** 1.776***
(0.044) (0.080) (0.083) (0.091) (0.044) (0.079) (0.082) (0.091)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank failures at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated losses in year of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-age trends Yes Yes
R2 0.136 0.139 0.141 0.145 0.136 0.139 0.141 0.144
N 14951 14950 14911 14911 14951 14950 14911 14911
# states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
# survey years 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Baseline controls include gender, age, income bracket and level of education. The additional controls further
include unemployment and marital status, religion and number of children.
Similar to the WVS, the GSS results are robust to alternative definitions of
the experience stock and to using alternative values for the depreciation rate.
Moreover, we again find evidence that interpersonal trust is affected more if
banking crises are experienced at a younger age (Table 4.B.5 in the Appendix).
In line with Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), our data indicate that the forma-
tive period from the age of 16 to the age of 25 deserves particular attention.13
Traumatic experience in a trust-intensive domain during that age interval has
the potential to persistently erode interpersonal trust.
12 The crisis measure is computed similar to equation (4.2), as
C del tai t (δ) =
t∑
s=t−agei t
δt−sEst imated Losss, (4.3)
with Est imated Losss denoting the cumulated (real) losses from bank failures in a given region
in year s.
13 Note that Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) in fact run their analyses on the same individual-
level data set, the GSS.
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4.5 Conclusion
Recent work attests to a substantial variation in trust levels across geographi-
cal locations and over time. These differences affect outcomes such as financial
development, stock market participation, and economic growth. However, the
sources of the heterogeneity in trust levels across locations and over time are
not yet well understood. In this paper we provide field evidence that trust is
not an exogenous and stable characteristic of individuals or societies, but is mal-
leable and systematically shaped by economic experiences during individuals’
lifetime.
Our empirical analysis of cross-country data establishes that, among a set of
different economic crisis types, only banking crises have a robust, sizeable and
long-lasting negative effect on interpersonal trust. Notably, this relationship is
not an artifact of an erosion of trust in financial institutions. The effect is more
pronounced for experiences made during adulthood and in the 20s. Our findings
in cross-country data suggests that drastic, adverse personal experience in the
domain of banking operates like a persistent breach of trust. This intuition is
directly confirmed in separate state-level data from the U.S. We exploit regional
variation in the experience of small bank failures across U.S. states and replicate
a sizable effect on trust.
This study makes three contributions. First, our results have clear implica-
tions for understanding the determinants of trust. Why do adverse macroeco-
nomic events undermine generalized trust in strangers? An emerging literature
on lay perceptions of economic events shows that people tend to rationalize
macroeconomic crises as man-made rather than as the result of bad luck or sys-
temic reasons – i.e., they tend to attribute crises to the misbehaving of other
people. For example, Leiser et al. (2010) provide evidence that people favor
personal (blaming) over impersonal (analyzing) explanations of the 2008/09
financial crisis and display a tendency toward intentional rather than causal ac-
counts.14 In ongoing companion work, we examine the behavioral mechanisms
underlying the observed erosion of interpersonal trust more directly. Exploiting
a rich individual-level panel data set, we identify financial stress and financial
worries as key driving forces of broken trust. Second, our results bear on the wel-
fare costs of macroeconomic crises. Distrust is regarded as costly (Kosfeld and
Falk, 2006; Kramer, 1999; Malul et al., 2010), but such indirect effects are no-
toriously hard to quantify. Recent work examines the repercussions of financial
14 Leiser et al. (2016, p.156) describe this as people assuming a “malevolent hand behind ev-
ery negative outcome”. Similarly, Kumagai et al. (2006) show that victims of natural disasters
attribute an overly high share of responsibility for such disasters to human agency. This also re-
lates to the more fundamental human inclination to judge events as being intentional rather than
due to chance or simply causally determined; see, for example, Kelemen and Rosset (2009) and
Rosset (2008).
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crises on political preferences (Funke et al., 2016). In light of this research, our
findings suggest that the erosion of trust can add to such channels, for example
via the link between trust and preferences for redistribution (Hetherington and
Husser, 2012; Yamamura, 2014).
Third, our data confirms that robustness should be a concern in observa-
tional studies on experience effects. We design a conservative empirical strat-
egy based on more demanding specifications that recognize the multiplicity of
plausible formal characterizations of experience. Caution in drawing conclusions
from experience regressions is warranted: In our data, some types of experience
show unsteady patterns across specifications. This stands in contrast to the ef-
fect of experiencing banking crises or bank failures on trust, which is robustly
supported throughout our analyses.
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Appendix 4.A Data
4.A.1 Individual-Level Data
Our cross-country level analysis in Section 4.3 uses survey data from the World
Values Survey (WVS), available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.
Table 4.A.1 displays summary statistics for our individual-level controls in the
WVS.We do not exclude specific countries or waves of theWVS from our analysis.
The sample of available countries and survey years depends on the included
variables. Our main results for banking crises are robust to excluding specific
controls and including additional measures.
For the state-level analysis in the U.S., we use survey data from the General
Social Survey (GSS), available at http://gss.norc.org/get-the-data. We addition-
ally obtained geo-coded sensitive data from the NORC Institute that allows to
link GSS observations to the respondent’s state of residence at the time of the
survey as well as to the state in which the respondent lived at the age of 16. We
restrict our analyses to observations with geo-coded information.
4.A.2 Country-Level Crisis Data
Our macroeconomic crisis data comes from two sources, Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) and Barro and Ursua (2008). Figure 4.A.1 provides an overview of the
distribution of different type of crises in this sample. There is substantial hetero-
geneity across countries and across time, providing the necessary variation in
our derived measures of experience.
4.A.3 U.S. Bank Failures
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides Historical Statis-
tics on Banking (HSOB) as a “reference and source document for those inter-
ested in banking history and in performing analyses on major trends in bank-
ing”.15 All data a freely available at https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?
EntryTyp=30. This data provide comprehensive information on failures of finan-
cial institutions insured by the FDIC since 1934, which includes both commer-
cial banks and savings institutions. The effective date used for bank failures is
defined as the “date that the failed / assisted institution ceased to exist as a
privately held going concern.” To create a continuous measure for the severity
of a bank failure we use the Estimated Loss (previously called Estimated Cost),
defined as “the difference between the amount disbursed from the Deposit In-
surance Fund (DIF) to cover obligations to insured depositors and the amount
15 See also https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/help.asp.
4.A Data | 165
Table 4.A.1. Summary statistics for individual-level controls
Percentiles
Mean Std 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th N
Male 0.49 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 151695
Age 40.34 15.61 21 27 38 51 64 154852
Number of Children 2.12 2.01 0 0 2 3 5 154859
Religious 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 144940
Primary Education 0.25 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 154859
Secondary Education 0.49 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 154859
Post-secondary Education 0.13 0.34 0 0 0 0 1 154859
Married 0.64 0.48 0 0 1 1 1 151516
Separated 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 151516
Widowed 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 151516
Single 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 1 1 151516
Employed 0.45 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 151217
Self-employed 0.12 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 151217
Retired 0.10 0.30 0 0 0 0 1 151217
Student 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 0 0 151217
Unemployed 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 0 0 151217
Other 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 0 1 151217
Upper class 0.02 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 120481
Upper middle class 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1 120481
Lower middle class 0.37 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 120481
Working class 0.28 0.45 0 0 0 1 1 120481
Lower class 0.13 0.34 0 0 0 0 1 120481
Notes. This table shows summary statistics for control variables used in the study. The employment cate-
gory Other contains respondents that characterized their employment status as “Housewife.” Social class
is evaluated on a ve-point scale and gives a subjective assessment. N denotes the number of non-missing
observations.
estimated to be ultimately recovered from the liquidation of the receivership
estate”.
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Figure 4.A.1. Distribution of crises over countries and years (cont.)
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Appendix 4.B Alternative Specications and Robustness
4.B.1 Alternative Denitions of the Experience Stock
We investigate the robustness of our results to alternative specifications of cri-
sis experience that have been suggested in the literature. Our first alternative,
which we label lambda experience, is also a weighted average of years in which a
crisis was experienced. We adopt the parsimonious one-parameter formulation
of Malmendier and Nagel (2011), which allows weights to be constant, decline
or increase over time:




where wi t(s,λ) =
(agei t − s)λ∑agei t−1
s=1 (agei t − s)λ
.
(4.B.1)
Here, s denotes the time lag relative to t, and λ is the weighting parameter.
The indicator function takes value 1 if the individual experienced a crisis in year
t − s and 0 otherwise. The parameter λ determines the shape of the weighting
function, where λ > 0 assigns lower weights to more distant years, λ < 0 gives
higher weight to years in the more remote past and λ= 0 weights all past years
equally (see Figure II of Malmendier and Nagel (2011) for an illustration of the
non-linearity implied by the functional form).
This specification produces an age-specific weighting function for past expe-
rience and furthermore only allows for a weakly monotonic weight distribution.
The latter precludes a bimodal, e.g., a hump-shaped or U-shaped weight distri-
bution.
Our second alternative, which we label age range experience, acknowledges
that the effect of a crisis may differ depending on the life stage in which it is
experienced. For example, events during the formative years from 18 to 25 may
be particularly important for shaping preferences and beliefs (Spilimbergo and
Giuliano, 2014). We define age range crisis experience as the average number
of years in which a crisis was experienced during the respective age range.
4.B.1.1 Results for the WVS
Table 4.B.2 mirrors Table 4.3 from the main text but uses lambda experience
instead of delta experience as the experience stock measure. Again, banking
crisis and trust are robustly negatively related.
Figure 4.B.2 illustrates the decay effect of past experiences that we already docu-
mented in themain text. Furthermore, this specification allows for heterogeneity
across individuals of different age, holding constant the time distance between
the macroeconomic crisis event and today.
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Table 4.B.2.World Values Survey: Trust and crisis experience using lambda approach
Dependent variable: 1 if trusting λ= 1.5 λ= 1.0 λ= 2.0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience stock of banking crises -0.119** -0.139*** -0.146** -0.194** -0.217*** -0.263*** -0.183***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.059) (0.079) (0.071) (0.081) (0.064)
Constant 0.139*** 0.153*** 0.060* -0.034 0.019 0.028 0.011
(0.032) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.137) (0.136) (0.132)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crisis at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.121 0.122 0.127 0.131 0.146 0.146 0.146
N 120427 120427 100405 100405 76921 76921 76921
# countries 44 44 43 43 30 30 30
# survey years 17 17 16 16 13 13 13
Notes. Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Levels of
signicance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Other macroeconomic experiences include average percentage change
in GDP, as well as ination, stock market and domestic debt crises. Baseline controls include gender, level of education
and (subjective) social class. The additional controls include income decile, indicators for unemployment and marital
status, subjectively assessed religiousness and number of children.
We run age range regressions to investigate explicitly whether the effects of
banking crises on trust depend on the stage of life at which an individual expe-
riences a banking crisis. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) test whether macroe-
conomic recessions are especially relevant for political attitudes when they are
experienced between the ages of 18 and 25. We follow them in their division of
age ranges.
Table 4.B.3 shows that the effects of banking crises on trust are stronger
when an individual is younger at the time of the crisis. In particular, we observe
that the effect on trust is negative when an individual is below around 40 years
old during a banking crisis. If a crisis is experienced at a later age, the effect is
not statistically significant and even positive.
The formative years hypothesis states that social preferences are formed in
the early twenties. Our result suggests that beliefs about trust also form in the
earlier years of an individual’s life (at least as far as trust is affected by the
experience of macroeconomic crises).
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For a 25 year old with lambda = 1.5
For a 45 year old with lambda = 1.5
For a 25 year old with lambda = 1
For a 45 year old with lambda = 1
Figure 4.B.2. Estimated eect of experiencing a banking crisis X years ago on
trust today, for dierent for dierent parameter values. Calculated eects
sizes are based on our estimation results using the Malmendier and Nagel
(2011) one-parameter experience specication. The red curves assume a
weighting parameter λ= 1, the dark curves assume λ= 1.5.
4.B.1.2 Results for the GSS
Mirroring the preceding analysis of the WVS results to alternative experience
stock definitions, we show that GSS results in Section 4.4 are robust across dif-
ferent experience stock specifications.
Table 4.B.4 shows results using lambda experience. We again find signifi-
cant effects for both the binary and the continuous version of the bank default
definition.
Similarly, table 4.B.5 shows age range specifications for the GSS data. Owing
to the relatively small number of observations, most coefficients are imprecisely
estimated. Estimates based on the binary bank default indicator suggest that
bank defaults experienced in early adulthood leave a stronger footprint on in-
terpersonal trust. The sign of coefficient estimates based on the continuous bank
default variable are also consistent with that conclusion but are not statistically
significant.
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Table 4.B.3. World Values Survey: Trust and crisis experience using the age range ap-
proach
Dependent variable: 1 if trusting (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exp. crises 16–25 years -0.015* -0.015
(0.009) (0.010)
Exp. crises 26–35 years -0.026*** -0.022**
(0.009) (0.008)
Exp. crises 36–45 years -0.020* -0.007
(0.012) (0.011)
Exp. crises 46–50 years 0.004 -0.001
(0.007) (0.006)
Constant 0.121*** 0.051 0.287 0.258 -0.010 -0.076 -0.013 -0.237**
(0.033) (0.041) (0.191) (0.230) (0.056) (0.091) (0.057) (0.091)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other macro crisis experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.148 0.159 0.150 0.160 0.151 0.162 0.151 0.160
N 128217 111007 91866 79393 59593 51272 46257 39672
# countries 45 44 45 44 45 44 45 44
# survey years 19 18 19 18 19 18 19 18
Notes. Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p <
0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Other macroeconomic experiences include average percentage change in GDP, as well as ination, stock
market and domestic debt crises. Baseline controls include gender, level of education and (subjective) social class. The additional controls
include income decile, indicators for unemployment and marital status, subjectively assessed religiousness and number of children.
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Table 4.B.4.General Social Survey: Trust and crisis experience using the lambda approach
Dependent variable: 1 if trusting λ= 1.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience stock of bank failures -0.099*** -0.129*** -0.135*** -0.130***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Estimated losses -51.538*** -56.553*** -57.192*** -55.956***
(15.197) (17.326) (17.691) (17.994)
Constant 1.329*** 1.293*** 1.272*** 1.782*** 1.328*** 1.289*** 1.267*** 1.776***
(0.044) (0.080) (0.083) (0.091) (0.043) (0.080) (0.083) (0.091)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank failures at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated losses in year of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-age trends Yes Yes
R2 0.136 0.139 0.141 0.145 0.136 0.139 0.141 0.144
N 14951 14950 14911 14911 14951 14950 14911 14911
# states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
# survey years 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p < 0.1, **p <
0.05, ***p < 0.01. Baseline controls include gender, age, income bracket and level of education. The additional controls further include
unemployment and marital status, religion and number of children.
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Table 4.B.5. General Social Survey: Trust and crisis experience using the age range ap-
proach
Dependent variable: 1 if trusting (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exp. failures 16–25 years -0.069**
(0.029)
Estim. losses 16–25 years -20.920
(20.679)
Exp. failures 26–35 years -0.058*
(0.031)
Estim. losses 26–35 years -38.777
(32.716)
Exp. failures 36–45 years 0.057
(0.062)
Estim. lossess 36–45 years 49.859
(50.221)
Exp. failures 46–50 years -0.033
(0.050)
Estim. losses 46–50 years -77.953**
(35.290)
Constant 1.968*** 1.961*** 4.256 4.263 4.257 4.315 3.597 3.648
(0.072) (0.072) (2.941) (2.942) (3.549) (3.518) (2.409) (2.416)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank failures at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated losses at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.138 0.138 0.143 0.143 0.164 0.164 0.182 0.183
N 11800 11800 9080 9080 5976 5976 3725 3725
# states 51 51 51 51 48 48 49 49
# survey years 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Notes.Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance levels:
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Baseline controls include gender, age, income bracket and level of education. The additional
controls further include unemployment and marital status, religion and number of children.
4.C Nonlinear Specications: Probit and Ordered Probit | 175
Appendix 4.C Nonlinear Specications: Probit and Ordered
Probit
For our main analyses we estimated linear probability models. Below we dis-
play analogous results to those in the main text using non-linear specifications
estimated as probit or ordered probit models.
Table 4.C.6 corresponds to table 4.2, table 4.C.7 to table 4.3, table 4.C.8 to











Table 4.C.6.World Values Survey: Experience of dierent types of crises and the eect on trust
Dependent variable: 1 if trusting
δ = 0.98
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Most people can be trusted
Experience stock of output crises 0.091 0.128
(0.117) (0.171)
Experience stock of ination crises 0.004 0.006
(0.029) (0.038)
Experience stock of banking crises -0.066*** -0.081***
(0.022) (0.025)
Experience stock of stock market crises 0.025 0.039
(0.030) (0.042)
Experience stock of currency crises -0.005 -0.004
(0.025) (0.042)
Experience stock of domestic debt crises 0.045 0.165
(0.041) (0.124)
Experience stock of foreign debt crises 0.011 0.031
(0.045) (0.068)
Constant -1.420*** -1.635*** -1.161*** -1.645*** -1.186*** -1.794*** -1.316*** -2.164*** -1.130*** -1.666*** -1.147*** -1.701*** -1.162*** -1.702***
(0.143) (0.096) (0.225) (0.348) (0.102) (0.112) (0.242) (0.322) (0.152) (0.247) (0.086) (0.106) (0.090) (0.110)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crisis at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.120 0.106 0.112 0.106 0.113 0.110 0.117 0.106 0.112 0.106 0.113 0.106 0.113
N 97672 81700 120396 100387 120396 100387 108796 89640 120396 100387 120396 100387 120396 100387
# countries 33 32 44 43 44 43 39 38 44 43 44 43 44 43
# survey years 15 14 17 16 17 16 15 14 17 16 17 16 17 16
Notes. Probit regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Crisis at the time of survey is a dummy for whether
there was a respective type of crisis in the year in which the respondent answered the survey. Baseline controls include gender, level of education and (subjective) social class. The additional controls
include income decile, indicators for unemployment and marital status, subjectively assessed religiousness and number of children.
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Table 4.C.7.World Values Survey: Trust and banking crisis experience
Dependent variable: 1 if trusting δ = 0.98 δ = 0.95 δ = 0.90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Most people can be trusted
Experience stock of banking crises -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.056*** -0.064*** -0.068***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025)
Constant -0.997*** -0.935*** -1.139*** -1.396*** -1.758*** -1.624*** -1.592***
(0.120) (0.122) (0.156) (0.155) (0.400) (0.424) (0.383)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Banking crisis at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other macro crisis experience Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.106 0.110 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.114
N 120412 120396 100387 100387 100387 100387 100387
# countries 44 44 43 43 43 43 43
# survey years 17 17 16 16 16 16 16
Notes. Probit regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Other macroeconomic experiences include average percentage change in GDP, as well as ination,
stock market and domestic debt crises. Baseline controls include gender, level of education and (subjective) social class.
The additional controls include income decile, indicators for unemployment and marital status, subjectively assessed reli-
giousness and number of children.
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Table 4.C.8.World Values Survey: Condence in institutions, δ = 0.98
Condence in institutions (1=“None at all” to 4=“A great deal”)
Dependent variable: Government Parliament Political parties Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience stock of banking crises -0.041*** -0.074*** -0.045** -0.077** -0.031** -0.055** 0.013 0.028
(0.013) (0.022) (0.019) (0.030) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.032)
Experience stock of output crises 0.166** 0.229*** 0.118*** 0.182*** 0.091** 0.133*** 0.025 -0.548**
(0.078) (0.084) (0.042) (0.061) (0.042) (0.049) (0.060) (0.277)
Experience stock of ination crises 0.019** 0.023* 0.016*** 0.012 0.012** 0.008 0.021*** 0.131***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.044)
Experience stock of stock market crises -0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.019 0.002 0.018 -0.008 0.045
(0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.092)
Experience stock of domestic debt crises 0.057** 0.055 0.041*** 0.023 0.039*** -0.025 -0.040 -0.196
(0.025) (0.045) (0.014) (0.037) (0.012) (0.025) (0.026) (0.193)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Any crisis at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.055 0.068 0.064 0.063 0.056 0.075 0.106
N 145673 86754 147606 88492 146911 88815 37495 4118
# countries 44 36 44 37 44 37 27 3
# waves 4 4 5 4 4 4 2 2
# survey years 17 13 18 13 17 13 4 2
Notes. Ordered probit regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The dependent variables have four levels: 1=“None at all”, 2=“Not very much”, 3=“Quite a lot”, and 4=“A great deal”. Al-
ternative specications with ordinal regressions are reported in appendix 4.C. Other macroeconomic experiences include average percentage
change in GDP, as well as ination, stock market and domestic debt crises. Baseline controls include gender, level of education and (sub-
jective) social class. The additional controls include income decile, indicators for unemployment and marital status, subjectively assessed
religiousness and number of children. We do not use additional controls in specication (8) as this reduces the available sample to a single
wave.
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Table 4.C.9. General Social Survey: Trust and crisis experience
Dependent variable: 1 if trusting δ = 0.98
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
can people be trusted
Experience stock of bank failures -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Estimated losses -21.370*** -21.859*** -22.814*** -19.612***
(4.125) (3.979) (3.960) (4.231)
Constant 2.643*** 2.497*** 2.419*** 3.872*** 2.632*** 2.484*** 2.404*** 3.857***
(0.143) (0.260) (0.268) (0.292) (0.143) (0.257) (0.265) (0.290)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank failures at time of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated losses in year of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-age trends Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.115 0.116 0.120 0.112 0.115 0.116 0.120
N 14950 14949 14910 14910 14950 14949 14910 14910
# states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
# survey years 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Probit regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Baseline controls include gender, age, income bracket and level of education. The additional controls further include unemployment and
marital status, religion and number of children.
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Appendix 4.D Additional Analyses
4.D.1 Trust as a Belief Versus Trust as a Preference
Our discussion leaves open whether interpersonal trust is a belief or is related to
risk preferences. For instance, Ben-Ner and Putterman (2001) argue that trust-
ing others can be risky and that trust should therefore be related to individual
risk tolerance.16 If individuals become less willing to take risks as a result of
experiencing a banking crisis, this argument suggests that we should also see a
reduction in interpersonal trust. In this section, we test this channel by regress-
ing different measures of risk tolerance on the banking crisis experience stock.
The WVS does not elicit risk tolerance directly. Instead, we rely on three
suggestive measures that have been used in the literature (e.g., Freese, 2004;
Miller, 2000; Miller and Hoffmann, 1995). We use potential risk measures as
outcome variables in otherwise unchanged versions of our regression specifica-
tion in equation (4.1). Our three measures are:
• Act boldly versus cautiously: The WVS asks respondents whether they think
it is important to act boldly to achieve major life changes or be cautious
about major changes. The answer is coded on a 10-point scale with lower
values corresponding to “more cautious.”
• Adventure and risk taking: The WVS asks respondents to assess their simi-
larity to a person for which adventure and risk taking are important. The
answer is coded on a six-point scale, and we inverted the scale such that
a higher value corresponds to “This person is very much like me.”
• Job security: Respondents are shown several (16) dimensions of a job (e.g.,
good hours, good chance for promotion) and indicate which dimensions
they find important. Job security is coded as 1 if it is mentioned by the
respondent.
Table 4.D.10 shows that we do not find a consistent effect of banking crises
on any of the three measures of risk. Coefficients are small and insignificant
for two of the measures. The coefficient’s sign in column (4) is significant and
in the expected direction, but we are skeptical because the sign switches only
when additional controls are included. If banking crises affect risk preferences,
the effect appears to be rather weak.
16 The empirical evidence on this hypothesis is not clear-cut: Eckel and Wilson (2004) do not
find a strong correlation between trust and risk preferences in laboratory experiments. Bohnet
and Zeckhauser (2004) find betrayal aversion in a trust game, and Bohnet et al. (2008) extend
the evidence to several countries.
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We interpret these results as suggestive evidence for an effect of banking
crises on trust beliefs rather than via a risk preference channel. This interpreta-
tion is consistent with Sapienza et al. (2013), who demonstrate that the trust
question in the WVS largely captures beliefs, and, as mentioned above, with
Eckel and Wilson (2004) who do not find a strong relationship between trust
and risk tolerance.
Table 4.D.10.World Values Survey: Risk preferences, δ = 0.98
Self-assessment: Risk attitude
Dependent variable:
Act boldly vs. cautious





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experienced banking crises -0.000 -0.005 0.116 -0.229** -0.008 0.003
(0.030) (0.027) (0.110) (0.096) (0.007) (0.005)
Experience stock of output crises -0.153* -0.095** -0.081 0.029 -0.001 0.006
(0.087) (0.043) (0.135) (0.089) (0.014) (0.016)
Experience stock of ination crises 0.018 -0.006 -0.043 0.045* -0.002 0.000
(0.013) (0.015) (0.028) (0.024) (0.002) (0.004)
Experience stock of stock market crises -0.010 0.006 0.052* -0.018 -0.001 -0.005
(0.013) (0.015) (0.030) (0.031) (0.001) (0.004)
Experience stock of domestic debt crises 0.009 0.018 -0.007 0.131** -0.002 -0.002
(0.032) (0.024) (0.021) (0.050) (0.002) (0.006)
Constant 3.434*** 4.002*** 5.235*** 7.603*** 0.422*** 0.441***
(0.232) (0.261) (1.049) (0.687) (0.063) (0.057)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Any crisis at time of survey Yes Yes Yes
Country-age trends Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.195 0.187 0.108 0.112 0.116 0.133
N 78541 35025 35919 28570 68353 53140
# countries 40 27 28 24 35 30
# waves 2 2 1 1 3 2
# survey years 8 5 5 4 10 8
Notes. Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. Levels of
signicance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Other macroeconomic experiences include average percentage change in GDP,
as well as ination, stock market and domestic debt crises. Baseline controls include gender, level of education and (subjective)
social class. The additional controls include income decile, indicators for unemployment andmarital status, subjectively assessed
religiousness and number of children.
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5Negative Long-run Eects
of Prosocial Behavior on Happiness
Joint with Armin Falk
5.1 Introduction
Happiness is a key concept and building block of modern societies. Philosophers
put happiness center stage as a fundamental driving force, life goal, and even
natural right of humans (Cumberland andMaxwell, 1727; Leibniz, 1988; Locke,
1988; Wollaston, 1759). Recently, subjective well-being has gained increasing
acceptance as a relevant indicator of a society’s welfare and various countries
have incorporated national happiness levels into their economic policy objec-
tives (Layard, 2011; Oswald and Wu, 2010). Likewise, the nature of prosocial
behavior has attracted sustained interest for centuries as an identifying feature
of human existence. Scholars across diverse fields such a philosophy, psychol-
ogy, economics, organizational science, political science and neuroscience have
studied the consequences of other-regarding as opposed to selfish behavior at
the individual and societal levels (Batson and Powell, 2003; Bénabou and Tirole,
2006; Latané and Darley, 1970). A long-standing and divisive hypothesis con-
nects happiness to prosociality, suggesting that prosocial behavior is a reliable
source of happiness.1
Recently, scientific interest in this topic has surged anew, putting the empir-
ical validity of the proposed relationship to the test. This empirical literature
forcefully argues for a positive association between prosocial behavior and hap-
piness (Aknin et al., 2015, 2012; Dunn et al., 2008, 2014; Lyubomirsky et al.,
2005; Thoits and Hewitt, 2001), up to the point of proclaiming it a new “psycho-
1 This hypothesis dates back at least two millennia to Aristotle’s (1987) Nicomachean Ethics,
in which he suggests a fundamental link between well-being, eudemonia, and moral behavior.
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logical universal” (Aknin et al., 2013a). In an influential experiment, Elizabeth
Dunn, Lara Aknin and Michael Norton randomly gave a small amount of money
to subjects and told one group to spend it on a gift for themselves and another
group to spend it on a gift to others (Dunn et al., 2008). Happiness elicited
later that day was significantly greater among subjects instructed to spend the
money on others. Yet, as this example illustrates, rigorous evidence on a uni-
versal effect of prosocial behavior on happiness is hard to obtain. First, real-life
decisions of interest have more far-reaching consequences than the small-stakes
decisions typically studied in experimental research. More substantial choices
might not only affect happiness more strongly, but also in different ways. Second,
all forms of giving come at a cost to the giver. The alternative of donating money,
for instance, is not simply the absence of that donation, but it is what the person
would otherwise buy with that money. Awareness about the self-benefiting coun-
terfactual is a key feature of prosocial behavior. Third, small-stakes decisions
are unlikely to have lasting effects on happiness. This and other experimental
constraints impede investigating the temporal profile of happiness derived from
prosocial as opposed to selfish behavior. Virtually all activities, however, gener-
ate distinct time-varying patterns of happiness. A tempting dessert creates im-
mediate happiness that quickly fades, while an exhausting workout can reduce
happiness in the short term but be a source of happiness with some delay. Fourth,
to identify causal relationships, experiments typically “force” people into proso-
cial or selfish behavior so as to create random variation. This prevents observing
what subjects would have chosen for themselves. Such choice data, however, is
crucial to classify subjects into more prosocial versus more selfish “types”, who
plausibly react in different ways to an enforced prosocial outcome. Fifth, social
activities are easily mistaken for prosocial, other-regarding behaviors. Prosocial
behavior can imply more social interactions, which are known to increases hap-
piness (Aknin et al., 2013b; Diener and Seligman, 2002). However, this is a
mere consequence of prosocial behavior that is often absent, as for instance in
monetary donations. In fact, social connections can similarly result from purely
selfish behavior.
We took the existing evidence as a point of departure and put the happiness
hypothesis to a new test. We designed a behavioral experiment that addresses
previous limitations and the above-noted concerns, expecting to generate robust
affirmative evidence for the hypothesis of a positive causal relationship from
prosocial behavior to happiness.
5.2 Saving a Human Life Paradigm
To examine a meaningful prosocial decision that plausibly affects happiness,
we designed a high-stakes study paradigm in which subjects faced a life-and-
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death situation. Each participant took a binary decision to either save a hu-
man life in expectation, or not to save a human life. We developed the Saving
a Life paradigm in cooperation with the Indian non-profit organization Oper-
ation ASHA. Operation ASHA specializes in the treatment of tuberculosis, an
infectious disease caused by bacteria. With an estimated global death toll of
1.7 million people in 2016, tuberculosis kills more people than HIV or malaria,
making it the deadliest infectious disease of today (World Health Organization,
2018). Highly effective and low-cost treatment with antibiotics is available for
drug-susceptible tuberculosis. We calculated the cost of a life saved by Operation
ASHA based on public information on the charity’s operations in combination
with estimates from peer-reviewed epidemiological studies on tuberculosis mor-
tality for the specific type of treatment and location considered (Kolappan et al.,
2008; Straetemans et al., 2011; Tiemersma et al., 2011) Under conservative as-
sumptions, a donation of 350 euros – roughly 400 dollars at the time – covers all
costs incurred by Operation ASHA to identify, treat and cure five patients, which
is equivalent to saving one human life in expectation (see Appendix for more
details). To construct a strong alternative to saving a life that constitutes the
individual “opportunity cost” of a moral outcome, every study participant who
did not save a life received a payment of 100 euros. This payment implements a
salient self-benefiting counterfactual to the prosocial outcome. Our binary set-
ting generates an extreme personal conflict, with little room for interpretation of
what is the “right” thing to do. In fact, the Saving a Life paradigm fundamentally
presents not just a prosocial, but a moral tradeoff.2
This study is not a thought experiment with only hypothetical consequences.
Instead, for each subject, we actually implemented a donation of 350 euros or
an experimental payment of 100 euros. Moreover, our paradigm accommodates
the common critique of donation experiments that subjects can take the money
to donate it for other purposes, such that the seemingly selfish option is in fact
altruistic. In our setting this is essentially ruled out given that foregoing 100
euros generates a substantially larger donation of 350 euros.
Identifying the causal effect of prosocial behavior on happiness requires ex-
ogenous variation in whether subjects save a life or receive the money. However,
randomly allocating subjects into either condition, i.e., force them to save a
life or take the money, does not allow observing which option a subject would
choose for herself. This decision reflects a subject’s personal intention and re-
veals whether she is a more altruistic or a more selfish “type”. Not knowing a
subject’s choice, we would not be able to tell, for example, whether a subject
who saved a life and is later found to be relatively unhappy is simply dissatis-
fied with not getting her desired outcome. To circumvent the dilemma between
2 A general notion of morality defines immoral behavior as harming others in an unjustified
and intentional way. See, e.g., B. Gert and J. Gert (2017).
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observing voluntary choice and generating causal variation, we implemented a
lottery procedure where subjects had to choose between two lotteries, Lottery
A and Lottery B. Lottery A was the prosocial lottery. Choosing this lottery, the
subject saved a life with 60% probability and received money with 40% proba-
bility, i.e., LA = (0.6,€350 donation; 0.4,€100 payment). Lottery B, the selfish
lottery, featured the reverse probabilities, i.e., this lottery saved a life with only
40% probability and generated additional earnings of 100 euros with 60% prob-
ability, so that LB = (0.4, €350 donation; 0.6, €100 payment). Our procedure
simultaneously provided random variation allowing for a causal identification
of the effect of prosociality on happiness, as well as information on subject’s
prosocial intentions. Specifically, by choosing lottery A rather than lottery B,
a subject made the prosocial outcome 50% more likely. The lottery procedure
produced four different study groups. Outcomes were aligned with choices for
those subjects who chose the altruistic lottery and ended up saving a life, and
for those who chose the selfish lottery and received 100 euros. Outcomes and
choices were not aligned among subjects who picked the altruistic lottery, but
received money, and for subjects who chose selfishly, but nevertheless saved a
life, respectively.
Our main measure of interest was subjects’ self-reported happiness. Subjects
completed the statement “In general, I consider myself” with responses ranging
from 1= “not a very happy person” to 7= “a very happy person” on a Likert scale
(Lyubomirsky and Lepper, 1999). To account for potential temporal patterns,
we elicited happiness at three points in time. The first measurement, HBasel ine,
provided a baseline level of happiness at the very beginning of the laboratory ses-
sion, before the Saving a Life paradigmwas presented. The secondmeasurement,
HShor t−run, was elicited shortly after the lottery was drawn, i.e., after subjects
had learned about the respective outcome. Finally, HLong−run was measured four
weeks after the laboratory session in an online survey. In between the second
and third measurements, we sent three emails to all subjects, exactly one, three,
and four weeks after the laboratory session. The purpose of these emails was
to remind subjects of the content and outcome of the laboratory session.3 The
lottery outcome from the experiment was implemented exactly after two weeks,
between the first and the second reminder. The corresponding transfer was said
to be “in process” in the first email and “executed” in the second email. By the
time the third email invited subjects to participate in the online survey after four
weeks, the donation or personal bank transfer had already been carried out two
3 Specifically, each email stated that in the study “you could make a decision about whether
you rather want a human life to be saved for you, or whether you rather want to receive an
additional payment of €100”. Moreover, the text reminded that the subject would “receive an
additional payment of €100” or that she “arranged for a donation in the amount of €350 for
the treatment and cure of tuberculosis patients, such that one human life is saved in expectation”
(see full text in Appendix).
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weeks earlier. In addition to the happiness measures, we obtained self-reports
of subjects’ self-image, measured as agreement with the statement “I am a good
person”, and of subjects’ mood. The happiness, self-image and mood questions
formed part of a questionnaire including various other items, so as to obfuscate
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Figure 5.1. The lottery choice paradigm and repeated happiness measure-
ments. In the initial laboratory session, each participant chose between
two lotteries, the “prosocial” Lottery A and the “selsh” Lottery B. Based on
their individual lottery draw, subjects either received 100 euros or saved
one human life in expectation, in which case the experimenter transferred
a donation of 350 euros to a charity that ghts tuberculosis. The laboratory
session was followed by an online survey four weeks later. We elicited hap-
piness three times, at the beginning (HBaseline) and at the end (HShort-run) of
the laboratory session, and again in the survey (HLong-run). We sent out two
personalized emails reminding each participant of their individual lottery
outcome between the laboratory session and the survey.
We ran 10 laboratory sessions with a total of 325 subjects. Of those, 297 also
participated in the follow-up online survey four weeks later and constitute our
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sample for the main analysis.4 Several additional treatments allow for further
analyses, see Section 5.5. In sum, we used data from 591 subjects.
For the short run, we made the following predictions. Our main hypothesis
was a positive causal effect of saving a life on happiness. This would be in line
with the existing body of evidence that analyzes the short-run effect of prosocial
outcomes (Aknin et al., 2015, 2012; Dunn et al., 2008, 2014). In addition, we
expected a positive (non-causal) effect of the prosocial choice itself, in as much
as choosing the altruistic lottery might improve a person’s self-image (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2002, 2011), feel like “the right thing to do”, or generate positive
emotions (“warm glow”, Andreoni (1990)). Moreover, we hypothesized that the
alignment of choice and lottery outcome, i.e., whether people got what they
wanted, affects mood, which might also be reflected in happiness. A person who
picked the selfish lottery but saved a life might partly be less happy simply due to
not getting her preferred outcome. Note that the distinction between choice, out-
come and the interaction between these two is a central feature of our paradigm.
Subjects initially opted for one of the two lotteries, and conditional on the lottery
choice we can identify the causal effect of saving a life versus receiving money.
For the long run, the existing literature cannot provide specific hypotheses,
as the causal evidence is limited to short-term effects. First, with respect to the
causal effect of the prosocial outcome, one may expect that timing matters. Sav-
ing a life can provide happiness through a mental form of consumption from
thoughts ormemories that occurs entirely in themind (Ariely and Norton, 2009).
Such “conceptual consumption” presumably occurs in temporal proximity to the
experiment but fades as time passes. Money, by contrast, generates happiness
based on what a person buys with it and when. Happiness is then linked to the
time when actual consumption occurs, which can be spread out over time. The
long-term causal effect of the prosocial versus the selfish outcome is therefore
ambiguous, i.e., even a negative effect is conceivable. Second, we further hypoth-
esized that the effect of prosocial choice wanes over time, because past choices
become less and less accessible to people’s mind and thus lose relevance for
generating positive self-image or feelings of warm-glow. At the same time, there
is no reason to expect a reversed effect in the long run – unlike for prosocial
outcomes.
To analyze the happiness data, we split the sample along two dimensions.
The lottery choice provided an endogenous dichotomy between more altruis-
tic and more selfish subjects. The outcome as determined by the individual
lottery draw was fully random conditional on lottery choice and allowed for
causal inference. For each subject in each of the four study groups, we calcu-
4 Note that the relative frequency of altruistic lottery choice as well as other personality mea-
sures did not systematically differ for subjects who did not complete the follow-up survey (see
Appendix).
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lated two individual differences of reported happiness scores in the short and
long run relative to the baseline level of happiness. That is, for each subject
we obtained ∆Shor t−run = HShor t−run −HBasel ine and ∆Long−run = HLong−run −
HBasel ine. These measures indicated individual-level changes in happiness over
time. By comparing group averages of those individual changes, we can assess
whether different lottery choices and lottery outcomes were associated with dif-
ferent changes in happiness. We complemented this group comparison with re-
gression analyses to assess the size and significance of the main and interaction
effects. We regressed the standardized level of a short-run or long-run measure-
ment on an indicator variable that equals 1 if a subject chose the altruistic lottery
and 0 otherwise, an indicator variable that is 1 if the subject’s lottery draw deter-
mined that she would save a life and 0 if she received the money, an interaction
term between these two variables, and the baseline level of the dependent vari-
able. For these analyses, we standardized happiness scores at each point in time.
5.3 Prosocial Behavior Promoted Happiness in the Short
Run
Overall, 60% of subjects (N = 178) chose the altruistic lottery. Based on the ran-
dom lottery draws, 53% of the entire sample actually saved a human life (N =
158). Panel A of Figure 5.2 shows our main finding for the short run. Displayed
is the mean change in happiness from the beginning to the end of the labora-
tory session, ∆Shor t−run. We made three observations on the short-run change
in happiness. First, we found a positive relationship between prosocial behavior
and happiness, in line with previous evidence. Irrespective of lottery choice, the
outcome of saving a life was causally related to higher mean changes in hap-
piness. The main effect of saving a life is an increase in happiness by 0.06 SD
(p < 0.1, Table 5.1, column 1).5 Moreover, we found that choosing the proso-
cial lottery was associated with a positive change in happiness, irrespective of
the actual lottery outcome. The magnitude of the (non-causal) relationship was
0.14 SD (p < 0.1, Table 5.1, column 1). Note, however, that size and signifi-
cance of both main effects were moderate. Considering point estimates of mean
changes in happiness in Figure 5.2, we observed a gradual decline from the
prosocial-choice-prosocial-outcome group to the selfish-choice-selfish-outcome
group. Moreover, the insignificant interaction effect of lottery choice and lottery
outcome in the regression implied that changes in happiness were not driven by
5 The main effect of saving a life (as compared to receiving money) is the average of the effects
for those who chose the altruistic lottery and those who chose the selfish lottery. This main effect
is reported in the footer of Table 5.1. Note that the coefficients reported in row 2 of the regression
table indicate the estimated effect of saving a life for those who chose the selfish lottery.
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participants getting or not getting what they wanted, as judged by their lottery
choice (Table 5.1, column 1).
Second, we documented pronounced effects of both prosocial choice and
the prosocial outcome on changes in the measure of subjects’ self-image. Sub-
jects who chose the altruistic lottery reaped self-image benefits as indicated by
a quantitatively large correlational effect (0.38 SD, p< 0.01, Table 5.1, column
2). More compellingly, the random variation in lottery outcomes identified a
sizable and highly significant causal effect of saving a life conditional on pre-
ceding choice (0.25 SD, p < 0.01, Table 5.1, column 2). As with happiness, we
found no significant interaction between choice and outcome, suggesting that
the fact of (not) getting the desired outcome did not affect changes in happiness
or self-image.
Third, in contrast to happiness and self-image, changes in mood strongly
reflected whether subjects got what they wanted. Choosing prosocially was as-
sociated with an increase in a person’s mood, but only if she indeed ended up
saving the life (0.54 SD, p < 0.01, Table 5.1, column 3). Mood declined by a
similar magnitude after opting for the prosocial lottery if that person instead
got the money (-0.62 SD, p < 0.01, Table 5.1, column 3), such that the main
effect of choice across both groups was close to zero and insignificant (-0.04 SD,
p = 0.91, Table 5.1, column 3). Considering the effect of randomized lottery
outcomes, we found that saving a life did not significantly affect mood of sub-
jects who chose the selfish lottery (0.21 SD, p = 0.38, Table 5.1, column 3), but
led to a strongly positive and highly significant effect on those who picked the
altruistic lottery (1.36 SD, p < 0.01, Table 5.1, column 3).
5.4 Negative Eect of Prosocial Behavior on Happiness in
the Long Run
For the long-run effects on happiness, we performed analyses that are analogous
to the short run, this time based on group averages of changes in happiness ob-
served four weeks later, ∆Long−run. The key finding is presented in panel B of
Figure 5.2. We found a strongly negative causal effect of saving a life on hap-
piness. Notably, this effect was independent of the lottery choice. That means
not only those subjects who picked the selfish lottery, but also those who opted
for the altruistic lottery reported substantially higher levels happiness if they
ended up receiving the money, rather than saving a life. Moreover, the effect
on happiness was quantitatively large, especially in light of the four-week de-
lay. Regression results showed that saving a life decreased long-run happiness
by 0.26 SD (p < 0.01, Table 5.1, column 4) relative to receiving money, con-
trolling for individual-specific baseline levels of happiness. This finding was in
marked contrast to our own and other studies’ short-term finding of a prevailing
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positive association. It also implied a pronounced temporal pattern of happiness
derived from prosocial behavior. In fact, the sign of the causally induced change
in happiness switched over time. Moreover, over time the outcome got relatively
more important than the choice in determining happiness: In the short run, our
data revealed marginally significant positive effects of prosocial lottery choice
(0.14 SD, correlational) and of saving a life (0.06 SD, causal), while long term
happiness was swayed by a highly significant and sizable negative causal effect
of saving a life (0.26 SD).
Interestingly, the only short-term relationship that persisted in the long run
was a positive association between happiness and altruistic lottery choice among
those who ended up receiving money (0.28 SD, p < 0.05, Table 5.1, column 4).
Put differently, choosing prosocially made people happy even in the long run,
but only if they did not have to bear the “cost” of that decision in the sense of
foregoing their payment. These subjects credibly revealed their prosocial inten-
tions, but were randomly selected to experience the self-benefitting outcome ex
post. While this kept them from actually saving a life, they did not have to sac-
rifice the high payment, and they were able to tell themselves (and/or others)
that they had done what was in their power to bring about the moral outcome.
We completed our analysis of the long-term results by considering self-image
and mood. The strong effects of both choice and outcome on these measures
observed in the short term faded out as time passed (Table 5.1, columns 5 and
6).
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Panel B: Long Run
 
 Figure 5.2. Prosocial behavior increased happiness in the short run but de-
creased it in the long run. Panel A shows the mean changes in self-reported
happiness between the end and the beginning of the laboratory session
for each of the four study groups. Regression analyses conrmed a casual
main eect of saving a life (0.06 SD, p < 0.1, Table 5.1, column 1) and a (non-
causal) positive main eect of choosing the prosocial lottery (0.14 SD, p <
0.1, Table 5.1, column 1). Panel B displays mean changes in happiness after
four weeks compared to the beginning of the laboratory session. The causal
eect of saving a life on happiness after four weeks was negative and quan-
titatively large (-0.25 SD, p < 0.01, Table 5.1, column 4). Happiness scores
were standardized at each point in time. N = 297. Error bands indicate ± 1
SEM.
Table 5.1. Regression analyses of the eect of prosocial behavior on happiness, self-image and mood in the short run and the long run
Short run Long run
Dependent variable (standardized): HShor t−run Self-image Mood HLong−run Self-image Mood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lottery choice: 1 if altruistic, 0 if selsh 0.11 0.41*** -0.62*** -0.05 0.28** 0.17
(0.112) (0.135) (0.149) (0.129) (0.128) (0.172)
Lottery outcome: 1 if life saved, 0 if money received 0.03 0.28** 0.21 -0.29* 0.25 0.14
(0.116) (0.132) (0.179) (0.150) (0.159) (0.190)
Altruistic lottery choice * life saved 0.06 -0.05 1.16*** 0.06 -0.27 -0.14
(0.159) (0.166) (0.212) (0.190) (0.193) (0.235)
HBasel ine 0.77*** 0.61***
(0.065) (0.056)
Self-image at begin of session 0.52*** 0.46***
(0.033) (0.041)
Mood at begin of session 0.10** 0.18***
(0.037) (0.041)
Constant -3.65*** -4.45*** -0.84*** -2.64*** -3.83*** -1.47***
(0.316) (0.279) (0.302) (0.294) (0.344) (0.356)
Main eect choice: altruistic lottery .14* .38*** -.04 -.02 .14 .11
Main eect outcome: life saved .06* .25*** .78*** -.26*** .12 .07
R2 .5426 .5564 .3127 .3642 .391 .08326
N 297 297 297 297 297 297
Notes: Displayed are regression results that complement the ndings in Figure 5.2. In each column, we regressed a standardized hap-
piness, self-image, or mood score on an indicator variable that equals 1 if a subject chose the altruistic lottery and 0 otherwise, an
indicator variable that is 1 if the subject’s lottery draw determined that she would save a life and 0 if she received the money, an
interaction term between these two variables, and the baseline level of the dependent measure. Ordinary least squares regression.
Analogous ordered probit regressions are reported in Table S2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗
∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
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5.5 Robustness
A number of additional analyses examined whether our findings were the arti-
fact of a specific experimental design. One feature that distinguishes the Saving
a Life paradigm from previous studies is stake size. We validated the credibility
of the paradigm in a separate calibration treatment run with a different set of
subjects. For each subject, we elicited the minimum amount of money that she
preferred over saving a life by triggering a donation of 350 euros. This was done
using an incentive compatible price-list method, such that each subject indeed
either saved a life or received money (see Appendix). In a sample of 45 students,
we found that the median valuation was 200 euros, an amount close to the aver-
age monthly disposable income of a German student. That subjects were willing
to forgo substantial amounts of money indicated that the high-stakes experimen-
tal paradigm was credible. Based on the calibration we chose an amount of 100
euros for our main treatment, which provides a greater contrast to the amount
of the donation. We therefore expected more than 50% of subjects to be willing
to save a life in our main experiment, which at 60% was the case.
Next, we investigated the confirmatory validity of personality measures that
the existing literature has linked to prosociality, i.e., we tested whether proso-
cial lottery choice in our data was predicted in a plausible manner by these mea-
sures. Reassuringly, we found that higher cognitive skills, higher self-control and
stronger empathic concern were all positively associated with the propensity to
choose the altruistic lottery (see Appendix for details). Most of all, our measure
of altruism (Falk et al., 2017) strongly predicted lottery choice.
One concern about using lotteries rather than a deterministic choice to assess
participants’ individual preference is that some people who picked the prosocial
(selfish) lottery might have wanted to choose money (to save a life) in a de-
terministic environment: on the one hand, the lottery gives the opportunity to
perform a prosocial act without necessarily incurring the cost of foregoing the
payment, which might increase prosocial choice. On the other hand, picking
the prosocial lottery might be perceived as less virtuous than saving a life di-
rectly, decreasing the motivation for prosocial choice. To address this concern,
we ran a treatment in which a separate set of subjects made a direct choice be-
tween saving a life and receiving 100 euros (N = 221). Reassuringly, 60% of
subjects in our main treatment chose the altruistic lottery, and 57% of subjects
in the deterministic condition chose to save a life (p = 0.49, two-sample test of
proportions). Moreover, none of the personality measures elicited in the survey
differentially predicted lottery choice and the direct choice to save a life (see Ap-
pendix). Hence, our data showed that the lottery choice closely captures what
subjects would have chosen if they had been offered the direct and deterministic
choice between saving a life and the payment.
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5.6 Discussion
In the short run, our results squared with the current consensus of a positive
relationship between prosocial behavior and happiness. Extending previous re-
sults, we documented that prosocial choices and prosocial outcomes were inde-
pendently associated with happiness. Whether subjects received their desired
outcome affected mood, but not happiness or self-image. In addition, the data
hinted at the importance of image concerns in the short run, a key driver of
prosocial behavior in a large class of economic models of prosociality (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2002, 2011). In the long run, our main finding was that prosocial be-
havior causally reduced happiness. This changes our previous understanding of
the relationship between prosociality and happiness, which – based on short-run
evidence – suggested a uniformly positive effect.
We speculate that happiness derived in the short run and the long run is
partly driven by different factors. In the short term, happiness may be governed
by visceral factors and the “conceptual consumption” (Ariely and Norton, 2009)
associated with the act of giving, such as “warm glow” (Andreoni, 1990) and
a favorable self-image (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002, 2011). That these factors
play a role in shaping happiness in the short run was explicitly confirmed by
our data. As time passes, however, a prosocial act might become less salient
or even be forgotten, and the effect of these positive emotions and thoughts
fades out. Instead, however, a substantial amount of money can still be source of
happiness after some delay if it is spent gradually and thus leads to consumption
that is spread out over time. In fact, that giving money to people can have a
positive impact on their happiness is a frequent finding in empirical research
(Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016). Moreover, in our design, the payment of 100
euros deliberately constructed a “cost of saving a life” that is known to all subjects,
which in itself might affect happiness derived from saving a life. Research on
the nature of prosocial behavior has repeatedly shown that the set of available
alternatives plays a key role, e.g., in determining what people deem fair (Falk
et al., 2003).
Another interpretation of the main finding is that a single prosocial act can
be a two-sided sword: The short-run elation takes a toll on happiness in the
long run. In our experiment, for example, the survey after four weeks might
act like a reminder that brings up the positive feelings experienced in the short
run among those who saved a life. At the same time, however, it may remind
them that since the time of saving a life, they have not performed a prosocial
action anymore, or their prosocial deeds from the meantime appear minuscule
relative to saving a life. In other words, prosocial behavior can raise the bar for
future happiness because it establishes a standard of comparison against which
people judge their own behavior. This could either have a discouraging effect or
provide a motivation for repeated prosocial behavior. We did not, however, find
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a negative effect on self-image in the long run, which would have been in line
this interpretation.
Adding to a recent debate, the results are relevant for the debate on effective
altruism, an evidence-based philosophy that advocates finding the most efficient
ways to benefit others (MacAskill, 2015; Singer, 2015). A positive correlation
between prosocial behavior and happiness is a central empirical justification
for the quest to donate more: Philosopher Peter Singer forcefully argues that
altruism is not about self-sacrifice, but that the greatest happiness arises from
helping other people (Singer, 2015). Our findings indicate that this notion is
incomplete.
Finally, our evidence speaks to a puzzle pointed out in previous work. If
the proposed relationship between prosociality and happiness were as strong
and unambiguously positive as suggested therein, people should behave much
more prosocially in practice if they wanted to maximize their happiness (Dunn
et al., 2008). Previous authors point out that people might mis-predict their
own happiness. In contrast, our findings are qualitatively compatible with selfish
behavior in many contexts, assuming people trade off the short-term benefit of
prosocial behavior against the delayed costs.
Rather than suggesting that prosocial behavior does not promote happiness,
our data reconfirm that it does, but only so in the short term. However, pro-
claiming this relationship to be a “psychological universal” (Aknin et al., 2013a)
may be premature. A comprehensive understanding on the effects of prosocial
behavior on happiness requires a more nuanced view that accounts for delayed
effects.
References
Aknin, Lara B., Christopher P. Barrington-Leigh, Elizabeth W. Dunn, John F. Helliwell, Jus-
tine Burns, Robert Biswas-Diener, Imelda Kemeza, Paul Nyende, Claire E. Ashton-
James, and Michael I. Norton (2013a): “Prosocial spending and well-being: Cross-
cultural evidence for a psychological universal.” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 104 (4), 635–652. [184, 196]
Aknin, Lara B., Tanya Broesch, J. Kiley Hamlin, and Julia W. Van de Vondervoort (2015):
“Prosocial behavior leads to happiness in a small-scale rural society.” Journal of Ex-
perimental Psychology, 144 (4), 788–795. [183, 188]
Aknin, Lara B., Elizabeth W. Dunn, Gillian M. Sandstrom, and Michael I. Norton (2013b):
“Does social connection turn good deeds into good feelings?: On the value of putting
the “social” in prosocial spending.” International Journal of Happiness and Develop-
ment, 1 (2), 155–171. [184]
Aknin, Lara B., J. Kiley Hamlin, and Elizabeth W. Dunn (2012): “Giving leads to happiness
in young children.” PLoS One, 7 (6), e39211. [183, 188]
Andreoni, James (1990): “Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of
warm-glow giving.” The Economic Journal, 100 (401), 464–477. [188, 195]
References | 197
Ariely, Dan and Michael I. Norton (2009): “Conceptual consumption.” Annual Review of
Psychology, 60, 475–499. [188, 195]
Aristotle (1987): The Nicomachean Ethics (translated by J.E.C. Welldon). Prometheus
Books. [183]
Batson, C. Daniel and Adam A. Powell (2003): “Altruism and prosocial behavior.” In Hand-
book of Psychology. Wiley Online Library. [183]
Bénabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2002): “Self-condence and personal motivation.” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (3), 871–915. [188, 195]
Bénabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2006): “Incentives and prosocial behavior.” The Ameri-
can Economic Review, 96 (5), 1652–1678. [183]
Bénabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2011): “Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs as assets.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126 (2), 805–855. [188, 195]
Chen, Daniel L., Martin Schonger, and Chris Wickens (2016): “oTree—An open-source plat-
form for laboratory, online, and eld experiments.” Journal of Behavioral and Exper-
imental Finance, 9, 88–97. [200]
Cumberland, Richard and JohnMaxwell (1727): A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. R. Phillips.
[183]
Davis, Mark H. (1983): “Measuring individual dierences in empathy: Evidence for a mul-
tidimensional approach.” Journal of Personality and Social psychology, 44 (1), 113–
126. [200]
Diener, Ed and Martin E. P. Seligman (2002): “Very happy people.” Psychological Science,
13 (1), 81–84. [184]
Dunn, Elizabeth W., Lara B. Aknin, and Michael I. Norton (2008): “Spending money on oth-
ers promotes happiness.” Science, 319 (5870), 1687–1688. [183, 184, 188, 196]
Dunn, Elizabeth W., Lara B. Aknin, and Michael I. Norton (2014): “Prosocial spending and
happiness using money to benet others pays o.” Current Directions in Psychologi-
cal Science, 23 (1), 41–47. [183, 188]
Falk, Armin, Anke Becker, Thomas J. Dohmen, Benjamin Enke, and David Human (2017):
“Global evidence on economic preferences.” Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic
Research. [194, 200, 202]
Falk, Armin, Ernst Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher (2003): “On the nature of fair behavior.” Eco-
nomic Inquiry, 41 (1), 20–26. [195]
Gert, Bernard and Joshua Gert (2017): “The Denition of Morality.” In The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2017. Metaphysics Research Lab,
Stanford University. [185]
Haushofer, Johannes and JeremyShapiro (2016): “The short-term impact of unconditional
cash transfers to the poor: Experimental evidence from Kenya.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 131 (4), 1973–2042. [195]
Kolappan, C., R. Subramani, V. Kumaraswami, T. Santha, and P. R. Narayanan (2008): “Ex-
cess mortality and risk factors for mortality among a cohort of TB patients from rural
south India.” The International Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, 12 (1), 81–
86. [185]
Latané, Bibb and John M. Darley (1970): The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He
Help? Appleton-Century-Crofts. [183]
Layard, Richard (2011): Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. Penguin UK. [183]
198 | 5 Negative Long-run Eects of Prosocial Behavior on Happiness
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1988): Leibniz: Political Writings. Cambridge University Press.
[183]
Locke, John (1988): Locke: Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge University Press. [183]
Lyubomirsky, Sonja and Heidi S. Lepper (1999): “A measure of subjective happiness: Pre-
liminary reliability and construct validation.” Social Indicators Research, 46 (2), 137–
155. [186, 199]
Lyubomirsky, Sonja, KennonM. Sheldon, and David Schkade (2005): “Pursuing happiness:
The architecture of sustainable change.” Review of General Psychology, 9 (2), 111.
[183]
MacAskill, William (2015): Doing Good Better: Eective Altruism and a Radical New Way
to Make a Dierence. Guardian Faber Publishing. [196]
Oswald, Andrew J. and Stephen Wu (2010): “Objective conrmation of subjective mea-
sures of human well-being: Evidence from the USA.” Science, 327 (5965), 576–579.
[183]
Rammstedt, Beatrice and Oliver P. John (2005): “Kurzversion des big ve inventory (BFI-
K).” Diagnostica, 51 (4), 195–206. [200]
Singer, Peter (2015): The Most Good You Can Do: How Eective Altruism Is Changing Ideas
About Living Ethically. Castle Lectures Series. Yale University Press. [196]
Straetemans, Masja, Philippe Glaziou, Ana L. Bierrenbach, Charalambos Sismanidis, and
Marieke J. van der Werf (2011): “Assessing tuberculosis case fatality ratio: a meta-
analysis.” PLoS One, 6 (6), e20755. [185]
Tangney, June P., Roy F. Baumeister, and Angie Luzio Boone (2004): “High self-control
predicts good adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success.”
Journal of Personality, 72 (2), 271–324. [200]
Thoits, Peggy A. and Lyndi N. Hewitt (2001): “Volunteer work and well-being.” Journal of
Health and Social Behavior, 115–131. [183]
Tiemersma, EdineW., Marieke J. van derWerf, MartienW. Borgdor, Brian G.Williams, and
Nico J. D. Nagelkerke (2011): “Natural history of tuberculosis: duration and fatality
of untreated pulmonary tuberculosis in HIV negative patients: a systematic review.”
PLoS One, 6 (4), e17601. [185]
Wollaston, William (1759): The Religion of Nature Delineated. Samuel Palmer. [183]
World Health Organization (2018): Tuberculosis fact sheet. URL: http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs104/en/ (visited on 03/29/2018). [185]
5.A Sample | 199
Appendix 5.A Sample
The data used in this paper comprise three between-subjects conditions with a
total of N = 591 participants.
1. Main sample: Lottery choice
Each subject had a choice between two lotteries, Lottery A and Lottery B.
N = 325 participated in the laboratory sessions, N = 297 of those also
completed the follow-up online survey four weeks later.
2. Baseline sample: Deterministic choice
As in condition Lottery choice, but each subject directly chose between
saving a life and receiving 100 euros. N = 221.
3. Calibration sample: Price list method
Using a price list method, we elicited the minimal monetary amount that
would make a participant indifferent to saving a life. N = 45.
Appendix 5.B Details of the Experiment
Participants were recruited from the subject pool of the BonnEconLab and re a
fixed payment of 10 euros transferred to their bank account for participation in
the laboratory experiment. In between the laboratory session and the follow-up
online survey, we sent two reminder emails to subjects, stating their individual
lottery outcome in the laboratory experiment. Exact wording of the experimen-
tal instructions and email texts is reproduced in Appendix 5.D. Subjects received
15 euros transferred to their bank account for participating in the online survey.
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Economics Department
at the University of Bonn (reference no. 2016-02).
Our focus was on measuring two concepts, subjective well-being (SWB) and
self-image. As to the former, the current consensus in the literature is that SWB
constitutes a multidimensional concept with several components. Rather than
evaluation of life, i.e., life satisfaction, or a sense of meaning or purpose in one’s
life, the notion of happiness used in this study most closely relates to the emo-
tional, or affective element of subjective well-being. We chose our main measure
of happiness to fulfill two requirements: It should be suited to capture both short-
term as well as long-term variation in happiness, and it should be a widely used
and validated by the previous literature. Our measure is based on the Subjective
Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky and Lepper, 1999), also referred to as the Gen-
eral Happiness Scale. In particular, we use the first item, which is an assessment
of the statement “In general, I consider myself:” with possible responses raging
200 | 5 Negative Long-run Eects of Prosocial Behavior on Happiness
from 1 = “not a very happy person” to 7 = “a very happy person” on a 7-point
Likert scale.
Our measure of self-image is an assessment of the statement “I am a good
person” on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = “fully disagree” to 10 =
“fully agree”. “Good person” is a direct translation of the original German phrase
“guter Mensch” used in the experiment, which may also be translated as “good
man” or “good human” here. Importantly, this is a typical expression with a clear
meaning in the German language featuring a strong moral connotation, with
essentially the opposite meaning of being a “bad person” or “evil”. Moreover,
mood was elicited using the frequently used question “What is your mood at the
moment?”, and a 11-point response scale from 0 = “very bad” to 10 = “very
good”.
All of the above measures were asked at three points in time during the study.
The first instance was at the beginning of the laboratory session, before subjects
were informed about the content of the study. This measure serves as an unpol-
luted individual measure which we exploit as an individual-specific benchmark
for comparison against later measurements. The second elicitation took place
after subjects had taken their lottery choice and the lottery had been resolved,
i.e., after knowing the outcome of the lottery. Note that we abstained from ask-
ing the set of questions again between the choice and lottery resolution, mainly
because this would have cluttered the experimental procedure and might have
been indicative of the experimenters’ objectives. The third set of measures was
elicited during the online survey four weeks after the laboratory session. At the
end of the laboratory session, we elicited a range of further measures based on
standard questionnaires. In particular, we elicited cognitive skills using a set of
10 incentivized Raven matrices, self-control (Tangney et al., 2004), the Interper-
sonal Reactivity Index including a measure of empathic concern (Davis, 1983), a
short version of the big five personality inventory (Rammstedt and John, 2005)
and a measure of altruism Falk et al. (2017).
The laboratory sessions were run in the main auditorium of the University
of Bonn, Germany, in September 2016. We recruited 325 subjects for the main
lottery sample, mostly students at the University of Bonn, studying in various
fields. 297 subjects completed both the laboratory session and the follow-up
survey four weeks later, corresponding to an attrition rate of 9.4%. Attrition
was not significantly predicted by lottery choice (p > 0.1) or outcome (p >
0.1) in a linear regression of a dummy variable for participation on indicators
for lottery choice and lottery outcome and their interaction. The experiment
was fully computerized and conducted using the software oTree (Chen et al.,
2016). Subjects sat in cubicles to allow full privacy – no other person could
see their screen during the experiment. Participants could ask questions to an
experimenter at all times. The average completion time was 45 minutes.
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Appendix 5.C Additional Analyses
5.C.1 Deterministic Choice Treatment
We ran the Deterministic Choice treatment to examine whether the lottery
choice in the main treatment is informative for which outcome the participant
would have chosen had he had the direct, deterministic choice between life and
money. We compare lottery choice in our main sample (N = 297) to the direct
deterministic choice in an independent baseline experiment with a different set
of subjects (N = 221). In particular, subjects in this comparison study received
identical instructions about the two outcomes, except that they could directly
choose one of them.
First of all, note that the fraction of subjects choosing the prosocial option
is almost exactly identical in both samples. 60% choose the prosocial lottery
(58% when including subjects who did not participate in the follow-up) and
57% choose to save a life directly (p= 0.49). Second, we analyze whether those
who choose prosocially in each sample differ systematically based on the person-
ality measures that we elicited at the end of the laboratory session. Table 5.C.1
shows results from regressions that investigate which measures are correlated
with prosocial choice in both treatments. Column 1 indicates which measures
predict choice of the prosocial lottery. In line with previous evidence, we find
that higher cognitive skills, higher levels of self-control, higher levels of altruism,
and stronger emphatic concerns all positively predict altruistic choice. Our data
shows no direct effects of agreeableness – a component of the big five personal-
ity inventory – and gender, once other factors are controlled for. The correlates
of altruistic lottery choice reported in column 1 square with previous evidence.
Column 2 reports a regression run on the joint sample of the lottery treat-
ment and the deterministic choice treatment. We again include the above men-
tioned personality measures as regressors as well as a full set of interaction terms
of our personality measures with an indicator variable that equals 1 for observa-
tions from the baseline condition and 0 otherwise. We only display estimates of
the interaction effects in the table, since the main effects are identical to those
reported in column 1. We find that none of the measures differentially predicts
altruistic choice in the baseline sample relative to the lottery sample (p> 0.1 for
all interaction terms). Taken together, these results strongly suggest that our lot-
tery choice data allows for a categorization of more altruistic versus more selfish
types that is essentially identical to the categorization that we would have ob-
tained from having subjects choose directly between saving a life and receiving
100 euros.
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Table 5.C.1. Correlates of prosocial choice in lottery treatment and the deterministic
choice treatment
Dependent variable:
Lottery choice (1 if altruistic, 0 if selsh)








Big 5 - agreeableness 0.005 -0.017
(0.010) (0.015)
Preferences module: altruism 0.220*** -0.025
(0.034) (0.049)
Preferences module: positive reciprocity -0.040 0.000
(0.038) (0.054)
Preferences module: trust 0.026 -0.015
(0.027) (0.043)
IRI - empathic concern 0.028** 0.005
(0.012) (0.017)




Notes: Column 1 tests the predictive power of dierent personality measures for the choice of
the prosocial instead rather than the selsh lottery. Column 2 is the same regression on a joint
sample including the condition with a deterministic choice between life and money instead
of lotteries. The displayed coecients in column 2 are interactions terms with an indicator
that equals 1 for observations from the deterministic choice sample. Ordinary least squares
regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
5.C.2 Robustness of Results
Table 5.C.2 shows that the regressions analyses in the main text are robust to
including a battery of control variables. The regression specifications are identi-
cal to those in Table 5.1 but further include the set of personality measures (all
big five personality traits, the four measures of the Interpersonal Reactivity In-
dex, all measures of the preferences module (Falk et al., 2017), the self-control
score), our measure of cognitive skills, and a gender dummy. The results are
similar to those in Table 5.1.
Table 5.C.2. Additional regression specications with control variables
Short run Long run
Dependent variable (standardized): HShor t−run Self-image Mood HLong−run Self-image Mood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lottery choice: 1 if altruistic, 0 if selsh -0.001 0.444*** -0.694*** -0.116 0.244* 0.139
(0.118) (0.142) (0.171) (0.129) (0.140) (0.187)
Lottery outcome: 1 if life saved, 0 if money received 0.027 0.248* 0.161 -0.277* 0.259* 0.067
(0.104) (0.143) (0.180) (0.143) (0.154) (0.184)
Altruistic lottery choice * life saved 0.087 -0.018 1.243*** 0.064 -0.266 -0.084
(0.147) (0.176) (0.218) (0.181) (0.192) (0.228)
Constant -4.389*** -4.282*** 0.736 -2.740*** -4.116*** -0.460
(0.732) (0.713) (0.818) (0.751) (0.730) (1.043)
HBasel ine Yes Yes
Self-image at begin of session Yes Yes
Mood at begin of session Yes Yes
Big 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Preferences module Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IRI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cognitive intelligence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main eect choice: altruistic lottery .04 .43*** -.07 -.08 .11 .1
Main eect outcome: life saved .07 .24*** .78*** -.24*** .13 .03
R2 .6068 .5746 .3629 .4295 .457 .2047
N 297 297 297 297 297 297
Notes: The regressions results shown in this table replicate the results obtained in Table 5.1 of the main text but include a set of control
variables as a test of robustness. Ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
204 | 5 Negative Long-run Eects of Prosocial Behavior on Happiness
In addition, we recognize that a least squares regression implicitly interprets
the measurements of self-reported happiness, self-image and mood scores as if
they were interval data. Table 5.C.3 shows estimates from ordered probit regres-
sions, which accommodate the fact that these data are better characterized as
having an ordinal scale instead. We show estimates for ordered response model
specifications that are equivalent to the least squares specifications in the main
text (Table 5.1). The qualitative results are similar to those in the least squares
analysis.
Table 5.C.3. Alternative probit specication for main analyses
Short run Long run
Dependent variable (standardized): HShor t−run Self-image Mood HLong−run Self-image Mood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
main
Lottery choice: 1 if altruistic, 0 if selsh 0.223 0.549** -0.728*** -0.117 0.339** 0.163
(0.191) (0.214) (0.172) (0.182) (0.170) (0.179)
Lottery outcome: 1 if life saved, 0 if money received 0.098 0.357* 0.221 -0.432** 0.376* 0.145
(0.190) (0.206) (0.215) (0.200) (0.201) (0.195)
Altruistic lottery choice * life saved 0.091 0.026 1.399*** 0.144 -0.379 -0.132
(0.266) (0.261) (0.247) (0.255) (0.250) (0.245)
HBasel ine 1.188*** 0.829***
(0.157) (0.099)
Self-image at begin of session 0.822*** 0.618***
(0.084) (0.065)
Mood at begin of session 0.126** 0.196***
(0.050) (0.043)
Main eect choice: altruistic lottery .269** .562*** -.028 -.045 .15 .098
Main eect outcome: life saved .143** .369*** .921*** -.359*** .187 .08
N 297 297 297 297 297 297
Notes: The displayed regression results replicate the main results from Table 1 using ordered probit estimation, which recognizes that
the response data is ordinal rather than interval. The table shows regression coecients, not partial eects. Coecients for cut points
not displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Appendix 5.D Instructions
Instructions used in the laboratory experiment, the reminder emails and the
follow-up online survey were translated from German into English. Please con-
tact the authors for the German instructions.
5.D.1 Laboratory Session
Welcome and thank you for your interest in this study!
For your participation you will receive a fixed payment of 10.00 €, which
will be paid to you by bank transfer after the study. In this study you will
take decisions on the computer. Depending on how you decide you can earn
additional money.
During the entire study it is not allowed to talk to other participants. Please
turn off your mobile phone now, so that other participants will not be disturbed.
Please only use the designated functions on the computer and make your
entries using the keyboard and the mouse. If you have questions, please make
a hand signal. Your question will be answered at your seat.
On the next screens you will see detailed information concerning the participa-
tion in this study. After reading this information you can confirm or refuse your
participation.
To proceed click "Next".
[end of screen]
Information on Participation in this Study of the BonnEconLab
The following information have been sent to you via email together with the
confirmation of your registration for this study. You receive this information
again now. Once you have read the subsequent declaration of consent you can
confirm your participation by clicking on “I agree”.
[ followed by mandated exclusion restrictions for participation in this study ]
[end of screen]
Information
In the following you will see important information, which are relevant for your
subsequent decisions. They are about the disease tuberculosis and its possible
treatment. Please read all information carefully.




Tuberculosis – also called consumptiveness or White Death – is an infectious
disease, which is caused by bacteria. Roughly one third of all humans are
infected with the pathogen of tuberculosis. Active tuberculosis breaks out
among 5 to 10 % of all those infected. Tuberculosis is primarily airborne. This
is also why a quick treatment is necessary.
What are the symptoms of tuberculosis?
Tuberculosis patients often suffer from very inspecific symptoms like fatigue,
feeling of weakness, lack of appetite and weight loss. At an advanced stage of
lung tuberculosis, the patient coughs up blood, leading to the so-called rush of
blood.Without treatment a person with tuberculosis dies with a probability
of 43 %.
How prevalent is tuberculosis?
In the year 2014, 6 million people have been recorded as falling ill with active
tuberculosis. Almost 1.5 million people die of tuberculosis each year. This
means more deaths due to tuberculosis than due to HIV, malaria or any other
infectious disease.
Is tuberculosis curable?
Today tuberculosis is curable. Treatment is administered by giving antibiotics
several times each week over a period of 6 months. It is important that there
is no interruption of treatment. In the years 2000 to 2014 approximately 43
million human lives could be saved due to an effective diagnosis and treatment
of tuberculosis. The success rate of treatment for a new infection is often
above 85 %.
The preceding numbers and information were provided by the World Health
Organization (WHO), the United Nations’ institution for the international
public health, and are freely available. You can check this information on the
web page of the WHO after this study.
[end of screen]
Description of the Decision
In the course of this study there is an Option A and an Option B. Option A
and Option B have different consequences. One of these two options will be
implemented for you. That means, this option will be implemented with all its
consequences exactly as described.
Next the consequences of Option A and Option B will be explained to you in de-
208 | 5 Negative Long-run Eects of Prosocial Behavior on Happiness
Figure 5.D.1. Picture shown to subjects in instructions. Typical symptoms of
a tuberculosis patient. Source: http://www.opasha.org.
tail. After that you will see a decision situation, in which you will have to make
a choice. By means of your choice in this decision situation you can influence
which of the two options – Option A or Option B – will be implemented for you.
Option A
If Option A is implemented for you, you will be paid an additional monetary
amount of 100.00 € by bank transfer after the study.
Option B
If Option B is implemented for you, you will not receive an additional payment.
This option has another consequence: You save one human life if Option B is
implemented.
After it has emerged which option will be implemented for you, it will be
carried out exactly as described.
On the next tab you will receive more information about the implementation of
Option B.
[end of screen]
Information about Option B
How will the human life be saved?
Only if Option B is carried out for you, you will save a human life.
If this option is implemented, a donation of 350.00 € will be arranged on your
behalf to an organization which identifies and treats people suffering from
tuberculosis. This donation will be executed for you by the BonnEconLab after
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the study. The entire donation amount will be used by the organization for the
direct treatment of tuberculosis.
What does it mean to “save a life”?
To save a human life here means the successful cure from tuberculosis for one
person, who otherwise would have died due to his tuberculosis. That means
in particular: The donation amount is sufficient to identify and cure as many
sick persons such that there is at least one person among these, who would
otherwise have died from tuberculosis in expectation. The calculation of the
amount accommodates the fact that there are other ways (e.g., the national
health care system) through which people can be cured.
That means: The amount of 350.00 € was calculated in such a way that the
organization can save at least one additional human from death.
On the next tab you will receive additional information about the possible saving




In case of Option B being implemented you will save one human life. For this
an amount of 350.00 € will be transferred to the organization Operation ASHA
after the study.
Operation ASHA is a charity organization specialized since 2005 on treating
Figure 5.D.2. Picture shown to subjects in instructions: Logo of organization
Operation ASHA. Source: http://www.opasha.org.
tuberculosis in disadvantaged communities. The work of Operation ASHA is
based on the insight that the biggest obstacle for the treatment of tuberculosis
is the interruption of the necessary 6-month-long regular intake of medication.
For a successful treatment the patient has to come to a medical facility twice a
week – more than 60 times in total – to take the medication. An interruption
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or termination of the treatment is fatal, because this strongly enhances the
development of a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis. This form of tuberculosis
is much more difficult to treat and almost always leads to death.
To overcome this problem, Operation ASHA developed a concept that guaran-
tees the regular treatment through immediate spatial proximity to the patient.
A possible non-adherence is additionally prevented by visiting the patient at
home.
By now Operation ASHA runs more than 360 treatment centers, almost all of
which are located in the poorer regions of India. More than 60,000 sick persons
have been identified and treated that way.
Operation ASHA is an internationally recognized organization, and their
successes haven been covered by the New York Times, BBC and Deutsche
Welle, for example. The MIT and University College London have already
conducted research projects about the fight against tuberculosis in cooperation
with Operation ASHA. The treatment method employed by Operation ASHA is
described by the World Health Organization (WHO) as “highly efficient and
cost-effective”.
[end of screen]
Figure 5.D.3. icture shown to subjects in instructions: An employee of Op-
eration ASHA provides medication to a tuberculosis patient. Source: http:
//www.opasha.org.
What determines the donation amount for saving a human life?
the donation amount makes sure that at least one human life is saved in
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expectation.
The information used for the calculation of the donation amount exclusively
consists of public statements by the World Health Organization (WHO), peer-
reviewed research studies, statistical releases from the Indian government as
well as published figures from Operation ASHA. In the calculation all informa-
tion was interpreted in a conservative way and more pessimistic estimates were
used in case of doubt, such that the donation amount of 350.00€ is, if anything,
higher than the actual costs associated with saving a human life. Moreover, the
calculation was based on the treatment success rate of Operation ASHA, the
mortality rate of an alternative treatment by the national tuberculosis program
in India, and different detection rates for new cases of tuberculosis have been
accounted for.
Based on a very high number of cases, one can illustrate the contribution of
your donation as follows:
With your donation Operation ASHA can treat 5 additional tuberculosis
patients.
If these 5 sick persons would not be treated by Operation ASHA, one patient
would die in expectation.
If 5 persons are treated by means of your donation, no patient dies in expecta-
tion.
Based on these expected values this means that one human life will be saved
with your donation. This relationship is depicted in the following diagram.
Without treatment by Operation ASHA, one of 5 persons sick of tuberculosis
will die in expectation.
With the donation 5 persons sick of tuberculosis can be treated by Operation
ASHA and none of these persons will die in expectation.
An agreement with Operation ASHA for the purpose of this study ensures
that 100 % of the donation amount will exclusively be used for the diagnosis
and treatment of tuberculosis patients. That means that every euro of the
donation amount will directly go into saving human lives and no other costs
will be covered with it.
[end of screen]
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Figure 5.D.4. Picture shown to subjects in instructions. Top: Illustration of
Option A. Without treatment by Operation ASHA, one of 5 persons sick of
tuberculosis will die in expectation. Bottom: Illustration of Option B. With
the donation 5 persons sick of tuberculosis can be treated by Operation
ASHA and none of these persons will die in expectation.
Summary
Tuberculosis
The success rate of medical treatment for a new infection is very high. Despite
this 1.5 million people die from tuberculosis each year. The biggest obstacle
for the cure of tuberculosis is a possible termination of the regular treatment
with antibiotics. The concept of Operation ASHA is therefore based on the direct
spatial proximity to their patients and on the control and recording of the
regular intake of medication.
Option A, Option B and your decision
Exactly one of the two options will be carried out for you after the study. The
options have different consequences:
• In case of an implementation of Option A you will receive an additional
amount of money.
• In case of an implementation of Option B you will save a human life. Con-
cretely, for Option B a donation of 350.00 € will be paid on your behalf,
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which is sufficient not only to cure one person, but to actually save that
person from death by tuberculosis.
In the following decision situation you will take a choice through which
you can influence which of the two options – Option A or Option B – will be
implemented for you.
How is the human life saved?
The donation amount already accounts for the fact that a sick person could also
have survived without treatment by Operation ASHA; or that he could instead
have been treated by the national health care system. This is why the amount is
sufficient for the diagnosis and complete treatment of several affected persons.
Please note:
This is not a hypothetical game. The option to be implemented for you will
actually be carried out – exactly as described – on behalf of the BonnEconLab.
As a proof you will receive the money in case of Option A; in case of an
implementation of Option B we will allow inspection of the confirmed bank
transfer to the organization Operation ASHA on request.
If you have individual questions, you can also direct these by email after the
study to nachbesprechung@uni-bonn.de. You find this email address on the
back of your seating card. You can take it home with you.
Click on “Next”, if you have carefully read the information on this page.
Please note: You can only click on the button “Next” once you have spent at least
5 minutes on the seven tabs of this page.
[end of screen]
Your decision
On the next screen you can choose between two lotteries, Lottery 1 and Lottery
2.
Lottery 1
With 60 % probability, Option A is implemented for you.
With 40 % probability, Option B is implemented for you.
Lottery 2
With 40 % probability, Option A is implemented for you.
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With 60 % probability, Option B is implemented for you.
This means: With your choice of a lottery you can determine whether rather
Option A or rather Option B shall be implemented for you.
The lottery is played as follows: After you have chosen one of the two lotteries,
the computer will draw a random number. The drawn random number is one
of the numbers from 1 to 10.
If you have opted for Lottery 1, Option A will be implemented only if the
drawn random number is a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Option B will be implemented if
the drawn random number is a 7, 8, 9 or 10.
If you have opted for Lottery 2, Option A will be implemented only if the drawn
random number is a 1, 2, 3 or 4. Option B will be implemented if the drawn
random number is a 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10.
Remember:
• In case of an implementation of Option A you will receive an additional
amount of money of 100.00 €.
• In case of an implementation of Option B you will save a human life. Con-
cretely, for Option B a donation of 350.00 € will be paid on your behalf,
which is sufficient not only to cure one person, but to actually save that
person from death by tuberculosis.
Please note:
1. All statements in these instructions are true. In particular, all consequences
that are described in the instructions will be implemented exactly as de-
scribed. This holds generally for all studies of the Bonn lab for research in
experimental economics, and also for this study.
2. Anonymity: No other participant of this study can see your decision. The
subsequent analysis of all data is performed in an anonymized way, such
that your decisions cannot be linked to your person anymore.
[end of screen]
Decision
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I choose Lottery 1
With 60 %: I receive 100.00 €.
With 40 %: I save one human life.
I choose Lottery 2
With 40 %: I receive 100.00 €.
With 60 %: I save one human life.
[end of screen]
Result
You chose [Lottery 1 / Lottery 2].
The random number drawn for you is a [1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10].
Bank transfer to you: [0.00€ / 100.00€] Bank transfer to Operation ASHA:
[0.00 € / 350.00 €]
5.D.2 Reminder Emails and Survey
Email 1 (after 1 week)
Dear [ first name last name ]!
Thank you very much for your participation in our study from [ date of
study, time of study ]. In the context of this study, you could make a decision
about whether you rather want a human life to be saved for you, or whether
you rather want to receive an additional payment of 100 €.
[ Either: ] At the end of the study you were informed that you receive an
additional payment of 100 €.
[ Or: ] At the end of the study you were informed that you arranged for a
donation in the amount of 350 € for the treatment and cure of tuberculosis
patients, such that one human life is saved in expectation.
The corresponding bank transfer is currently in process.
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We will notify you again as soon as the bank transfers are entered.
Yours sincerely,
BonnEconLab
Email 2 (after 3 weeks)
Dear [ first name last name ]
Thank you very much for your participation in our study from [ date of
study, time of study ].
[Either:] In the context of this study you received an additional payment of
100 €!
The corresponding bank transfer has been executed in the meantime and is
credited to your bank account.
[Or:] In the context of this study you have arranged for a donation in the
amount of 350 € for the treatment and cure of tuberculosis patients. This way
you saved one human life in expectation!
The corresponding bank transfer has been executed in the meantime and is
credited to the bank account of Operation ASHA.




Survey (after 4 weeks)
To remind you: The study that you participated in was about either saving
a human life or receiving an amount of money.
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[Either:] Due to your participation you have received an additional payoff
of 100 €for yourself! This considerable amount of money has been transferred
to you in the meantime.
With your amount of money you saved no human life in expectation!
[Or:] Due to your participation you have arranged for a donation in the
amount of 350 € for the treatment and cure of tuberculosis patients. This con-
siderable amount of money has been transferred in the meantime and will now
benefit people in great distress.
With your amount of money you saved one human life in expectation!
